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
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THE

SCIENCE OF RHETORIC:

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AN INTRODUCTION TO THE

LAWS OF EFFECTIVE DISCOURSE

BY  
DAVID J. HILL, LL.D.,

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RHETORICAL SERIES AND THE ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY.

"These rules, of old discovered, not devised,  
Are Nature still, but Nature methodized."

FOR

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# PREFACE

THIS book is not designed as an introduction to English composition, but rather as a systematic presentation of the laws of discourse, for advanced classes.

Most of the text-books on Rhetoric take a one-sided view of the subject. Dr. Whately has treated Rhetoric as a branch of Logic, making it "the art of inventing and arranging arguments;" Dr. Blair treats it as department of applied Æsthetics, as if it were a purely critical art; Dr. Theremin regards it as belonging to Ethics, as if eloquence were a virtue. This little work aims to explain the whole theory of effective discourse, for whatever purpose and in whatever form it may be used. The specific province of the rhetorician is to render given ideas effective in producing mental changes in others. Rhetoric treats of thought militant. Logic furnishes conceptions which are formally *true*; Æsthetics, conceptions which are *beautiful*; Ethics, conceptions which are *just*. Rhetoric takes these conceptions and establishes them in the mind of another.

Rhetoricians have frequently regarded Invention as a part of Rhetoric. Invention implies the production of some particular kind of thought, conditioned by the nature of the subject-matter. What propositions are

to be maintained by the lawyer, the theologian, the scientist, or the critic, must depend upon the facts of law, theology, science and criticism. The methods of investigation are different in the various departments of thought. Hence no truly useful rules can be given on this subject. The truth has been forcibly stated by John Stuart Mill. He says : "Invention, though it can be cultivated, cannot be reduced to rule ; there is no science which will enable a man to bethink himself of that which will suit his purpose. But when he *has* thought of something, science will tell him whether that which he has thought of will suit his purpose or not."

Disposition has often been made a distinct division of Rhetoric. The arrangement of matter contributes greatly to the effectiveness of discourse, but is so conditioned by the nature of the subject-matter, that it cannot properly be made a distinct department of rhetorical science. The parts of a Description, Narration, Exposition, or Argument should be arranged according to the specific laws of these different kinds of discourse. Disposition has been treated in connection with the different classes of ideas, and not as a distinct topic. No recognition is taken of the traditional division of a Discourse into (1) Introduction, (2) Division, (3) Narration, (4) Explication, and (5) Peroration. This is regarded as mechanical and conventional. There is often nothing to divide, or nothing to narrate, or nothing to explicate. All this depends upon the nature of the subject-matter. As a rule, the less conventional the division of a discourse the better.

It has been customary to introduce into works on Rhetoric some discussion of Taste, Beauty, Sublimity

etc. These topics belong strictly to *Æsthetics*, a division of science well worthy of the attention which is now bestowed upon it by advanced educators, and which will soon co-ordinate with Logic and Ethics as a study in the college curriculum. It is as reasonable to discuss the nature of *truth* or of *right* in a text-book on Rhetoric, as to admit the discussion of Taste, Beauty and Sublimity. Surely there is as good a reason why our sentiments should be true and just, as why they should be beautiful.

Elocution has long been regarded as a part of Rhetoric, but it is by itself too important and extensive subject to be treated as a division of rhetorical science. It does, indeed, contribute to render spoken discourse more effective, but so does elegant chirography or clear typography improve the effectiveness of written thought. Rhetoric treats of discourse in general, not of written or spoken discourse in particular.

It has been common in treatises on Rhetoric to give some account of the Origin and Progress of Language. There is no reason why this subject should be treated of in connection with Rhetoric, since language is neither a more nor a less perfect instrument of expression from our knowing its origin and history. The Science of Language is now an independent department of knowledge, and deserves attention as such.

Rhetoricians have frequently included the Forms of Composition as a part of their science. It is evident that completed literary works, such as epics, dramas, histories, novels, etc., belong to Literature, and their classification pertains to the critical section of that department. If it be claimed that Rhetoric treats of the means whereby these forms of composition

are made excellent, it may be answered that the production of such works involves two processes : (1) that of rendering certain given ideas effective ; and (2) that of selecting and combining suitable ideas for a particular kind of composition. The first process is rhetorical, and is the same in all composition ; the second is technical, and conditioned by the purpose of the writer ; the first is the work of the rhetorician ; the second is the work of the dramatist, historian, or novelist, *as such*. The poet and the theologian alike make use of Rhetoric, but, in addition, the poet must study Poetics, and the preacher Homiletics. Rhetoric is not the science of play-writing or of preaching, but of rendering given ideas effective, whether in a play or in a sermon.

The old terms Purity, Propriety, Precision, Clearness, Vivacity, etc., have not been used in this treatise, partly because some of them are vague from their figurative use, but chiefly because they are not *distinct* qualities of Style, and the division of properties denoted by them involves repetition or incompleteness.

Having given reasons for the exclusion of some topics which have commonly appeared in works on Rhetoric, I shall now explain why some new ones have been inserted.

Sufficient prominence has not been given to the relation between thought and its expression. This topic has been somewhat fully discussed in the Introduction.

The advantages and disadvantages of language as a medium of expression in comparison with other means of communicating ideas, have been fully exhibited, in order that the peculiar conditions of verbal expression might be realized.

The consideration of the Laws of Mind may seem strange to those who have regarded Rhetoric as dealing only with the communication of thought. But if the rhetorical process aims at effecting mental changes, the laws according to which those changes must take place form an important part of rhetorical science. The treatment of Age as furnishing particular laws of mind, is not new. In Aristotle's Rhetoric, three chapters are devoted to this topic. Experience and Affiliation are not less important modifiers of the human mind, and deserve the closest attention of the rhetorician.

That expression is conditioned by the nature of the idea to be conveyed is vaguely acknowledged by most works on Rhetoric. The Laws of Idea, based upon the essential nature of the four elementary classes of ideas, are believed to be of great importance.

The Laws of Form are here for the first time derived from a single principle. The Law of Mental Economy, as enunciated by Spencer, has been so modified and developed as to refer all the valid precepts of Style to a single law, thus affording to Expression what Aristotle's *dictum* affords to Deductive Reasoning. Taken in connection with the laws of Association, his Law of Economy at once explains the great value of Figurative Language, and furnishes rational rules for its use.

A systematic analysis, by insuring a progressive exposition and avoiding repetition, enables the learner to master the whole work in a very short time. Notwithstanding the compendious form in which the subject is presented, it is believed that the student will be able to see the reason for everything as he proceeds, and it is hoped that teachers who may use the book will be able

to supplement it with oral illustrations. The Exercises at the end of the book are regarded as an important addition, and their use in the class-room may be made highly profitable. The topical method seems to be the only proper mode of recitation for advanced students, and this work has been especially designed for that method. The headings, however, may be used as questions by those who prefer the catechetical method of reciting.

It is not claimed that any new precepts of composition have been derived from the treatment here adopted. The merit of the plan is believed to be simply that of scientific analysis, furnishing the *rationale* of such rules as have long been laid down by rhetoricians. Astronomy creates no new celestial movements; it simply aids us in comprehending those which were observed but not understood by the earliest shepherds of our race. Rhetoric cannot *make* laws for composition, but it can *discover* them, and explain why poetry pleases and eloquence wins, by referring their effects to the laws of mind and language.

DAVID J. HILL.

July, 1877.



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# INTRODUCTION

## 1. Essential Elements of Discourse.

Every sentence is designed to communicate an *idea*, and employs language as the *medium* of communication. The idea may be definite to the mind of the communicator, but vague to the interpreter of the sentence. This is because the medium does not always perfectly reveal the idea. There is obviously such a distinction between the idea and the medium as to present two classes of facts for our consideration.

## 2. The Relations of Thought and Language.

A proper conception of the relations of an idea and its medium of expression, is of primary importance. As the question belongs both to Linguistics and to Logic, we shall cite authorities from both sciences.

(1) **Language and Thought Separable.**—After showing that thought is antecedent to expression, Professor Whitney says: “Language, then, is the spoken means whereby thought is communicated, and it is only that. Language is not thought, nor is thought language; nor is there a mysterious and indissoluble connection between the two, as there is between soul and body, so that the one cannot exist and manifest itself without the other. There can hardl-

be a greater and more pernicious error, in linguistics or in metaphysics, than the doctrine that language and thought are identical. . . The body would be neither comfortable nor comely, if not clad ; cotton and wool would be of little use, but for machinery making quick and cheap their conversion into cloth ; and, in a truly analogous way, thought would be awkward, feeble, and indistinct, without the dress, the apparatus, which is afforded by language. Our denial of the identity of thought with its expression does not compel us to abate one jot or tittle of the exceeding value of speech to thought ; it only puts that value upon its proper basis."\*

(2) **Language an Aid to Thought.**— Although thought and its expression are distinct, words furnish an indispensable aid to intricate or long continued thinking. The manner in which assistance is afforded is thus illustrated by Sir William Hamilton : " A country may be overrun by an armed host, but it is only conquered by the establishment of fortresses. Words are the fortresses of thought. They enable us to realize our dominion over what we have already overrun in thought ; to make every intellectual conquest the basis of operations for others still beyond. Or another illustration : You have all heard of the process of tunneling through a sand-bank. In this operation it is impossible to succeed, unless every foot, nay almost every inch in our progress, be secured by an arch of masonry, before we attempt the excavation of another. Now, language is to the mind precisely what the arch is to the tunnel. The power of thinking and the power of excavating are not dependent on the word in

\* Whitney's *Language and the Study of Language*.

the one case, on the mason-work in the other; but without these subsidiaries, neither process could be carried on beyond its rudimentary commencement. Though, therefore, we allow that every movement forward in language must be determined by an antecedent movement forward in thought; still, unless thought be accompanied at each point of evolution, by a corresponding evolution of language, its further development is arrested."\*

(3) **Language Abbreviates Thinking.**— In addition to their recording power, but growing out of it, is the power of words to take the place of a complex conception, and thus to become an object of thought, or thought itself. Leibnitz was the first to distinguish between *symbolical* and *intuitive* conceptions. When our notion of an object consists of a clear insight into all its essential attributes, it is intuitive. When, on the contrary, our notion is so complex that we do not at once realize all its properties, it is symbolical. When we use the words *state*, *church*, *deity*, designating complex notions which we fully realize only after analysis, the *word*, and not what it signifies, is the thought. If we use the word in a single sense, and the propositions containing it are true, such a symbol abbreviates the processes of thought without inaccuracy.

(4) **Language Vitiates Thought.**— Meaningless combinations often result from the union of *symbols* instead of *things*. This was the error of the schoolmen, who toyed with the signs of things without comparing things themselves. Much of the so-called "subjective poetry" is of this description. Such is Dryden's stanza :

\* *Lectures on Logic.*

" From harmony, from heavenly harmony  
 This universal frame began ;  
 From harmony to harmony  
 Through all the compass of the notes it ran  
 The diapason closing full in man."

'In these sonorous lines," Dr. Campbell says  
 'there is not even a glimpse of meaning."

(5) **Language an Instrument of Analysis.**—The eye conveys to the mind an impression of an action as a whole, but language is necessarily analytic. This important property of language has been described as follows by Archbishop Thomson : "As the mind does not receive impressions passively, but reflects upon them, decomposes them into their elements, and compares them with notions already stored up, language, the close-fitting dress of our thoughts, is always analytical,—it does not body forth a mere picture of facts, but displays the working of the mind upon the facts submitted to it, with the order in which it regards them. This analysis has place even in the simplest descriptions. 'The bird is flying' is an account of one object which we behold, and in its present condition. But the object was single, while our description calls up two notions—'bird' and 'flying,'—and it is plain that this difference is the result of an analysis which the mind has performed, separating, in thought, the bird from its present action of flying, and then mentioning them together. In painting and sculpture, on the contrary, we have languages that do not employ analysis ; and a picture or statue would be called by some a *synthetic*, or compositive sign, from the notion that in it all the elements and qualities of the object which would have been mentioned separately in a de-

scription, are *thrown together* and represented at one view. The statue of the Dying Gladiator gives at one glance all the principal qualities so finely analyzed by the following description, which, however, includes also the poet's reflections upon and inferences from the qualities he observes; the *objective* impression is described, but with a development of the *subjective* condition into which it throws the narrator.

"I see before me the Gladiator lie:

He leans upon his hand—his manly brow  
Consents to death but conquers agony,  
And his drooped head sinks gradually low—  
And through his side the last drops, ebbing slow  
From the red gash, fall heavy one by one,  
Like the first of a thunder shower; and now  
The arena swims around him—he is gone,

And ceased the inhuman shout which hailed the wretch who  
won.

He heard it, but he heeded not—his eyes  
Were with his heart, and that was far away;  
He recked not of the life he lost, nor prize,  
But where his rude hut by the Danube lay:  
There were his young barbarians all at play,  
There was their Dacian mother—he, their sire,  
Butchered to make a Roman holiday!  
All this rushed with his blood—shall he expire  
And unavenged? Arise, ye Goths, and glut your ire!

BYRON.

'Here the analysis of the impression is carried to its farthest; and in the second stanza the object becomes quite subordinate to the inferences and fancies of the subject. But it is all the more striking as an illustration of the principle, that language presents to

as the analysis, as painting and sculpture the imitations, of a sensible impression." \*

With the progress of the human intellect, language becomes less synthetic and more analytic, in order to express new distinctions.

### 3. Modes of Expressing Ideas.

It is important for the comprehension of discourse to dwell upon the various modes of expressing ideas, and the peculiar advantages and disadvantages of language as a medium of expression.

When a landscape is spread before the eye, we receive impressions of form, relation, color and motion. These, united into a complex whole, give to the mind a conception of the landscape. Now let the observer be removed from the place, and try to convey that conception to another. Memory may retain every feature of the scene. The idea may be complete. The problem is to communicate that idea to another mind.

(1) **Drawing.**—This may be done by drawing. If so, the outlines of each object may be perfect. The shading may be an accurate representation of the gradation of light on the natural objects. The relations of the parts may be exact. The perspective may be so true as to fulfill all the requirements of optical laws. Yet color and motion, the two vital elements of nature, must be wanting.

(2) **Painting.**—In order to convey the idea still more fully, the observer may resort to the painter's brush. As before, outline, shade, perspective, relation of parts, are all true to nature, and now color enlivens the scene. The sky is warmed with the blush of dawn,

\* Thomson's *Outline of the Laws of Thought*.

the grass and leaves are animated with their own green life, and the curling smoke of the cottage is no longer of the same hue with the cloud. Yet, on closer inspection, the incessant stir of natural life is wanting. there is no motion in the scene.

(3) **Sculpture.**—Next the chisel of the sculptor chips the white dust from the marble, until the scene is evoked from its smooth surface, and stands out in relief. If now the painter adds color, the work combines the skill of the draughtsman, the sculptor and the painter. Formal art has exhausted itself. Still there is no motion. That fisherman has been looking steadily into the water for months and years, and has caught nothing. It is as if a flood of liquid glass had suddenly crept over the scene, holding all in its crystalline death-grip. To represent a five minutes' view of the landscape would require a hundred pictures. Motion, the most ceaseless and admirable principle of all material existence, baffles the painter and sculptor, and time, the measure of motion, is beyond all the arts of pencil and chisel.

(4) **Language.**—See now how Language airily lifts the foot to the step which Painting cannot touch with her longing finger-tips. Even Painting cannot express this idea :

“ *Missing thee I walk unseen  
On the dry, smooth-shaven green,  
To behold the wandering moon  
Riding near her highest noon,  
Like one that had been led astray,  
Through the heaven's wide pathless way  
And oft, as if her head she bowed,  
Steoping through a fleecy cloud.*”

The poet has described a scene which the painter



cannot represent. The painter may place the moon in the zenith, bursting through a maze of silvery mist, so that the active imagination might infer motion, but the motion itself, which language so easily expresses in "stooping as if her head she bowed," defies all formal art.

#### 4. Restrictions of Formal Art.

(1) **Motion.**—We have just seen how any merely imitative art is restricted from the representation of motion. The last example sufficiently illustrates the limitation.

(2) **Time.**—Painting or Sculpture can scarcely tell a story involving a succession of incidents, except as they hint the narrative to such minds as are given to reflection on the relations of cause and effect. Mr. Ruskin has given a description of one of Tintoret's paintings, in which the power of the artist's invention is displayed by the ingenious triumph over the most formidable obstacles of his art :

"In the center of the gallery at Parma, there is a canvas of Tintoret's whose sublimity of conception and grandeur of color are seen in the highest perfection, by their opposition to the morbid and vulgar sentimentalism of Correggio. It is an Entombment of Christ, with a landscape distance. . . . An ordinary or unimaginative painter would have made prominent, among his objects of landscape, such as might naturally be supposed to have been visible from the sepulcher, and shown with the crosses of Calvary some portion of Jerusalem, or of the Valley of Jehoshaphat. But Tintoret has a far higher aim. Dwelling on the peculiar force of the event before him, as the fulfillment of the final prophecy respecting the passion, 'He made his grave with the wicked and with the rich in his death,' he desires to direct the mind of the spectator to this receiving of the body of Christ, in its contrast with the houseless birth and the desert life. And, therefore, behind the ghastly tomb-grass that shakes

its black and withered blades above the rocks of the sepulcher, there is seen, not the actual material distance of the spot itself (though the crosses are shown faintly) but that to which the thoughtful spirit would return in vision, a desert place, where the foxes have holes and the birds of the air have nests, and against the barred twilight of the melancholy sky are seen the moldering beams and shattered roofing of a ruined cattle-shed -- the canopy of the nativity."\*

This is exquisite, but altogether too subtle for general apprehension. Features of this kind are generally overlooked, because the appreciation of them depends on an acuteness of perception not universally possessed. It may be held, therefore, that painting has no power of its own to express ideas of *time*. It here meets a limitation which is no barrier to diction. The painter must seize his subject at the one favorable moment; and here is another limitation, since all moments are not equally favorable.

(3) **Power.**—Power, the cause of motion, may be suggested in painting, but it is with difficulty that unusual power can be expressed. Homer, speaking of Minerva's attack upon Mars, says :

" But she, retiring, with strong grasp upheaved  
A rugged stone, black, ponderous from the plain,  
A landmark fixed by men of ancient times."

Lessing, commenting on this passage, expresses his views thus :

" In order properly to estimate the greatness of this stone, we must remember that Homer makes his heroes for the nonce as strong as the strongest man in his day; but he makes those men whom Nestor knew

\* *Modern Painters*, Vol. 1.

in his youth surpass them in strength. Now, I ask, with respect to this stone, which not one man out of the men of Nestor's youthful contemporaries could have put down for a boundary stone,—now, I ask, if Minerva had thrown such a stone at Mars, of what stature must the goddess be? If her stature is to be proportioned to the greatness of the stone, then the wonder ceases. A man who is three times larger than I am must naturally be able to throw a stone three times greater. But if the stature of the goddess be not proportioned to the greatness of the stone, then there arises an evident improbability in the painting the repulsiveness of which is not removed by the cold reflection that a goddess must have superhuman strength. Where I see an effect greater than usual, I expect to find an instrument greater than usual. And Mars overthrown by this mighty stone, 'covered ten acres.' It is impossible that the painter could give this extraordinary size to the god, but if he does not give it him, then Mars does not lie upon the ground, like the Homeric Mars, but like a common warrior." \*

(4) **Penetrative Imagination.**—A consideration of great importance to the relative value of the various modes of expression is, that the best results of the penetrative imagination, the power which reaches to the essential constitution of things, cannot be expressed by any formal art. The genius of Tintoret again vindicates the wondrous powers of painting, but we must be content with a reference to Ruskin's description of his "Massacre of the Innocents." †

\* *Laocoon*. Sir Robert Phillimore's Translation.

† Ruskin's *Modern Painters*, vol. 1.

'The limit of formal art will be seen by a study of the following description of "Death."

"As silent and dark as a shadow, unmoved as a stone  
That standeth all day in the desert, unseen and alone,  
Waiteth Death: no breeze touches her *mantle that falleth right  
down.*

*Over feet that we see not and hands that we see not; a frown  
Seems to drift down the distance and blight the fresh pastures  
of life,*

And an *icy breath* seems to flow from her and *make the air rife  
With tremblings.*"

"Over feet that we see not and hands that we see not!" What combination of line and color can present this subtle image? If *unseen*, surely not to be expressed in line and color. The painter and sculptor drape those unseen hands and feet, but then how shall they be expressed? How shall any formal art express the idea of the "air rife with the tremblings of her icy breath?"

Another forcible illustration of the inability of painting to represent the results of the penetrative imagination is found in the mist with which Homer envelops his heroes when he makes them invisible to mortals. Painting has sometimes attempted to represent this invisibility by placing a thin cloud between the hero and those from whom he is supposed to be concealed. Lessing has pointed out the absurdity of introducing this cloud into painting.

## 5. Restrictions of Language.

(1) **Lessing's Limitation.**—Lessing seems to have gone too far in his generalization of the proper spheres of poetry and painting. He truly says: "Painting makes use of figures and colors in *space*. Poetry

of articulate sounds in *time*. The signs of the former are natural; those of the latter are arbitrary." But he seems to err when he adds: "Express painting of bodies [by which he means description] is forbidden to poetry." Mackintosh well asks what Chinese artist could paint a butterfly better than Spenser.

"The velvet nap which on his wings doth lie,  
The silken down with which his back is dight,  
His broad outstretched horns, his hairy thighs,  
His glorious colors and his glistening eyes!"\*

Here is a picture from Hood which is its own justification against this limitation:

"Loud hissed the sea beneath her lee—my little boat flew fast,  
But faster still the rushing storm came borne upon the blast.  
Lord! what a roaring hurricane beset the straining sail!  
What furious sleet, with level drift, and fierce assaults of hail  
What darksome caverns yawned before! what jagged steeps  
behind!

Like battle steeds, with foamy manes, wild tossing in the wind  
Each after each sank down astern, exhausted in the chase,  
But where it sank another rose and galloped in its place;  
As black as night—they turned to white, and cast against the  
cloud

A snowy sheet, as if each surge upturned a sailor's shroud."

If language is not as impressive as painting in express description, it falls little short of it; while in the communication of ideas of time, motion, and the results of the penetrative imagination, language surpasses all other means of expression. Nevertheless, with all these excellences, language has serious disadvantages as a medium of expression.

(2) **The Symbolic Character of Words.**—Words may be distinguished as presentive or symbolic, accord-

\* Quoted by Sir Robert Phillimore.

ing as they do or do not suggest substantive objects to the mind. Thus *at*, *but*, *where*, and *the* present no objects to the mind, and are merely symbols for mental notions. Such words as *lamp*, *post*, *flag-staff*, and *house* do suggest objects to the mind. But aside from this important distinction, all words are symbolic in a broader sense, although, so strong is the tie of association between words and things, we are in danger of forgetting the symbolism. "When barbers' poles were first erected, they were pictorial and presentive, for they indicated by white bands of paint the linen bandages which were used in blood-letting, an operation performed by the old surgeon-barbers. In our time we only know (speaking of the popular mind) that the pole indicates a barber's shop, but why or how is unknown. And this is symbolism."\* Now most of our words have no more connection with the objects they signify than the barber's pole has with shaving or hair-cutting. The connection is purely arbitrary and accidental; not natural and necessary.

(3) **The Uncertainty of Words as a Medium.**—Words are not, then, images of ideas reflected in a faultless mirror. They are not even photographs requiring only the addition of color. They are scarcely "fragmentary sketches," furnishing the bare outlines of an idea, while much must be supplied by the imagination to fill up the picture. However careful and extended our training may have been, it cannot be presumed that we know all the verbal signs in our own language. The child can converse on only a few subjects, and can understand only the most common terms. In this respect all men are more or less

\* Earle's *Philology of the English Tongue*.

children. The English language contains over a hundred thousand words. Of this vast number only a few thousand are used by any single person. To a nucleus of a few hundred common terms every speaker or writer adds many which are peculiar to his profession, his subject, his district, or the social class to which he belongs, but which are unintelligible to the majority of those who speak the same tongue. Each mind, too, has feelings, cognitions, and conceptions which other minds do not have. There are various proper styles of expressing the same idea, depending upon the discernment of different relations and analogies. There are distinctions in thought which all have not made. So we do not speak the same words, or attach to them the same meaning. Thus a liability of being misunderstood or unintelligible belongs to all language however carefully it may be used.

(4) **Language an Impediment.**—Again, language is an actual impediment in the communication of ideas. The shaft which communicates the power of an engine to the machinery is itself an obstruction, since some of the power is required to move the shaft. If it can be reduced in size and weight without failing to transmit the force, so much the better; and, by progressive approach, it follows that it would best serve the purpose when its weight should be reduced to zero. So in language, words are often an incumbrance. A simple pointing to the door is much more impressive than to say, "leave the room." A smile of approbation or of contempt is more suggestive than an elaborate sentence. As power cannot be applied to some kinds of machinery except by a complex system of cog-wheels, so some ideas cannot be expressed except

oy words ; yet the cog-wheels are an incumbrance rendered necessary by the conditions of the case, and so are words. They are media of power, but themselves absorb some of it.

### 6. Excellence of Style Relative.

The perfection of style is, therefore, merely relative, and not absolute. It cannot be perfect in melody, for while sometimes it may glide along with liquid smoothness, at others it must grate upon the ear, or fail to express its contained idea. It cannot be perfect in universality, for, since its signs are conventional, it must change with those to whom it is addressed. The fleeting and mutable elements of language render it impossible for it to be perfect, or even intelligible, for more than a few generations, except in the most mature and stationary languages ; and a stationary living language is impossible among a progressive people. The poems of Chaucer cannot be said to be written in a style which we can recognize as good, until, by the help of a glossary, we become Englishmen of the fourteenth century.

In all these respects, language is placed at a great disadvantage as a means of expression. All men who have eyes may perceive the genius of Zeuxis and Phidias, but Homer and Æschylus are nonentities to the masses of men, unless their works are translated ; in other words, their expression must go for naught, and their ideas must be revealed anew.

### 7. The Difference between Prose and Poetry.

Prose and Poetry are both forms of discourse, and



may be treated together. The distinction between them has been much discussed. Definiteness of view on this subject is necessary to the comprehension of several principles of expression.

(1) **Aristotle's Opinion.**—Aristotle views poetry as consisting in *imitation*. \* But nothing can be farther from imitation than most poetry. “In the first place,” says Professor Masson, “that it is verse at all is a huge deviation in itself from what is in any ordinary sense natural. Men do not talk in good literary prose, much less in blank verse or rhyme. Macbeth, in his utmost strait and horror—Lear, when the lightnings scathed his white head—did not actually talk in meter.” † Goethe declared that art is called art simply because it is *not* nature.

(2) **Bacon's Opinion.**—Bacon makes poetry to consist in *fiction*, and says it is “nothing else but *feigned history*, which may be styled as well in prose as in verse.” ‡

(3) **Coleridge's Opinion.**—Coleridge denies that the true antithesis is between prose and poetry, but asserts that it is between poetry and *science*. §

(4) **Ruskin's Opinion.**—Ruskin, after much reflection, concludes that poetry is “The suggestion by the imagination of noble grounds for noble emotions.” ¶ According to this, Carlyle's *Essays* and the eighth chapter of Paul's *Epistle to the Romans* would be poetry of the highest class.

(5) **Dr. Whately's View.**—Doctor Whately defines his views thus : “Any composition in *verse* (and

\* Aristotle's *Poetic*, Chap. I.

† *Essays Chiefly on the English Poets*.

‡ *Advancement of Learning*.

§ *Works*, vol. ii.

¶ *Modern Painters*, vol. ii.

none that is not) is always called, whether good or bad, a poem, by all who have no favorite hypothesis to maintain."\* Mr. De Quincey has invalidated the Archbishop's position by showing that, on a question not of fact but of opinion, those are cited as the best authority who professedly have no opinion.†

(6) **The True Difference Based on Effects.**—Failing to find satisfaction from those who have discussed the subject, let us attempt an analysis. If prose and poetry are really distinguished by any difference, it does not lie wholly in the *form*, since that has changed from age to age. Again, since poetry is recognized by all civilized races, there must be something in *man* which makes the difference. We find in man three classes of powers; the *intellect*, the *feelings*, and the *will*. If we observe the effect of discourse upon the mind, we shall find that three distinct kinds of effect are produced, which lead men to distinguish *common prose*, *poetry*, and *eloquence*. When ideas are addressed chiefly to the *intellect*, we say they are *prosaic*; when to the *feelings*, that they are *poetical*; when to the *will*, that they are *eloquent*. Ruskin's prose is often poetical; some of Pope's poetry is confessedly prosaic. Thus far for the distinction of prose and poetry as related to *idea*. There is another element, *form*. Strong emotions and eager passions spontaneously express themselves by a rhythmical movement. Love, death, and war move men to what in ordinary circumstances they would not attempt—the writing of verse. Meter, rhythm, and, in uninflected languages, rhyme, are the natural forms for the

\* *Rhetoric*, Part iii, Chap. iii, § 8.

† De Quincey's *Review of Whately*.

expression of pure feeling.\* Pure thought is content with the irregular forms of prose, and, unless united with feeling in sentiment, seems awkward and absurd in verse. Poetry and prose differ, then, in idea and in form. Poetry is emotive ideas in emotive language ; prose is intellective ideas in intellective language. Both are forms of discourse, and may be treated together.

(7) **The Difference Relative.**—This difference between prose and poetry is simply relative. There are compositions upon which a conclusive judgment could scarcely be passed, since they possess such union of thought and feeling, and a form so rhythmical without being verse as to defy classification. This, however, is no objection to our offering a definition, or insisting upon the one already given. We all agree that a vegetable is not an animal, yet there are forms of life so closely uniting the characteristics of each as to puzzle the most expert in classification. Of course, almost any specimen of prose contains some element of feeling. The most heartless, and, therefore, real prose is, A is B, C is A, therefore C is B. Even this formula has some emotive power when we descend from the airy region of pure abstraction, and make A B and C signify objects having human relations. To some minds there is a poetical element in the driest mathematical reasoning, especially when it lifts the veil from infinitude, and displays the harmony, order, and benevolence which the science of numbers reveals. So, on the other hand, true poetry is never wholly devoid of thought. It appeals to the sensibilities *through* the intellect. What constitutes it poetry is, that, in both form and idea, it aims at and reaches

\* The reason is given in Book III. Chap lii, Sect. 1

the seat of emotion, and does not stop at the intellect, which translates it and unfolds it to the feelings. Every faculty of the intellect is thus addressed by poetry as well as by prose. Indeed, it is only as it addresses the feelings through the different faculties of the intellect, that poetry is capable of any philosophical classification.

(8) **Versification a Part of Grammar.**—Although poetry is here regarded as a form of discourse, versification is excluded from the province of Rhetoric, since it belongs properly to Grammar. Its rules are given in that science under the fourth division, or Prosody.

### 8. The Province of Rhetoric.

All worthy discourse aims at producing some change in the mind addressed. It may be a change of knowledge, or instruction ; a change of opinions, or conviction ; a change of disposition, or persuasion ; or a change of the passing emotion for its own sake, or mere entertainment. Whatever this change be, it is produced by *ideas*. These ideas are effective in producing the change only when they are assimilated to the dominant ideas of the mind addressed. The rhetorical process extends farther than the mere *presentation* of ideas ; it is complete only when those ideas *are referred to the preëxisting ideas* of the person addressed in such a manner that they will effect the desired change. All mental changes take place in accordance with certain laws. As an *art*, Rhetoric communicates ideas according to these laws ; as a *science*, it discovers and establishes these laws. Rhetoric is, therefore, the science of the laws of effective discourse.

### 9. Related Sciences.

Rhetoric is closely allied with several sciences which deal in some way with discourse.

(1) **Grammar.**—Every language has its peculiar idioms and forms. These constitute its special grammar. Universal or philosophical grammar considers language generally as an instrument of thought and expression. Rhetoric is distinct from every form of grammar, and everywhere presupposes grammatical accuracy.

(2) **Logic.**—Discourse is governed by certain laws of thought which must be regarded in effective speech. These laws of pure thought are the subject matter of Logic. While Logic deals with the nature and laws of thought, Rhetoric deals with the effective communication of thought. Logic is the *statics*, Rhetoric the *dynamics* of thought.

(3) **Æsthetics.**—Language, in common with everything else which can affect the sensibilities, is the subject-matter of applied Æsthetics. This science is closely connected with the proper estimate of discourse regarded as a fine art. It is an important auxiliary, but by no means a rival of Rhetoric.

(4) **Psychology.**—As the science of effecting mental changes, Rhetoric often borders closely upon the science of Psychology, which treats of the laws of mind. Any effective presentation of ideas to the mind for the purpose of changing it, presupposes some knowledge of its laws. Hence Rhetoric, though distinct in its province, borrows many facts and laws from Psychology.

(5) **Ellocution.**—Vocal delivery has often been regarded as a part of Rhetoric. Although it is an in-

portant aid to the effectiveness of discourse, several considerations exclude it from this science. Elocution is a bodily exercise requiring a peculiar kind of training. A person may acquire excellence as a writer while deficient as a speaker, and hence may be a rhetorician without being an elocutionist. Ideas may be expressed to the eye as well as to the ear, so that elocution has no closer connection with Rhetoric than Penmanship.

### 10. Departments of Rhetoric.

Discourse, then, aims to produce a change (1) *in the mind*, (2) *by means of ideas*, (3) *expressed through language*. The science of producing mental changes must include an account of the laws of the *mind*, the *idea*, and the *form*. The laws of mind which affect the change of ideas, the peculiar characteristics of the main classes of ideas, the special properties of language as a medium of expression, all belong to the sphere of Rhetoric. The remainder of this work, therefore, consists of the following main divisions:

BOOK I.—LAWS OF MIND.

BOOK II.—LAWS OF IDEA.

BOOK III.—LAWS OF FORM.

## SYNOPSIS.

|                    |                    |                      |                            |                         |                                |                              |
|--------------------|--------------------|----------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------|
| Rhetoric.          | I. Laws of Mind.   | I. General Laws.     | 1. Laws of life, &c.       |                         |                                |                              |
|                    |                    |                      | 2. Laws of the Feelings.   |                         |                                |                              |
|                    |                    | II. Particular Laws. | 1. Effects of Age.         |                         |                                |                              |
|                    |                    |                      | 2. Effects of Experience.  |                         |                                |                              |
|                    | II. Laws of Idea.  | I. Description.      | I. Description.            | 1. Objects of Sense     |                                |                              |
|                    |                    |                      |                            | 2. Mental States.       |                                |                              |
|                    |                    |                      | II. Narration.             | II. Narration.          | 3. Character.                  |                              |
|                    |                    |                      |                            |                         | 1. Selection of Circumstances. |                              |
|                    |                    | III. Exposition.     | III. Exposition.           | III. Exposition.        | 2. Sequence of Events.         |                              |
|                    |                    |                      |                            |                         | 3. Synchronism of Events.      |                              |
|                    |                    |                      | IV. Argumentation          | IV. Argumentation       | IV. Argumentation              | 1. Of a Notion in Itself.    |
|                    |                    |                      |                            |                         |                                | 2. Of a Notion thro Another. |
| III. Laws of Form. |                    | I. Plain Language.   | I. Plain Language.         | 1. A priori Arguments.  |                                |                              |
|                    |                    |                      |                            | 2. Arguments from Sign. |                                |                              |
|                    |                    | II. Figures.         | II. Figures.               | II. Figures.            | 2. Arguments from Resemblance. |                              |
|                    |                    |                      |                            |                         | 4. Conduct of a Discourse.     |                              |
| III. The Feelings. | III. The Feelings. | III. The Feelings.   | 1. Diction.                |                         |                                |                              |
|                    |                    |                      | 2. Sentences.              |                         |                                |                              |
|                    |                    |                      | 1. Founded on Resemblance. |                         |                                |                              |
|                    |                    |                      | 2. Founded on Contiguity.  |                         |                                |                              |
|                    |                    |                      | 3. Founded on Contrast.    |                         |                                |                              |
|                    |                    |                      | 1. Variety.                |                         |                                |                              |
|                    |                    |                      | 2. Harmony.                |                         |                                |                              |

**BOOK I.**

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**LAWS OF MIND**





# THE SCIENCE OF RHETORIC.

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## BOOK I.—LAWS OF MIND.

### 1. Method of Treatment Explained.

The philosophy of the human mind is too vast a theme for even the briefest outline in a work like this. Psychology, *Æsthetics*, and Logic are extensive and important sciences, which should receive due attention from the rhetorician. This treatment of the Laws of Mind in their relations to Rhetoric is, accordingly, but an imperfect sketch, designed to direct attention to the necessity of studying mental science, if one would excel in the science of discourse.

### 2. Classification of Mental Phenomena.

The phenomena of the mind may all be referred to the following three classes :

- (1) Knowledge, or Cognitions ;
- (2) Pleasures and Pains, or Feelings ;
- (3) Exertions, or Conations.

### 3 Relations of these Phenomena.

These phenomena are important to the rhetorician, since his purpose of assimilating new ideas to the mind addressed can be accomplished through these only

Without cognition there could be neither feeling nor conation ; and without feeling there could be no conation. For example, a person is fond of cards. " In a company where he beholds a game in progress, there arises a desire to join in it. Now the desire is here manifestly kindled by the pleasure which the person had, and has, in the play. The feeling thus connects the cognition of the play with the desire to join in it ; it forms the bridge, and contains the motive, by which we are aroused from mere knowledge to appetency,—to conation, by reference to which we move ourselves so as to attain the end in view."\* Men are moved to action by three steps : (1) an idea is presented to the mind for cognition ; (2) the idea produces a state of feeling ; (3) the feeling excites action.

#### 4. Division of this Book.

There are certain laws of mind which are universal among sane men. In addition to these, there are certain rules of action which grow out of particular modes of life or degrees of mental development. We need, therefore, to consider separately the general laws of mind, and the particular laws depending upon individual circumstances.

\* Quoted by Sir William Hamilton *Metaphysics*.

# CHAPTER I.

## THE GENERAL LAWS OF MIND.

THE rhetorician must address the mind in accordance with its laws of action. This requires him to adapt his ideas to (1) the INTELLECT, or faculty of cognition; (2) the FEELINGS, or faculty of sensibility. These divisions of mind will be considered in the following sections.

### SECTION I.

#### INTELLECT.

IF dividing and classifying the powers of the mind, it should be remembered that the mind is a unit, and that all its powers are contemporaneously exerted. Yet, for purposes of study, we must subject the mind to dissection, as the anatomist does the body. The intellect is occupied with discourse in three ways; (1) as REASON, (2) as IMAGINATION, and (3) as MEMORY.

#### I. REASON.

##### 1. Nature of the Laws of Thought.

When we speak of laws of thought as the universal and necessary conditions of mental action, it must not be supposed that the necessity is the same as in the material world. The laws of thought may be violated,

while in the physical world a law signifies a constant mode of action. Logical necessity refers to a precept which we may violate, but not without invalidating our whole mental process. These laws of thought are the necessary conditions of valid thinking, and not necessary modes of action, like the law of gravitation. The treatment of these laws belongs properly to Logic, but they must be kept in mind by the rhetorician. A full discussion of them will be found in most works on Logic. Only a few practical suggestions are given here.

## **2. Rhetorical Use of the Laws of Thought.**

The speaker or writer must address the mind in accordance with these laws, or encounter opposition to his ideas. He may, indeed, succeed in imposing fallacies upon the unthinking, but even the most ignorant possess an intelligence which cannot be wholly disregarded. Confidence in the authority of another may insure the reception of paradoxical statements to some extent, but the mind is so constituted that it instinctively rejects whatever is manifestly inconsistent with its own laws. Fallacies are not open violations of the laws of thought, but subtle evasions of them, which the intelligence does not detect. A fallacy *seems* to satisfy the conditions of valid thinking without *really* doing so. Since the rhetorician is subject to the laws of ethics, not as a rhetorician, but as a moral being, he has no more right to use an intentional fallacy than to employ any other kind of deception. The true rhetorical procedure is to address the understanding in such a manner as to satisfy the requirements of its laws and show a marked respect for its authority.

### **3. Direct Address to the Reason.**

Reason differs from some other faculties of the mind in admitting of direct appeal. Men naturally oppose any avowed attempt on the part of a writer or speaker to dictate to the feelings, but readily accord to him the privilege of assisting them in the operations of reason. Truth is often so many-sided and so difficult of apprehension, that aid in reaching correct judgments is not thought to imply inferiority. It is, therefore, no offense if we announce a proposition to be proved, and invite candid criticism of the arguments adduced. It rather gives evidence of fairness in presenting our ideas, and is a compliment to the persons addressed, as if a recognition that they possess a test of truth.

### **4. General Confidence in Reason.**

If not universally recognized as an absolute standard of truth, reason is nevertheless the highest tribunal to which men may appeal in the affairs of life. It is generally confessed to be correct in its decisions unless deceived by fallacies. However much one may doubt the infallibility of others, most men confide in their own acuteness in detecting sophistry. They are far more distrustful of their feelings, even when these are known to be such as the occasion demands, or even to fall far short of their proper intensity. Even experience is sometimes questioned when it conflicts with rational consistency. Truth is instinctively felt to be a harmony between our conceptions and realities, and consistency is demanded in facts as well as in thought. A plausible theory is often more readily received than an anomalous fact.

### 9. Related Sciences.

Rhetoric is closely allied with several sciences which deal in some way with discourse.

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(5) **Elocution.**—Vocal delivery has often been regarded as a part of Rhetoric. Although it is an im-

gates of the mind, demanding the passport of every new idea which claims admission, and, although they may be deceived by sophistry, and enticed from duty by interest, they generally guard the portals of Truth's temple with vigilance and fidelity.

## II. *IMAGINATION.*

The imagination is the faculty which represents images to the mind. We shall find it the basis of attention, belief, and action.

### 1. **Attention.**

Attention is the concentration of the consciousness upon some one idea or class of ideas. Its intensity and duration are influenced by the forms in which ideas are presented. Dry and abstract formulas are generally repulsive except to trained minds. Objects of sense, especially in new combinations, are capable of holding the attention through the imagination. Forms and colors engage the attention by pleasing the mind. Accordingly the rhetorician who would hold the attention of either readers or hearers must so present his ideas as to fulfill this condition of mental action. Long and involved processes of argument must be so relieved by an appeal to this faculty, as to occupy it with the subject, or it will spontaneously engage itself with its own creations, and the attention will be lost upon these.

### 2. **Belief.**

Intensity of belief depends upon a vivid realization of relations. We are often more deeply moved by a poet's fancies than by the most thoroughly established convictions. Although we may yield a cold assent to



an abstract proposition which has been proved by apparently valid reasoning, still its influence over our life is comparatively slight. The scenes and characters of a fictitious story are much more real to us than the events and heroes of a dry historical compend. For the moment we believe in details purely imaginary, when they are addressed to the power of representation so as to fill the mind. Ideas thus communicated become associated strongly in the mind, and belief is often revived by the vivid recurrence of the images which excited it.

### 3. Action.

Action is the product of thought and feeling. An object is presented to the mind, the contemplation of it awakens desires, and the desires lead to action. Without the presentation of objects which excite the feelings, no action can be produced. Hence the imagination must be employed by the rhetorician as a principal assistant in persuasion.

## III. MEMORY.

Complex ideas can be presented to the mind only by the aid of memory. The action of the mind in some of its more prolonged processes will illustrate this.

### 1. Conviction.

A change in the opinions is generally produced by argumentation. This requires a series of propositions to be shown in their relation to one another, and often occupies considerable time. In what is called "moral" or "probable" reasoning, where the conclusion is based

upon a number of particulars which separately are of small value, but which are conclusive when contemplated together, this exercise of memory is absolutely necessary to the argument. Even in demonstrative reasoning, where the conclusion is obtained from a single proposition by a series of deductions, the processes are often numerous, and the order of the steps is important. Since the effect of argument upon the mind requires the retention of these successive steps, the rhetorician must construct his argument in such a manner as to avoid the danger of missing an important link in the chain.

### **2. Persuasion.**

As we have seen, persuasion depends upon the cognition of some idea which excites feeling, which in turn stimulates action. Usually the will is moved only when a number of motives are presented, either together or in close array. The aggregation of motives in persuasion requires the exercise of memory, in order to keep before the mind the incentives successively presented.

### **3. Language.**

Language, the medium of expression in discourse, is so related to time that the memory must be employed to treasure up its symbols for comparative interpretation. This function of memory is vitally connected with the laws of form, and will be noticed again in treating of them.

## SECTION II.

**THE FEELINGS.**

The second main class of mental phenomena should be studied with great care by the rhetorician. No one would have the presumption to play upon an organ with a score of stops unless he were skilled in their management. The human being is capable of a greater variety of feelings than an organ is of tones. The orator who does not understand the laws of feeling may not make audible discords, but he is sure to violate the harmonic principles of a far higher and more wonderful music. Only a brief outline of the theory of the feelings can be given here. We shall consider (1) the CLASSIFICATION of the feelings ; (2) the PRODUCTION of emotions, and (3) the MODIFICATION of emotions.

I. *CLASSIFICATION.***1. Necessary Imperfection.**

Any classification of the feelings must be imperfect from the nature of this mode of mind. It is easy to classify objects which may be pointed out and named, but states of feeling are not so easily distinguished. Any classification must be cumbrous and superficial, and can only supply an outline.

**2. Sensations and Sentiments.**

If the finger be pricked with a pin, apart from the knowledge that the cuticle has been punctured, there

is something else which we call *pain*. Such a feeling produced in the bodily organism is called a *sensation*.

You stand in the presence of a beautiful painting representing a benevolent act. Apart from the knowledge of the skill with which the painting is executed and the utility of the act, you are conscious of *beauty* in the picture and *morality* in the act. This sense of beauty and of morality we call *sentiments*.

It is not the part of the rhetorician to deal with *sensations*, which are bodily affections, but he must understand the *sentiments*, which are mental affections, or he can never skillfully move to action the mind addressed.

### 3. Scheme of the Sentiments.

The following scheme, modified for our purpose from Hamilton, may be useful in exhibiting the various sentiments which govern human action

|             |   |                |  |
|-------------|---|----------------|--|
| Sentiments. | { | Contemplative. | { Tedium<br>Truth.<br>Æsthetic emotions  |
|             |   | Practical.     | { Self-preservation.<br>Enjoyment of existence.<br>Preservation of the species.<br>Self-development.<br>Moral law. |

Any existing form of sentiment, simple or complex, may be called an *emotion*. This term will be used interchangeably with the word sentiment. For a full treatment of these sentiments, reference may be made to Hamilton's *Metaphysics*.

## II. THE PRODUCTION OF EMOTION.

### 1. The Necessity of Feeling.

That action is impossible without feeling, in the sense in which it is here used, has been shown by Dr. Campbell. "To say that it is possible to persuade without speaking to the passions, is but at best a kind of specious nonsense. The coolest reasoner always in persuading, addresseth himself to the passions in some way or other. This he cannot avoid doing, if he speak to the purpose. To make me believe, it is enough to show me that things are so ; to make me act, it is necessary to show that the action will answer some end. That can never be an end to me which gratifies no passion or affection in my nature. You assure me 'It is for my honor.' Now you solicit my pride, without which I had never been able to understand the word. You say, 'It is for my interest.' Now you bespeak my self-love. 'It is for the public good.' Now you rouse my patriotism. 'It will relieve the miserable.' Now you touch my pity. So far therefore is it from being an unfair method of persuasion to move the passions, that there is no persuasion without moving them." \*

### 2. Emotions Involuntary.

No one can produce a given kind of feeling by simply willing to do so. Dr. Whately compares feeling to the involuntary organs and processes of the body. We cannot alter any of the bodily secretions by a volition, nor can we directly retard or accelerate the pulsations of the heart. Our control over the feelings

\* *Philosophy of Rhetoric.*

depends upon the use of the appointed means. As we may affect the secretions, or the action of the heart, by taking medicines, so we may excite a feeling of a certain kind by presenting the stimulating objects to the mind. To arouse the emotion of beauty, we must present a beautiful object; to excite pity, we must present a scene or person that will call it forth.

### 3. Stimulating Circumstances.

Several circumstances are specially adapted to the production of feeling.

(1) **Probability.**—Probability is based on proof, and so operates upon the emotional nature with the force of conviction. When the probability is absolute, feeling has the assurance of demonstration. The most ingenious speculations are often devoid of interest if wanting in probability.

(2) **Verisimilitude.**—Verisimilitude arises from a consistent narrative. It must be distinguished from probability, which has relation to *actuality*, while verisimilitude has reference to *consistency*. A story wanting in verisimilitude, requires strong external evidence to render it probable. A narrative may want verisimilitude and still be true, or it may possess verisimilitude, and still be false. Probability results from proof; verisimilitude is an internal consistency. The historian aims at probability; the poet and novelist aim at verisimilitude. The latter alone is necessary to the production of sympathetic interest. Fiction arouses our emotions as well as history, and produces the same sympathetic effect.

(3) **Ideal Presence.**—The power of fiction to affect the mind is wholly owing to ideal presence, or im

aginative realization of relations. In a perfect act of memory, it is the ideal presence which excites emotion. In reading fiction, this ideal presence may be so vividly realized by the imagination as to seem for the moment actual. In reading history also, it is the same ideal presence which occupies the mind. Lord Kames remarks that history and fiction here stand upon the same footing. Nor is the emotion produced by history less modified by reflection than that produced by fiction. If the reflection that a description is pure fiction will destroy our sympathy, so to an equal degree will the reflection that the historical personages are not in existence. Why should the story of Cæsar's assassination excite our horror, when Cæsar has been past help for nearly twenty centuries? Why should the story of little Nell, as told by Dickens, move our sympathy when we know that little Nell is a creation of the brain? The picture is truthful and vivid, the scenes are *ideally present*, and hence momentarily real.

(4) **Minute Details.**—Since the feelings are awakened by contemplation, it is important to dwell upon the ideas which excite the feelings. These are not abstractions, but minute and pictorial details. The word "battle" is not very terrible, but a detailed account of a battle, from the first shock of encounter to the personal sufferings of the wounded and dying, and the desolation of the bereaved, touches the whole emotional nature, and we "live the battle o'er." This principle is instinctively acted upon when in announcing sad news we suppress all details. Homer with consummate art represents the messenger as announcing the death of Patroclus to Achilles in the brief sentence, "Patroclus is fallen;" to the reader, whose sympathy

must be aroused, he gives a detailed account of the battle in which Patroclus fell.

(5) **Proximity of Time.**—The effect of proximity of time upon the feelings may be illustrated in many ways. Events long past do not affect us like those of yesterday. The accident of the hour creates a general sensation, while a more terrible catastrophe of bygone years scarcely engages the attention. Death is the inevitable termination of every life, but that event touches our feelings only as it is believed to be near. Ingenious story-tellers represent their tale as new. Orators impress upon their auditors the necessity of immediate action because of immediate consequences. As a rule, men are more interested in the future than in the past.

(6) **Proximity of Place.**—Nearness of locality has an effect corresponding to proximity of time. Space seems to be a closer bond of interest than time. Men are more generally interested in historical events of their own country during preceding centuries, than in the occurrences of the same century in far off lands. Some lands, by classic or religious associations, are of special interest notwithstanding their distance. We are more interested in the prosperity of our neighbors than in that of aliens. An accident in Europe excites but little sympathy compared with a mishap to a fellow townsman, although he be not a personal acquaintance. The *scenes* of great events are more expressive than their *anniversaries*.

(7) **Personal Relation.**—The ties of consanguinity, friendship, acquaintance, even citizenship, are influential in arousing our feelings. A relative under arrest, a friend in trouble, an acquaintance killed



in battle, a fellow citizen unjustly treated,—are more likely to stir our sympathy than foreigners in like conditions. This general statement is subject to some limitation. The tendency of modern life, inspired by the precepts of Christian fraternity, is toward broader sympathies and the extinction of the clannish spirit.

(8) **Indirectness.**—In order to convince the understanding, it is necessary to keep before the mind the precise point to be established. The method of argumentation is, therefore, *direct*. The opposite method is most readily productive of feeling. Hence the less formal and announced, and the more incidental and indirect the presentation of ideas intended to excite the emotions, the more successful it will be. Men are generally suspicious of any dictation to their feelings, and accordingly set themselves in opposition to any obvious attempt to arouse feeling.

(9) **General Importance.**—Ideas move us according to their importance. When multitudes are affected, when great worth and dignity are involved, when the interests of society are at stake, when useful schemes of public improvement are presented, interest is proportionally great.

(10) **Connection with the Consequences.**—Interest reaches its highest development when the individual sees himself to be involved. Appeals to self-preservation, self-development, or enjoyment of existence, are certain to produce interest. Self is the center of interest. Sympathy is but a reflected interest. The consequences to society may be very potent in moving good men, but consequences to self are efficacious in moving all men. Most social motives may be made personal motives. Thus if a person be

touched with *pity* at the sight of suffering, his relation to the suffering may be exhibited in such a light as to touch the principle of *self-preservation*. As a general rule, no idea is assimilated to the mind addressed so as to be most effective, until it has been put in its closest possible relation to the principles of self-love. The nature of the idea may prevent its being carried beyond the circle of sympathy, but the aim should be at the core of human interest.

### III. *THE MODIFICATION OF EMOTION.*

#### 1. **The Law of Change.**

The emotions are the most complex part of mental experience. One law, however, runs through the whole emotional nature,—the law of change. No state of feeling is uninterruptedly persistent. Emotion is subject to ceaseless ebb and flow, and its transitions are often instantaneous. The same cause will not sustain the same emotion for a great length of time. Its duration may be prolonged only by an increasing cause, like a climax, but even this means soon fails by reaching its utmost.

#### 2. **Dominant States of Feeling.**

Certain states of feeling, however, become habitual, and dominate over those of less frequent occurrence. In some men there is a frequent recurrence of the æsthetic sentiments, in others of the moral sentiments, in others of the selfish sentiments. These predominant states of feeling give character to the mind, and men become enthusiasts in art, in religion, and in self-ado-

ration. These established states of feeling are the governing motives in life. To change them when deeply rooted, is difficult, if not impossible. The more natural rhetorical use of them is, to treat them as laws of action, and to address new ideas to them in such a manner as to deflect the course of action, without attempting to change the dominant feelings. One class of writers and speakers are specially called upon to modify these permanent states. Ministers of the Gospel aim to change the established sentiments as well as the convictions of men. This most difficult task requires superior and peculiar qualifications. Rhetoric alone is here an inadequate help. Power must be sought from more spiritual sources.

### 3. Temporary Emotions.

There are, however, certain temporary states of feeling which may be modified, and whose modification depends upon established rhetorical principles. Fear, anger, gratitude, admiration, and their like, are all capable of modification, as regards any given object. The modes of modification are two.

(1) **Allaying the Feelings.**—A feeling may be allayed by the representation of the object in an aspect which does not tend to arouse the unfavorable emotion. As soon as the aspect of the object exciting the emotion is banished from the consciousness, and a new aspect is presented tending to excite a different emotion, the first emotion will be allayed. This is a far more successful expedient than the attempt to suppress *all* emotion. Feeling, once excited, may be readily changed to the most opposite extremes, as from laughter to tears, but the absolute and instantaneous

suppression of any emotion is impossible. Like a flowing river, it may be turned into new channels, but it cannot be suddenly checked. A character in a story may call forth the contempt of the reader by an unworthy act. This feeling of contempt may be allayed by presenting a noble motive as the prompter of the act, so that, although admiration may not be engendered, the contempt may be *neutralized* by the nobility of the motive.

(2) **Diverting the Feelings.**—If the feeling cannot be allayed, it may be diverted from the object which called it forth. For example, a man is shown to be guilty of an infamous deed, and excites our condemnation and disgust. It may not be easy or even possible to transmute this feeling into one of a different character. The remaining expedient is, to direct this feeling against a *different object*, by showing that another person has really planned and forwarded the transaction, and that the accused is the dupe of another's criminality.

## CHAPTER II.

### THE PARTICULAR LAWS OF MIND.

IN the preceding chapter we have considered the universal principles of the human mind in its two modes of action, thought and feeling. The laws of mind would not be completely outlined, if we were to neglect those particular principles which grow out of the conditions of life. Age, position, education, business, even climate and government, affect the thoughts and feelings of men in ways with which the rhetorician should be familiar. Men are so modified by their circumstances, that they must be studied in their environment, in order to be understood and influenced.

A large portion of what, on general principles, should be esteemed true eloquence, falls impotent to the ground for want of special adaptation. The lawyer, the preacher, and the lecturer must study minutely the habits of thought and modes of feeling of the classes addressed. The purely literary man, who writes for the world and for all time, may not attend so closely to the modifications of human character, but those who address a particular class should adapt their ideas to its peculiar powers of reception and assimilation. We can here present only three of the most important causes of peculiarity—(1) AGE, (2) EXPERIENCE, and (3) AFFILIATION. Others may be equally worthy of study.

## SECTION I

## AGE.

Aristotle, in his "Rhetoric," devotes three chapters to the habits and passions of men at different periods of life. A practical difficulty in the treatment of such a subject is the impossibility of fixing with exactness the lines of demarcation between the different periods. Life is not a chain formed of separate links, but a stream which flows on without a break of its continuity. A difficulty equally great is the wide diversity of personal temperament. Dividing life into Youth, Old Age, and Middle Age, Aristotle enumerates the distinctive qualities of each.

## 1. Youth.

(1) **Passionate.**—The young are prompted by strong desires, and are ready to dare all for their gratification. Their fresh and vigorous life is impatient of restraint, prone to change, and fastidious as to the objects of desire. Their desires though strong are inconstant, like the hunger and thirst of the sick. They follow impulse rather than reason. Anger and pride are dominant motives, and ambition leads them to deeds of rashness, and spurs them with the desire of victory rather than of gain, for they have known little of want.

(2) **Sanguine.**—They usually hope for the best, from having had few disappointments, and believe in the good, from having had little experience with depravity. They are credulous from their instinctive love of truth, and from having seldom been subject to serious deception. They expect much of the future,

from never having known repulse. They live in hope because they cannot dwell much in memory. Hence they are subject to impositions from their extravagant expectations.

(3) **Spirited.**—They are spirited, for they have not yet been humbled by defeat, and have not known pressing circumstances. They, therefore, think more of honor than of expediency, for they are governed by the impulses of the heart rather than by the calculations of the brain.

(4) **Social.**—Their confidence in men and their exuberance of spirit lead them to companionship, and they delight in the amenities of social intercourse. They choose their companions from personal affinity, not from social expediency.

(5) **Mischievous.**—In their transgressions they err on the side of mischief rather than of malice. Their actions are often wanton, but seldom intentionally injurious. Repentance is easy, as the error does not proceed from established principles of action.

## 2. Old Age.

(1) **Calculating.**—In almost every particular, the old are the reverse of the young. Passion has lost its power, and calculation has become the rule of life. Caution marks every step. Impulse has given way to reason.

(2) **Desponding.**—They are slow to assert anything or to receive any new doctrine, always qualifying with “perhaps” or “possibly.” They are suspicious of general statements, since experience has shown many exceptions to general rules. They distrust men and theories on the same ground. They are apprehensive

of danger and difficulty from long experience of their prevalence and unexpected approach. They live in memory more than in hope.

(3) **Humble.**—Disappointment and deception have generally lowered their estimate of the world. The loss of power tends to lower their former ideas of life. They rely more upon careful calculation and the policy of expediency than upon the certain supremacy of right and the victory of honor.

(4) **Gentle.**—If the old are injurious it is not from mischief, but from calculation. Yet they are seldom injurious either in word or deed, having learned to subordinate impulse to reason, and having perceived the uselessness of retaliation.

### 8. Middle Age.

(1) **Moderate.**—The prime of life presents the golden mean between the two extremes of mental character already sketched. Moderation, mental balance, deliberation joined with action are the qualities of man at the middle period of life. Passion has been modified by reason, without having deprived him of enthusiasm and interest in the temporary ends of existence. Honor and expediency coöperate. Caution and daring are blended. Neither the extravagance of youth nor the parsimony of old age is predominant.

(2) **Power.**—The middle period in life is that in which the capacity and desire for power are at their height. The diffidence of youth has departed, and the weakness of old age has not supervened. Exercise of the faculties has imparted vigor and precision to their operations, and over-use has not impaired their activity.



Although subject to great individual modification, these differences of disposition should be known and remembered by the rhetorician, as they affect the reception of new ideas.

## SECTION II.

### EXPERIENCE.

Another class of particular conditions which should be studied by the rhetorician may be designated by the general name Experience. This is meant to include such personal preparation as education, occupation, political privilege, and general familiarity with the subject discussed.

#### 1. The Nature of Experience.

A very frequent but absurd mistake is, to confound experience with age, or some other non-essential but usual concomitant of experience. Political wisdom is often supposed to be associated with years, and a youth of wide historical knowledge, familiar with the causes and signs of national growth and decay, is supposed to know less of government than an ignorant voter of many years standing. Nothing can be more distinct than age and experience. There is no necessary bond of connection between them, though, it is true, they are often associated. Experience in a particular department of knowledge depends upon the amount of time and attention bestowed upon the subject with a given amount of intelligence. The factors of experience are three: time, attention, intelligence. A neglect to remember that experience is the product of these three factors often leads to a fatal misapprehension of individual capacity.

## 2. General and Specific Experiences.

Another prevalent error is the confounding of a general and a particular experience. A man may have a long experimental knowledge of religion without the ability to reason about even the fundamental doctrines of his faith. His experience may have been in the practice of religious precepts, whereas the experience required is in the discussion of doctrinal truths. For this special purpose a practical knowledge of religion would be an inadequate preparation. Whately cites an instance of a grain merchant in Holland who had spent a large part of his life dealing in corn, but who had never seen it growing in the field. His general experience with corn was extensive, but his opinion would be valueless with reference to the best modes of producing it.

## 3. Inferred Experience.

Another mistake is often made by persons who suppose their experience to extend farther than it does, and this error often needs to be pointed out before their opinions can be changed. It consists in regarding the *causes* as coming within the scope of experience, when only certain *effects* have been perceived. If a person were to take a medicine and soon afterward were to recover from his disease, he would possibly believe himself to have experimental knowledge that he was cured by that remedy. This would, however, imply a tracing of causes and effects which is not always possible. He might *infer* that the remedy effected the cure, but *experience* would justify him in affirming only that he took the medicine, and the disease was cured. The connection between the taking of the remedy and

the cure is one of inference, and not of experience, since *other* causes might have produced the effect. In offering to the mind a new theory to account for facts of experience, it will often be necessary to show that what has been taken for experience is not experience but inference.

### SECTION III.

#### AFFILIATION.

##### .. Relation of the Speaker to his Audience.

Men possess different degrees of influence according to their relations with those addressed. Aristotle has mentioned three essentials to one who would persuade his fellows: (1) good *sense*; (2) good *will*; and (3) good *principles*.

(1) **Good Sense.**—Men are willingly led by those in whose judgment they have full confidence. A reputation for good sense is, therefore, of value to one who would produce mental changes in another. The majority of men esteem others for their good sense in proportion as they hold similar views. It is of great practical importance, therefore, to agree as far as possible with those whom we would influence. Happily there are many facts and doctrines upon which all men agree. An allusion to some of these points of agreement brings the speaker into a closer relation of influence than if, these being kept out of view, nothing but differences should be advanced.

(2) **Good Will.**—If one were possessed of good sense and good principles, it would seem as if good will would scarcely need to be added, since ability would insure a clear apprehension of truth, and integ-

erty would lead one to a candid statement of convictions. But while one might on these grounds be supposed to have at heart the best interests of those addressed *as he viewed them*, if he were hostile to their cherished *opinions*, he would have comparatively little influence with the prepossessed. Hence Aristotle had good reason for mentioning this quality.

(3) **Good Principle.**—A character for good sense and good will might seem sufficient qualification for a speaker or writer, since the former quality would imply the ability and the latter the disposition to give the best advice, without reference to moral principle. Aristotle maintains that a reputation for integrity is equally necessary, for, although a man cannot be wanting in good will toward *himself*, yet able men often act absurdly in their own affairs, being so blinded by passion as to sacrifice the expedient for the agreeable. Such men are not likely to be better counselors of others than of themselves.

## 2. Party Spirit.

Many of the affiliations of life, such as family feeling, patriotism, religious belief, political partiality, and the various forms of caste, may be summed up under the general name *party spirit*. Among the means of winning or moving men, no one is more potent. It may be noticed in some of its special relations.

(1) **As a Motive.**—Scarcely any other motive is so potent when it is skillfully presented, and yet it is one from which few avowedly act. Its gratification affords a high degree of pleasure, and its defeat is intensely humiliating. While it often leads to violence and the most absurd conduct, it is the *esprit de corps* without

which there could be no unity of action in the organizations of men.

(2) **As a Means of Self-commendation.**—When indirectly appealed to, it is an almost infallible means of self-commendation. To belong to the same church, political party, or secret society, is with many men, a sign of intelligence, good will and integrity. Hence the speaker or writer who represents himself as belonging to a certain order of men at once gains for himself the credit or discredit attaching to that order in the estimation of those addressed. A speaker cannot say without embarrassment, "I am an honest and intelligent man;" but he may say without the slightest indelicacy, "I am a Republican," or "I am a Democrat." Such a statement often secures for a speaker the sympathetic attention of his audience, and banishes at once all suspicion.

(3) **Method of Counteracting.**—It is often necessary to oppose and change men's party attachments. This process is very difficult. It will be more likely to succeed if the speaker give full credit for any correct doctrines held by those whom he would change, affirm his confidence in their good intentions, present as many points of agreement as possible, and finally show that through too close attention to *some* truths they have lost sight of others which change the whole case. Any display of hostility, criminations, or charges of stupidity, will only confirm men in their previous views.

**BOOK II.**

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**LAW S OF IDEA**

## CHAPTER II.

### THE PARTICULAR LAWS OF MIND.

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elementary forms of discourse, we shall cover the whole ground of the conditions of communication depending upon the nature of the idea. These four classes of ideas give rise to four different processes of communication :

(1) The parts of a *simultaneous* whole are presented to the mind by *Description*.

(2) The parts of a *successive* whole are presented to the mind by *Narration*.

(3) A *general notion* is unfolded to the mind by *Exposition*.

(4) A *proposition* is confirmed to the mind by *Argumentation*.

# CHAPTER I.

## DESCRIPTION.

### 1. Describable Objects.

Complex objects only are capable of description. A simple object, as for instance the color blue, cannot be described. We may give instances of it, but one who had never seen any blue object could never learn from description what blue is. In order that anything may be capable of description, it must consist of parts which may be mentioned, and whose relations may be shown.

### 2. General Laws of Description.

There are some general qualities which every description should possess.

(1) **The Law of Purpose.**—Whenever we describe anything, we do so with a definite end in view. Let the subject be the United States. We might describe the United States for a geographical purpose, to inform the mind how the parts of the country are related in direction and distance; for an antiquarian purpose, to portray the condition of aboriginal tribes; for a geological purpose, to illustrate the operation of physical forces; for a political purpose, to demonstrate the necessity of national unity in so vast a country. Our selection of circumstances should be governed entirely by the purpose of the description.

(2) **The Law of Unity.**—The mere enumeration of

qualities is not sufficient for a perfect description. There must be coherence between the parts enumerated, a mutual dependence and correlation. Hence the necessity of proceeding according to some definite plan.

(3) **The Law of Completeness.**—It is necessary that nothing important to the purpose be left out of the list of qualities. It is not to be supposed that all the constituents of an object must be mentioned. The purpose regulates this. A description of the United States which should leave out the great rivers might be proper for some purposes, but for industrial purposes such a description would be worthless.

(4) **The Law of Brevity.**—The memory is soon overpowered by details. Hence a description should avoid all useless minutiae, and even leading characteristics which are irrelevant to the purpose. Vivacity is gained by this elimination, and the attention is more easily retained.

### 3. Kinds of Description.

It will be convenient to distinguish three kinds of description, which, from their peculiarities, should be treated separately. They are description of (1) OBJECTS OF SENSE; (2) MENTAL STATES; (3) CHARACTERS.

#### SECTION I.

### OBJECTS OF SENSE.

#### 1. Purpose.

(1) **Point of View.**—The purpose for which we describe an object should determine our point of view. This should be settled in the beginning. A description

of the United States for a class in geography might make the actual position of the class the point of view, and proceed outward in straight lines or concentric circles. If we were describing the peculiarities of the country to a foreigner, we might select his entrance into an American harbor as the point of view, and then conduct him into the interior and across the continent. The point of view should not be shifted without warning.

(2) **Division.**—Complex objects require systematic division, in order to be understood as a whole. The kind of division depends upon the purpose, taken in connection with the character of the object. A description of the earth's surface for a political purpose, divides according to national boundaries ; for a meteorological purpose, according to zones ; for a purely geographical purpose, according to continents.

## 2 Unity.

(1) **Order.**—Although a proper division is helpful to unity as well as important in its relation to purpose, the order in which the parts are considered is still more essential. The order will depend also upon the purpose of the description, but must be chosen chiefly with regard to unity. If a central and causative principle can be found, it will assist unity to follow the operation of this. Thus, in describing the climates of the earth, it would be best to follow the apparent movements of the sun, beginning at the equator. Another means of securing unity is to follow the order of actual perception. In describing a distant mountain, for instance, unity would be promoted by mentioning the various phases of its appearance in the order in

which they would occur to one approaching the mountain.

(2) **Fitness.**—It is conducive to unity to hold constantly in mind the exact purpose of the description, as particulars are suggested, and to decide upon their fitness for the end in view.

### 3. Completeness.

(1) **Location.**—One of the common violations of the law of completeness is the omission to fix the place of the object described. A description of any thing ought to be introduced by information about the place where it is found. This is especially the case when the object is local.

(2) **Inner Qualities.**—A description of an animal would be imperfect without some account of its instincts and habits. The mere external form and size are the least interesting facts with regard to animals. Their sagacity, their modes of life, and their disposition toward man are essential to any complete account of them.

(3) **Time.**—Every thing in nature is subject to change. A description is, therefore, unsatisfactory unless the time of the observation be given. We should know whether a plant or animal was young or old when the observer saw it. Even the posture, the time of day, the antecedent circumstances may be important. Travelers have variously described the chameleon, for its hue depends upon its own mood, the color of the objects about it, and even the temperature. In a certain sense all nature shares the qualities of this reptile.

(4) **Magnitude.**—Misconception is likely to result

from a failure to note the magnitude of an object. When the size is unknown from obvious relations, it should always be in some way stated.

#### 4. Brevity.

(1) **Comparisons.**—Among the various means of complying with the law of brevity, comparison is useful. A happy simile or metaphor often presents a somewhat complex object in a single word. Novel views of familiar objects are thus brought to mind, and by stimulating the attention are helpful to the description. An American poet thus describes the sea-shore :—

“ The curved strand  
Of cool gray sand  
Lies like a sickle by the sea.”

(2) **Effects.**—Another means of shortening the description is to describe the effect upon the mind, and leave the fancy to fill out the picture.

(3) **Contrast.**—Some objects may be described by contrasting them with well known opposites. This is generally productive of brevity, but care is necessary to avoid obscurity. We cannot always determine what an object is like from a knowledge of what it is not like.

(4) **Fixed Classes.**—Many objects may be sufficiently described by being referred to certain fixed classes. The botanist, for example, needs only the genus and species of a plant in order to know its character. Only the leading characteristics of a mineral are necessary to describe it for a mineralogist. This, however, is properly classification, rather than description in its common sense.

## SECTION II.

**MENTAL STATES.**

In the strictest sense mental states cannot be described. Unless similar states have been experienced by the mind addressed, they can be communicated only by indirect means, and even then with doubtful precision. The modes of communicating states of mind are two : (1) by the mental vocabulary ; and (2) by various associations. In the expression " mental states " we include only the subjective modes of consciousness, and not the consciousness of external objects.

**1. The Mental Vocabulary.**

The words used to designate states of feeling and the various powers of the mind are not in any true sense descriptive. They are symbolical signs associated with certain phenomena which they serve rudely to indicate. The chances of mistake in their interpretation are, therefore, very great. Hence the difficulty and seeming vagueness of metaphysical systems. Several peculiarities of the mental vocabulary need special attention.

(1) **Metaphorical Character.**—All the radical elements of language are significant of purely physical substances, qualities, acts, and relations. Such words as *perception*, *imagination* and *feeling* are derived from radicals primarily significant of material things. If we forget the metaphorical character of all higher speech, we shall be continually led into the error of supposing that there is an essential likeness between mental processes and physical acts. That there is an

analogy there can be no doubt, and in some instances, possibly, a direct resemblance. But we are not at liberty to suppose that mental and physical phenomena correspond throughout.

(2) **Indefiniteness.**—From this want of correspondence between internal states and external phenomena, the language of the mind is often indefinite. When we speak of a *mountain*, a *river*, or a *tree*, distinct notions rise in the mind; but when we speak of *love*, *joy*, *anger*, and other states of feeling, an apprehension of what is meant implies a personal experience of these states. The indefiniteness of language is increased by the individual modification to which all these states are subject. Thus *love* may mean widely different things to different persons, according to their temperament and extent of experience. Joy, too, may be either a calm, tranquil quiescence, or a tumultuous delight. Anger may mean to one a petty irritation, to another a righteous indignation in which the whole moral nature is profoundly agitated.

(3) **Subjective Result.**—The effect of language descriptive of the feelings upon the mind addressed, therefore, depends upon an infinite number of incalculable circumstances. The attempt to communicate the feelings and other complex mental states by the ordinary vocabulary of the mind, is almost certain to prove unsuccessful. The simpler and more common states of feeling may be thus reproduced in another or tolerably well suggested by the use of their proper names; but as soon as the phenomenon becomes exceptional, as in the finer shades of emotion, the exact communication of it in this way becomes almost impossible.



## 2. Various Associations.

What cannot be done successfully by the ordinary vocabulary may often be easily accomplished by various concomitants. Some of these may be noticed.

(1) **External Expression.**—There is a natural language of the body which is universal among men, and founded on laws of muscular and nervous action. The leading emotions of the mind have their characteristic modes of expression in the tones of the voice, the color of the face, and the gesticulations of the body. Love, joy, anger, pain, and pleasure, have each an external sign which is seldom mistaken. In describing the feelings, this language may be joined with the proper mental vocabulary to enforce expression. A description of the external accompaniment of an emotion is often the best possible description of the emotion itself.

(2) **Actions.**—Closely allied to the bodily expression, is the conduct produced by mental states. The habits of men are regulated by their feelings. The worship of art or literature springs from a devotion of soul which none but devotees can fully comprehend by any direct description ; but all form some notion of the intensity of this feeling when the humiliation, pain, and depression endured for its sake are minutely described. In one of his tales, Crabbe very successfully describes the state of an unfortunate girl by naming her favorite occupations. The question, how must one feel to select these pursuits? leads the inquirer with great exactness to the proper state of mind.

(3) **Surroundings.**—The surroundings have much to do with our feelings. We are impressed by the

scenery, the companionship, and the probable occurrences. It may, therefore, assist the communication of a feeling, to describe the circumstances in which it was produced, and then more directly state the character of the feeling. The external features of the occasion will thus assist the interpretation of what might otherwise be obscure.

(4) **Causes.**—Since human nature is governed by general laws, men of like dispositions are apt to feel the same from the same causes. Very often the most satisfactory way to communicate an emotion is to state the causes of it. When the emotion is unusually complex, this is often the only way in which the feeling can be communicated. The various dispositions of men render this mode somewhat uncertain, since the same causes produce different effects in different persons.

### SECTION III.

## CHARACTER.

The character of men is generally reflected in a narrative of their lives, but, considered as a complete growth, character may be described. Several peculiarities belong to the description of character. Some of these may be mentioned.

### 1. Individuality.

Only marked characters are worth describing. The distinctive traits of a man are necessary to a successful description. Those shared in common with most men of the same class may be sufficiently indicated by referring the character to that class. The power to

seize upon what is purely individual is the secret of all great character painting. It was possessed pre-eminently by Shakespeare. His female characters are very numerous, and generally among the most exquisite creations in literature. "And these Shakespearian women," says Whipple, "though all radiations from one great ideal of womanhood, are at the same time intensely individualized. Each has a separate soul, and the processes of intellect as well as emotions are different in each."\*

## 2. Inward Principles.

Specific acts are important only as suggestive of internal principles. These make up the character. External acts are helpful to the portraiture of character, but this carries us beyond the region of mere description, and invades the territory of narration, in which the *growth* of character is exhibited. The process of *investigating* character should be *inductive*. From isolated manifestations we infer the actuating motives, and thus arrive at the dominant qualities of mind and heart. The *description* of character should be *deductive*. The ruling principles should be stated first, and exemplified if necessary by illustrative instances. Thus every item will have the force of a confirmation, instead of being a mere datum from which to infer the principle.

## 3. Concrete Form.

No mere sum of abstractions, however, can truthfully represent a character. "A man is not an abstract

\* *The Literature of the Age of Elizabeth.*

passion," says Taine. "He stamps the vices and virtues which he possesses with his individual mark. These vices and virtues receive, on entering into him, a bent and form which they have not in others. No one is unmixed sensuality. Take a thousand sensualists, and you will find a thousand different modes of sensuality; for there are a thousand paths, a thousand circumstances and degrees in sensuality."\* Portraits of men which represent them as incarnations of a single vice or virtue are evidently untrue. No man is without redeeming virtues, and no man is absolutely free from faults or inconsistencies. Even an ideal character should not be perfect, if designed to represent any possible human being.

#### 4. Environment.

A character is a product, and must be studied in its environment. Apart from his circumstances in life, a man excites little genuine interest. Virtues and vices are wonderful or common-place, according to the soil in which they grow. Piety is an essential and natural element in the life of a great divine, and hence would be much more striking in the life of a common sailor. Vices which would seem natural to the seaman would seem to be foul blots upon the character of the divine. Hence consistency requires that character be described in connection with its atmosphere.

\* *English Literature*, Vol. I.

## CHAPTER II.

### NARRATION.

**NARRATION** is the presentation to the mind of the parts of a successive whole. Its theme is a series of related events occurring in time. Language, being itself related to time as a succession of signs, is particularly adapted to narration. This form of discourse presents three principal problems : (1) the **SELECTION OF SUITABLE CIRCUMSTANCES** ; (2) the **REPRESENTATION OF EVENTS IN THEIR PROPER SEQUENCE** ; and (3) the **REPRESENTATION OF SYNCHRONISTIC EVENTS SO AS TO SHOW THEIR TRUE RELATIONS**. These problems will be discussed in the following sections. No distinction is necessary between real and invented events, since the aim of fiction is to counterfeit reality.

#### SECTION I.

### THE SELECTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES

#### 1. Purpose.

The selection of circumstances depends greatly on the purpose for which a narrative is composed. We may give special attention to the *temporal* element, and so produce mere *annals* or *chronicles* ; we may relate the changes to which any thing has been subjected, and so narrate its *history* . we may *explain* the

compend and abstracts. Specific details fix the attention and fasten events in the memory. A narrative has an artificial appearance if each event be not explained by the preceding events. The omission of details is therefore injurious to the effect, when they are vitally connected with the succession of incidents. No history is complete without occasional references to contemporaneous facts in other departments. A history of literature which should take no notice of those social and political revolutions which produce great men and generate epoch-making ideas, would be unworthy of being called a history.

#### 4. Brevity.

Prolixity is the bane of effective narrative. Novels in two or three thick volumes, recounting the insipid adventures of some common-place personage, are the most tedious of literary creations. Histories which spin out the thread of events to undue length, though often praised and quoted, are seldom consecutively read. The memory can retain only a limited number of details, and narratives constructed without reference to the natural limits of this faculty, are almost sure to pay the penalty of dullness. Vivacity, also, as in description, is secured by confining the narrative to what is essential.

## SECTION II.

### THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS.

#### 1. Time.

It is important to a narrative that its incidents be related in the chronological order in which they occur.

This is usually the philosophical order, for events are not mere isolated links, but form part of an endless chain of antecedents and consequents, each of which is a cause of its consequent, and an effect of its antecedent. A narrator rises in dignity in proportion as he becomes a philosopher, and explains the events he narrates. This requires a constant reference to the actual sequence of events in time. Chronology and geography have been aptly called the two eyes of history. Chronology, by a different metaphor, has been called the latitude and longitude of narrative. The reader misses a marginal chronology in Gibbon's great history.

## **2. Reasons for Violating the Order of Time**

Sometimes it may be desirable to violate the actual order of events for a special reason. Thus Virgil, in the "*Æneid*," first describes the storm which wrecked the fleet of his hero, and threw him upon the African coast, and then causes him to relate to Queen Dido his own previous adventures. Homer had employed a similar plan in the "*Odyssey*," where Odysseus is represented as recounting his misfortunes to the Phæacian court. In these cases the violation of the natural order is for the obvious purpose of allowing the hero to add the charm of personal narration to the story of his wanderings. George Eliot has used a similar inversion for a different purpose. In "*Daniel Deronda*," the heroine is introduced to the reader as a desperate pleasure-seeker in a gambling scene. The remainder of the story is to a great extent occupied with a retrospective history of her life. The obvious design of the inversion is to absorb the reader's attention and inter-

est in the chain of events which brought Gwendolen Harleth to the gaming table.

### 3. Retrospective References.

A backward reference may be necessary in placing the true order of events before the mind. Macaulay, in his "History of England," introduces his account of the period about which he specially writes with a prefatory summary of English history from the Roman invasion. Thus his readers are prepared to place the events which make up the history in their proper relations with their antecedents. A plan somewhat different from this is, to describe a recent or existing state of affairs, and then to point out the causes which have produced it. An acquaintance with present facts interests us in their antecedents. In his "Elements of Geology," Sir Charles Lyell has first shown what is to be accounted for, and then proceeds to narrate the geological history of previous ages, by which he accounts for the present state of the globe.

### 4. Probability.

Probability ought to be attended to in a narrative. It depends greatly upon the order of events whether or not they seem probable. Writers are most in danger of making their story improbable when there are many concurrent events having a causal relation, but which are not brought into one view. This leads us to the topic of the next section, in which the best modes of surmounting this obstacle will be pointed out.



## SECTION III.

**SYNCHRONISM OF EVENTS.****1. Kinds of Concurrence.**

The chief difficulties of narration arise when concurring streams of events have to be exhibited as contemporaneous in order to show their actual relations. This concurrence is of several kinds.

(1) **Plurality of Departments.**—The life of a nation is complex. One department acts upon another, and is acted upon by other departments. Military, political, social, literary, and scientific life all flow on together, and their currents ever mingle and impart color to one another. The highest genius is requisite to exhibit all these various modes of progress in a true panoramic view.

(2) **Contending Parties.**—The historian ought to rise above the advocate, and, when there are two sides, he is under obligation to represent both. In depicting any kind of conflict, where the movements of both sides are to be narrated, there is great danger of confusion from a frequent shifting of the point of view. Few historians have the advantage of Kinglake at the Alma, where, as an eye-witness, he retains his point of view throughout the conflict. Those who compile from the accounts of many witnesses are in danger of sacrificing unity, and of blurring the whole picture.

(3) **Principal and Subordinate Actions.**—In a biography, or the narration of a campaign or voyage, the events are not all of the same rank. Some are principal, others merely subordinate. These must be

carefully distinguished, and prominence must be given to the principal events, while the minor incidents must be duly subordinated.

(4) **Different Countries.**—The history of some countries, Greece for example, is the history of a single race, but at the same time consists of a plurality of histories. Sparta, Athens, and Thebes live an independent life. The historian of Greece must carry along the story of all these states, with their numerous colonies, so as to maintain unity, and at the same time to give to each state its separate place in the narrative. The difficulty is increased when the historian attempts to narrate the concurrent progress of states less intimately connected, as in a history of Europe or of the world. Here the highest genius is necessary to success. An interesting universal history is more difficult than an epic poem, and it may be said that the problem of its production remains unsolved.

## **2. Means of Expressing Synchronism.**

The expedients resorted to in representing contemporaneous events are of great practical value, yet they leave many things for genius to solve in its own mysterious way. Macaulay was gifted, perhaps beyond all other men, with the power of seeing periods of history as organic wholes, and has succeeded in presenting them as such. Taine thus speaks of this gift: "So many accumulated events form with him not a total, but a whole. Explanations, accounts, dissertations, anecdotes, illustrations, comparisons, allusions to modern events, everything is connected in his book. It is because everything is connected in his mind. He had a most lively consciousness of causes; and causes

unite facts. By them scattered events are assembled into a single event ; they unite them because they produce them, and the historian who seeks them all out, cannot fail to perceive or to feel the unity which is their effect." \*

Of the ordinary means of overcoming the difficulties of synchronism, we may mention the following :

(1) **Sensible Forms.**—Charts in the form of trees, streams, and other physical objects, may be helpful in fixing the relations of periods in the mind. In written history they are of very great service, but even in speaking they may often be employed. Here the metaphor or simile takes the place of the actual chart. For example, in tracing the history of the Indo-European family, the migrations of that race may be represented under the figure of seven streams diverging from a common fountain, and, although each is followed separately, the mind will readily perceive that the others are flowing simultaneously, and this may be indicated by concentric circles intersecting the streams and representing centuries.

(2) **Analysis.**—A perspicuous division into chapters and sections assists the mind in associating synchronistic events. Hence every complicated narrative should be so divided as to suggest the parallel occurrences. The division of history according to reigns is not so philosophical as a division according to great historic movements. In composing the biography of a great man, 't would be absurd to divide his life according to the contemporary presidents. In every life, individual or national, there are causes which impel the man or the nation in certain different directions. These are the

\* *English Literature*, Vol. III.

true outlines of analysis, and give rise to distinct epochs.

(3) **Summary.**—A condensed summary of a period may be useful in setting events necessarily separated in the progress of the narrative in their proper chronological relations. Such abridgments serve the same purpose as maps after an observation of the ground. They correct the erroneous impressions resulting from detached views. The proper place for a summary depends upon circumstances. If interest in the plot will be diminished by a revelation of it, the summary ought not to be presented in the introduction. If, however, by coming first it will abridge the process of arrangement in the mind of the reader, it may be placed at the beginning, as a topographical map is spread out before a campaign. Usually the summary is retrospective. Coming after the detailed narrative, it serves to straighten the entangled threads of the story.

## CHAPTER III.

### EXPOSITION.

#### 1. The Nature of Exposition.

EXPOSITION consists in such an analysis of a general term as will make clear to the mind the general notion of which it is the sign. By "general term" is meant a word indicating a general notion. By "general notion" is meant a mode of thought in which certain attributes are taken as belonging to certain objects and as uniting them in one class. Thus "*animal*" includes the attributes "*organized*," "*sentient*," etc. and is applicable to such objects as "*men*," "*horses*," "*dogs*," etc., which make up the class "*animal*" by possessing the attributes "*organized*," "*sentient*," etc., in common. A general term is distinguished from a singular term, such as *Rome*, *Julius Cæsar*, *the Nile*, indicating a single object.

#### 2. Forms of Exposition.

Exposition assumes two forms : (1) Exposition of the notion in itself ; and (2) exposition of the notion in its relation to other notions. In either of these forms of exposition, we may have single terms, or terms united in propositions. In order to avoid useless repetition, it may be stated that the exposition of the terms of a proposition is an exposition of the prop-

position itself. Thus in the proposition, "Free institutions are promotive of happiness," an exposition of the subject and the predicate would be an exposition of the whole proposition. The copula "*are*" requires no exposition. Any doubt with reference to the copula, is not a doubt as to the *meaning*, but as to the *truth* of the proposition. The truth of a proposition must be established by argument, which takes for granted the meaning of the terms, and is occupied with the negative or affirmative quality of the copula. Exposition elucidates the meaning of "*free institutions*" and "*promotive of happiness*"; and here its office ends. Argumentation then decides whether the copula should be "*are*" or "*are-not*."

## SECTION I.

### EXPOSITION OF THE NOTION IN ITSELF.

#### 1. Comprehension and Extension.

A general notion, or conception of a class, includes certain attributes and certain objects to which the attributes belong. For example, the word *man* includes such attributes as *rationality*, *intellectuality*, *voluntary power*, etc., and also includes all the individual beings known to us as men. *Man* is also an *animal*, but this term includes a greater number of objects than the word *man*, for it embraces *horses*, *dogs*, etc. But these other animals do not possess *rationality* or *intellectuality*. The class "*animal*" excludes common attributes in proportion as it includes more objects. We have, then, in a general notion, two kinds of quantity: (1) *comprehension*, which is made up of the differen-

*attributes* included in the notion ; and (2) *extension* which is made up of those *objects* which are included in the general notion. These two, comprehension and extension, are in an inverse ratio to each other. As we pass from “*man*” to “*animal*” the extension increases, but the comprehension diminishes ; the *objects* included are *more* numerous, the *attributes* implied are *less* numerous.

## 2. Nature of a Definition.

The exposition of the comprehension of a notion is its logical definition. Thus, in the notion *man* there are two constituent notions, the first including the attributes of the notion *animal*, the second including the attributes of the notion *rational*. These constituent notions, *animal* and *rational*, may in turn be resolved in like manner into more elementary notions, and so on until those notions are so elementary as to satisfy the mind. In each of these processes of resolution we have one constituent notion which *includes* the notion defined. This is called the *genus*. The other constituent notion *distinguishes* the notion defined from the genus, and is called the *differentia*. A definition is, therefore, a division of a general notion according to its attributes. It follows that a simple notion, which can be referred to no genus, cannot be defined. Thus *being*, the highest genus known to the mind, is indefinable.

## 3. Nature of Division.

The exposition of the extension of a notion is its division. Thus, the notion *man* includes under it *white* men, *black* men, *red* men, etc., divided according to *color* ; *Africans*, *Asiatics*, *Europeans*, etc., divided

According to *geographical lines* ; *Jews, Mohammedans, Buddhists, Christians*, etc. divided according to *religion*. It is evident that the character of our division will depend entirely upon the principle according to which we divide a notion into its constituent objects. It follows that a notion cannot be divided when it includes only one object.

#### 4. Difference between Definition and Division.

Definition and division are opposite processes. Comprehension is simply the sum of the qualities, characteristics or attributes of which a notion is composed, and is resolved into its parts by definition. Extension is simply the sum or complement of the objects whose resembling characteristics constitute the general notion, and is resolved into its parts by division. Definition is a discrimination of attributes ; division a discrimination of objects. As the list of attributes is lengthened, the list of objects possessing them is shortened ; and *vice versa*. *Being* is the maximum of extension and the minimum of comprehension. Including the greatest number of objects, it includes the least number of attributes.

#### 5. Kinds of Definition.

Three principal kinds of definition are distinguished by Hamilton.

(1) **Nominal**.—Nominal definitions are mere explanations. They are, therefore, generally preliminary to a more precise distinction. Thus the nominal definition of a circle is, "The word 'circle' signifies a uniformly curved line."



(2) **Real.**—In real definitions, the object defined is considered as existing, and the notion precedes the definition. They are merely analytic, nothing being given explicitly in the defining member which is not contained implicitly in the subject defined; as, “A circle is a line returning upon itself, of which all the parts are equi-distant from a given point.”

(3) **Genetic.**—The genetic definition represents the defined object as in the process of becoming. It is therefore synthetic; as, “A circle is formed when we draw around, and always at the same distance from a fixed point, a movable point which leaves its trace, until the termination of the movement coincides with its commencement.” The genetic definition is possible only when the objects to be defined are quantities represented in time or space.

## 6. The Laws of Logical Definition.

The following are the laws of a strictly logical definition.

(1) **A definition must be adequate.**—This necessitates a genus and a differentia. A true definition will admit of a transposition of the subject and the predicate. Such a transposition is an easy test of a definition. If “Man is a rational animal” be an adequate definition, it must be true that a rational animal is a man; for otherwise something besides men is included in the definition.

(2) **A definition must not define by negative or divisive attributes.**—We do not say what a notion is by saying what it is not; nor do we define a notion by referring it to one class or another, which is a process of division. These expedients may properly precede

and prepare the way for a definition, but they are not definitions.

(3) **A definition should not be tautological.**—We cannot define an object by *itself*. This is called “defining in a circle.” This is a very common fault, and is fostered by the bilingual character of the English language, which renders it possible to define an Anglo-Saxon word by a Norman-French equivalent. The verbal form conceals the repetition of thought. This mode of explaining by equivalents is often useful, but must not be mistaken for a logical definition.

(4) **The definition must be precise.**—Any attribute not essential to the distinction only confuses it. The looseness of a definition leaves it open to refutation. The Platonic definition, “Man is a two-legged animal without feathers,” was refuted by exhibiting a plucked bird, which, by transposition of the subject and predicate, would be a man, if the definition were correct.

(5) **A definition should be perspicuous.**—The very object of a definition is clearness. That it should itself be perspicuous is, therefore, self-evident. Brevity is generally necessary to perspicuity. Figurative language will often render definitions brilliant, but it will frequently expose them to criticism for violating this law.

## 7. Kinds of Division.

(1) **Partition.**—The notion *man* may be regarded as made up of certain attributes; as *living being, rational, mortal*, etc. This division of a notion into its component attributes is called *partition*. It differs from definition in enumerating all the attributes which make up a whole, while definition states only a genus and differentia. It differs from logical division in

being a division of the comprehension, not of the extension.

(2) **Logical Division.**—A logical division is an exposition of the extension of a notion ; it enumerates, not the attributes but the species of a notion. Thus man may be divided into the various species together comprising the general notion *man*, and the division, as previously shown, may be according to any one of many principles. The principle of division is the one essential attribute according to which the division is made. The notion is called the divided whole ; its parts are the dividing members ; these with reference to one another are co-ordinates ; with reference to the divided whole, subordinates.

### 8. The Laws of Logical Division.

The logical division of a notion is regulated by several laws.

(1) **Every Division should have some Principle.**—The reason of this is manifest. If there be no attribute with reference to which objects are classed, there can be no division.

(2) **Every Division should have but one Principle.**—If there are two or more principles of division, there will be no division. Thus, to class men as *white, African, English, moral,* and *Jews*, would not be a division of men, for these classes include one another.

(3) **The Principle of Division should be an actual and essential character of the divided whole.**—Unless such a principle be selected, there will be no distinct and recognizable line of demarcation between the subordinates.

(4) **No dividing member must of itself exhaust**

**the subject.**—This law follows from the axiom that a part is less than the whole. That then must be a faulty division which represents a part as exhausting the whole. A division of men into *intelligent* races and *barbarous* races, would violate this law, since all men possess some degree of intelligence, and are hence included under the first class.

(5) **The dividing members must together exhaust the notion, but not more.**—Leaving out a distinct class violates this law. Thus, if we were to divide all actions into the *morally good* and the *morally bad*, excluding those which possess no moral quality, the division would be incorrect. This division would be a correct one of *moral* actions, but not of actions generally, since some are morally indifferent. If we were to divide geometrical figures into *surfaces*, *solids*, *lines*, and *points*, we should more than exhaust the notion expressed by the word *figures*, for *lines* and *points*, though elements of figures, are not figures.

(6) **The dividing members should not include one another.**—This law is often practically difficult to follow. Presenting the same subordinate more than once is a violation of this law. A perfect exposition of a science would so classify its facts that they would appear but once. Practically this is almost impossible. Logic and Æsthetics, for example, are distinct from Rhetoric, but there could be no science of Rhetoric which should not repeat facts of Logic and Æsthetics. Again, the laws of Rhetoric are laws of mind, of idea, and of form, but they are all so interdependent that the same fact often reappears under each of these divisions.

(7) **A division should proceed continuously with-**

**out hiatus.**—Division may proceed through proximate or remote subdivisions. A perfect division does not leap over intermediate steps. Mathematicians may for brevity say, “Angles are either right, or acute, or obtuse.” A continuous division would be, “Angles are either right or oblique; and the oblique, either acute or obtuse.”

|  |   |
|--|---|
| <i>Imperfect.</i><br>Angles. { 1. Right.<br>2. Acute.<br>3. Obtuse | <i>Continuous.</i><br>Angles. { 1. Right.<br>2. Oblique. { (1) Acute.<br>(2) Obtuse |
|--|---|

### 9. Exposition of a Proposition.

A proposition may be explicated by the exposition of its terms. This exposition may be by definition or by division. The process may be illustrated.

(1) **By Definition.**—A proposition may be explicated by the definition of its terms. Let us take the proposition, “Democracy is promotive of liberty.” Assuming that the word “promotive” needs no exposition, we have an exposition of this proposition when we have defined the terms “democracy” and “liberty.” In seeking for the genus of “democracy,” we must first decide whether we mean a *form of government*, a *political party*, or the avowed *principles* of that party. If we mean the first, *form of government*, is the genus. The differentia is expressed in the phrase *by the people*, which distinguishes it from other forms of government. The logical definition of “democracy,” in this sense, is, *A form of government by the people.*

“Liberty” must now be defined. In its political sense, “liberty” may be referred to the genus *state of society*. It must now be distinguished from other states

of society, such as license, anarchy or despotism. The differentia *regulated by just laws* distinguishes it from these, since license is lawless, anarchy is the absence of law, and despotism interferes with it. The definition of "liberty" is, *A state of society regulated by just laws.* Substituting the two definitions for the original terms, we have the proposition, *A form of government by the people is promotive of a state of society regulated by just laws.* This is an exposition by definition of the original proposition.

(2) **By Division.**—Let us take the proposition "Free institutions are compatible with literary progress." Assuming that the expression "compatible with" needs no explanation, the exposition of the terms "free institutions" and "literary progress," is the exposition of the whole proposition. Before dividing the subject "free institutions," we must select a principle of division. Let it be the *interests* of society. These are *educational, political, religious, commercial, industrial,* etc. We may then state the proposition thus :

|      |   |  |   |   |
|------|---|--|---|---|
| Free | { | educational,<br>political,<br>religious,<br>commercial,<br>and<br>industrial | } | institutions are compatible with literary progress. |
|------|---|--|---|---|

We may now divide the predicate. "Literary progress" may be divided into the progress of the different departments embraced under the notion *literature*. These may be imperfectly enumerated as *oratory, poetry, history, criticism, journalism.* Substituting this complex predicate for the term "literary progress," we have this exposition of the original proposition :—

|      |   |   |  |
|------|---|---|--|
| Free | $\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{educational,} \\ \text{political,} \\ \text{religious,} \\ \text{commercial,} \\ \text{and} \\ \text{industrial} \end{array} \right\}$ | institutions are compatible<br>with progress in | $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{oratory,} \\ \text{poetry,} \\ \text{history,} \\ \text{criticism,} \\ \text{and} \\ \text{journalism.} \end{array} \right.$ |
|------|---|---|--|

It is important to note that if the expanded subject and predicate agree, the truth of the original proposition is made evident. If, on the contrary, disagreement can be shown between any element of the expanded predicate and any element of the expanded subject, it shows that the original proposition is not universally true.

## SECTION II.

### EXPOSITION OF THE NOTION THROUGH ITS RELATIONS.

When the logical exposition of a notion is not convenient, it may be explicated through its relation to other notions. Several methods of doing this may be enumerated.

#### 1. The Method of Particulars.

We may explicate a notion by mentioning particular cases or concrete instances. This is a simple expedient, adapted to a low order of intelligence, and requiring no powers of generalization. Thus, poetry may be explained by enumerating representative poems, and beauty by concrete examples of the beautiful in objects.

#### 2. The Method of Conditions.

A second method of explicating a notion is to mention the conditions essential to its production or exist-

tence. Thus the notion *dew* may be explained by the enumeration of the circumstances in which the moist are of atmospheric vapor condenses. Cause and effect are both included under this head.

### 3. The Method of Similars.

A general notion may be explained by comparing it to similar notions. No direct similitude is necessary, but simply a resemblance of relations. Our notions of divinity and supernatural beings are explicated through our notions of *being* and *spirit* as they are known to us in consciousness. Hence many of the most important ideas of philosophy and religion are explicated in this way.

### 4. The Method of Contrast.

We may give an exposition of a notion through its opposite. All knowledge is double. Heat and cold, light and darkness, good and evil, are fixed in thought as opposite poles. Some of our most common notions can be discriminated only by this method. The notion of *self*, or the *Ego*, is distinguished from the *not-self*, or *non-Ego*, by the method of contrast.



# CHAPTER IV.

## ARGUMENTATION.

### 1. The Rhetorical Use of Argument.

IN many modern systems of Rhetoric, argumentation has no place. The whole process of confirmation is referred to Logic. We need, however, to distinguish between the logical and the rhetorical treatment of the subject. Logic deals with the laws of thought as thought; Rhetoric deals with the laws of altering or producing conviction. The problem of Logic is, with certain propositions as premises, what conclusion may we draw in accordance with the laws of thought? The problem of Rhetoric concerning arguments is, given, a certain conclusion, how may we confirm it to the mind of another? Logic gives us the *test* of arguments; Rhetoric gives us the rules for making them *effective*. With this distinction, argumentation forms an important part of Rhetoric.

### 2. The Division of Arguments.

The first step in the treatment of arguments is to find a correct classification of their kinds. Several divisions have been given.

(1) **Form.**—They have been divided into irregular, or enthymemes, and regular, or syllogisms; syllogisms into categorical and hypothetical; the categorical into

those of the first, second, third, and fourth figures the hypothetical into the conditional and disjunctive, as in the following scheme :

|           |                                   |                                      |              |            |
|-----------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------|------------|
| Arguments | { I. Enthymemes<br>II. Syllogisms | { 1. Categorical<br>2. Hypothetical. | {            | 1st Figure |
|           |                                   |                                      | 2d Figure    |            |
|           |                                   |                                      | 3d Figure    |            |
|           |                                   |                                      | 4th Figure   |            |
|           |                                   |                                      | Conditional  |            |
|           |                                   |                                      | Disjunctive. |            |

This is evidently a division according to the *form* in which they may be stated, for any argument may be stated in any of the forms mentioned.

(2) **Subject Matter.**—Another division of arguments is into necessary or demonstrative, and moral or probable; thus :

|            |                        |                                |
|------------|------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Arguments. | {                      | I. Necessary or demonstrative, |
|            | II. Moral or probable. |                                |

This is evidently a division according to the nature of the *subject-matter*. In mathematics, all arguments are necessary; in human affairs, they are generally only probable.

(3) **Purpose.**—Arguments are also divided into direct or indirect, according as the intention is to establish a given proposition, or to reduce a proposition to an absurdity.

|           |               |            |
|-----------|---------------|------------|
| Arguments | {             | I. Direct, |
|           | II. Indirect. |            |

This is plainly a division according to the *purpose* for which the arguments are used.

(4) **Arguments as Such.**—The three schemes of division above mentioned do not divide arguments *as such*, but according to some peculiarity of form or use. Hence arguments may at once belong to all three classes. For example, the same argument may be a syllogism, necessary and direct.

In order to find a principle of division by which to classify arguments according to their essential nature, we must find wherein lies the essence of an argument. Arguments are distinguished from other propositions by *some relation between the subject-matter of the conclusion and the subject-matter of the proposition used as an argument*. A true classification of arguments will be a classification of the *kinds of relation* which may subsist between things. We find these kinds of relation to be three.

Let the conclusion to be established be, "It will rain to-morrow." What proposition can confirm this conclusion, or, in other words, serve as an argument to prove it? Clearly none whose subject-matter is not related to the production of rain. "The clouds are forming," would be such a proposition, because the forming of the clouds shows a *cause* which, if unimpeded, will produce rain.

Let the proposition be, "It has rained." What proposition will confirm this conclusion? "The ground is everywhere wet," would be a proposition whose subject-matter is related to the conclusion, since the general wetness is a *sign* or *effect* which requires rain as its necessary *condition*.

Let the proposition be, "Tyrants are selfish men." The proposition "Cæsar was a tyrant and a selfish man," would be an argument, because Cæsar is an *example* of tyrants, and the subject-matter of the two propositions is related by *resemblance*.

Causes, signs, and resemblances, are the only kinds of relation in the subject-matter by which a proposition can be established. The argument from cause is called the *a priori* argument. The arguments from

sign and resemblance are called *a posteriori* arguments. The division of arguments as such is exhibited in the following scheme :

|            |   |                           |   |                 |
|------------|---|---------------------------|---|-----------------|
| Arguments. | { | I. <i>A priori</i> .      | } | 1. Sign.        |
|            |   | II. <i>A posteriori</i> . |   | 2. Resemblance. |

These classes, with their subdivisions, will be treated more specifically in the following sections.

## SECTION I.

### A PRIORI ARGUMENTS.

#### 1. Nature of the Argument.

The *a priori* argument is an argument from *cause to effect*. By the word *cause* is here meant *whatever would account for a fact*, if the fact were admitted. In his sense the word sometimes but not always indicates a physical cause. If we were to adduce the proposition "The sun's rays are most nearly vertical in summer," to prove that "The earth is warmest in summer," the logical and physical causes would coincide. If we were to claim that A B and C possess intelligence because they are men, the logical cause would be distinct from any physical cause, for A B and C are no more intelligent because they are men than they are men because they are intelligent. Yet, since the fact that they are men *accounts for, i. e., explains why* they should be regarded as possessing intelligence, this is an *a priori* argument. The word *cause* is used in the popular sense.

#### 2. Extent of Inference from a Cause.

When a cause is known to exist, we may infer from its existence any effect which it is capable of produc-

ing, unless impediments are presented to its operation. Thus, if a man is known to entertain a bitter hatred of a neighbor, and that neighbor is found dead, with obvious marks of assassination, suspicion may point to the hostile neighbor. If impediments to the operation of hatred as the cause of this murder, such as fear of punishment, the fear of God, a forgiving spirit, absence from the place, or some similar circumstances, cannot be shown, the suspicion will be very strong. In this case, however, *a posteriori* proofs would be needed for conviction, since *other* causes might have produced this effect, even if hatred be admitted as an adequate cause. Let the case be a purely physical one. Let the steam be turned on in a locomotive, and it is certain that the locomotive will move, unless impeded by too heavy a train, or some other mechanical preventive.

### 3. The Absence of Cause.

As from an existing cause we may infer its effect, so, on the other hand, the absence of a cause is proof that the effect will not follow. If a tree is known to be without vitality, it is certain that it will not put forth leaves and bear fruit. If a man has no motive to commit a crime, and no opportunity of performing it, we may infer that it should not be laid to his charge. It may not always be necessary to assign causes, when the *a posteriori* proofs are overwhelming, for some causes are beyond our discovery, although their effects prove that they exist.

### 4. The Degree of Connection between Cause and Effect.

The degree of connection between a cause and its

effect is measured by the probability of hinderance. As this probability of hinderance varies greatly, so must the certainty of an effect when its cause exists and is operative. Physical causes are more closely connected with their effects than moral or mental. If we know the level of a water course, we know with certainty in what direction the water will flow. If a man is known to hate his neighbors, it is by no means certain that he will injure them; for he may be deterred by many motives unknown to any one besides himself. Even threatened violence with an opportunity for its exercise, would not place an alleged crime beyond all doubt. Wherever the *will* is concerned, the connection of cause and effect is uncertain.

### 5. Probability Established by a priori Arguments.

Probability is shown by *accounting* for an event, or producing its *causes*. In poetry and romance, it is not necessary that the causes should be real, but they should be such as to account for the effects. In fiction, an important rule is, to relate only such incidents as can be accounted for by the causes shown to be operative. The explanation need not be given until the mind is lost in mystery, but it shows a lack of art to close a volume without having given to the whole an air of probability, or, at least, of verisimilitude. Future events rest wholly upon *a priori* arguments. Examples may, indeed, be used to establish the probability of future occurrences, but not directly. The example implies the existence of a *cause* which will be likely to operate again as it has in the given case. This cause then becomes an *a priori* argument.

## 6 Ambiguity of Causal Words

Such words as *why*, *because*, and *therefore*, are ambiguous, since they may designate more than one kind of sequence. Clearness of thought in the use of *a priori* arguments requires a close distinction between these different senses. The word *why* for example, may inquire after the *physical* cause ; as, "Why do thunder storms occur in summer ?" the *logical* cause ; as, "Why is the sum of the angles in a triangle equal to two right angles ?" or the *final* cause or *purpose* ; as, "Why is man filled with aspirations after immortality ?"

### SECTION II.

## ARGUMENTS FROM SIGN.

### 1. Nature of the Argument.

The argument from *sign* is an argument from an effect to a condition. An effect implies the existence of some condition so connected with the effect that the existence of the condition may be inferred from the existence of the effect. For example, a man is found with a bloody dagger in his hand, and another man is found near by stabbed to death. The possession of a bloody dagger is an effect implying some use of the dagger as its condition. If no other condition than a *murderous* use of the dagger can be suggested, the possessor of the dagger is proved to be the murderer. If another use of the dagger is avowed, guilt must be determined by the balance of probability that the *murderous* use, and not the *alleged* use was the condition.

If a condition be absolutely essential to the effect, the existence of the effect is demonstrative proof of the condition. If a watch were found in an unpopulated island, it would be *demonstrative* proof that it had been carried there, that being the necessary condition of its being there. The presence of the watch would be *probable* evidence that a man had been there, but not *demonstrative*, for other conditions are supposable, such as the wreck of a vessel, and the drifting of some portion to the island.

## 2. The Calculation of Chances.

This leads us at once to the doctrine of chances, since it is often necessary to decide between several possible conditions, one of which must be inferred from the given effect. In the case above cited, a sophist might ask, what is the objection to the supposition that the watch was always on the island, was, in short, the product of unconscious natural forces? Men have reasoned similarly about the fossils of extinct animals. They have asked why these objects may not have been produced just as they are, and for no distinct purpose. The obvious answer is, they show marks of *design*. But the elements of these fossils or of this watch, apparently adjusted with so much skill, must exist in *some* form, why not in this? There are as many chances against one form as against any other given form. The solution of this difficulty lies in the fact that such reasoning presents a false alternative. The proper comparison of chances is not between this arrangement of particles in the watch and some other determinate arrangement, but between the probability of the watch being the product of unconscious forces and the prob-



ability of its being made by a man and brought to the island in some way. The comparison of chances in the case of the fossil is not between this arrangement as opposed to another, but between the probability that it was formed for *no purpose*, and the probability that it is the *remains* of some animal.

### 3. Proof of a Cause.

Among conditions, some have no causal connection with a phenomenon, others have such a connection. To use Whately's illustration, if a man dies to-day, we may infer that he was alive yesterday. His being alive yesterday, however, while an essential condition of his dying to-day, has no *tendency* to produce his death to-day. Some conditions have a causal relation to the effect. If the man dies to-day, some antecedent must be supposed to have produced this effect. It is impossible to prove any condition *as a cause* from the effect alone. A cause may prove an effect, if there are no hinderances, although there may be other causes; but the cause cannot be inferred from the effect, for it can never be certain that the cause supposed to be proved is the *only* or *operative* cause. Practically the cause may be inferred from the effect with sufficient probability to establish conviction when the essential condition seems to be only *one*. In that case, since every effect must have a cause, we infer that the sole condition must be the cause. But this proof is not demonstrative, for the true cause may be different from the supposed cause, and yet escape our detection.

### 4. Testimony.

Testimony is a kind of sign implying as a condition of its existence the truth of the fact attested. The

laws of motive render it probable that testimony would not be given if the attestation were not called forth by fact. The same law leads us to infer the possibility of a different condition, as incompetency, falsehood, etc. In every case where testimony is used as an argument, we must decide between the truth of the attestation on the one hand, and the incompetency or corruption of the witness on the other. The decision of such questions requires us to attend to several particulars affecting the value of testimony.

(1) **The Number of Witnesses.**—The greater the number of witnesses, other things being equal, the greater the value of the testimony. The number, however, is frequently overestimated, as when men bear witness to the truth of certain doctrines of religion and science. Having never given these a personal investigation, their testimony is not really to the truth of these doctrines, but to the fact that they are held as true.

(2) **Character of Witnesses.**—The moral and intellectual character of the witness is important to the value of the testimony. A man may be so deceived as to believe that to have happened which in reality never occurred. Dr. Whately regards the testimony of ignorant and prejudiced men as especially valuable when it attests things too abstruse for them to invent, or contrary to their prejudices. The testimony of the disciples of Jesus, though coming from comparatively ignorant men, is not the less valuable since they testify to facts which they had not the ingenuity to invent, and to doctrines contrary to all their Jewish prejudices.

(3) **Concurrent Witnesses.**—Concurrent testimony is especially valuable if there has been no opportunity

for collusion. Too close concurrence, however, leads to the suspicion of previous conference, and the invention of a tale. The testimony of different witnesses who have observed the same transaction ought to present differences of detail from their having occupied different points of view, and from their subjective modification of the facts, as well as from observing at slightly different periods of time. The slight difference in the stories of the evangelists with reference to the garment worn by our Saviour at his crucifixion, is confirmatory of their trustworthiness as witnesses. The difference may naturally be accounted for either by the different times of day when the observations were made, or by an optical difference not uncommon, or, perhaps, both. The divergence of statement is proof that there was no collusion.

(4) **Adverse Witnesses.**— Adverse testimony is usually incidental, as in the Jewish work called the “Generation of Jesus,” which refers the miracles of Jesus to magic, thereby admitting their actual performance. Such evidence will generally be found in some minute detail, but the intrinsic insignificance of the circumstance is no measure of its value in an argument. Much skill in cross-examination may be necessary to draw out the testimony of an unwilling witness, or to show the inconsistency of his story. Dr. Whately cautions against brow-beating a witness, and sums up the whole philosophy of cross-examination in the forcible sentence: “The more the storm blusters, the more carefully he wraps round him the cloak which a warm sunshine will often induce him to throw off.” \*

\* *Rhetoric*, Part I., Chap. 11.

(5) **Character of Facts Attested.**—We need to distinguish sharply between matters of fact and matters of opinion. Witnesses almost invariably mingle their own opinions and explanations with the facts actually observed. Testimony as to matters of fact is valuable when the witness is *honest* and has *sound senses*. Testimony to matters of opinion requires *intelligence*, or the ability to form a judgment, in addition to honesty and sound organs of perception. Any thing beyond the natural expectations of the witness, and so not likely to enter his mind except by the actual occurrence, is of additional weight on that account. So the omission from a story of what would naturally occur to a fabricator, is indicative of truth.

(6) **The Denial of Testimony.**—To deny the story of a witness is to believe that he has invented it, or is deluded. Here we need to remember that belief and disbelief are the same mental state with regard to contradictory propositions. The proper opposite of belief is *doubt*, or indecision. To reject testimony is, therefore, to affirm that some other condition than truth must be inferred,—invention, or misunderstanding.

### 5. Authority.

The opinions of competent men are often used as an argument, and in this case the argument is called proof from authority. Authority is a kind of sign, since its existence supposes the truth of what is asserted as a condition of the assertion's being made. Thus, in legal decisions, the ability and honesty of the judge, and the careful advocacy of both sides by competent lawyers, assure us that the decision would not have been what it is, unless truth and law required it

to be so. Quotations from the Scriptures, precedents in law, the opinions of philosophers, and the decisions of physicians, are all valid arguments in their respective spheres, because their existence implies truth as the condition of their being what they are. The multiplicity of facts and the preoccupation of men with their special lines of investigation, render authority a chief source of conviction in departments of thought lying without our range of personal observation. Our religious, political, and philosophical doctrines, usually rest on this kind of proof.

### 6. The Progressive Argument.

Another kind of argument belonging to the class called sign, is "the argument from progressive approach." It consists of a series of signs, each one of which proves more conclusively than the preceding that a certain condition exists. If we roll a ball along the floor, it ceases moving after it has rolled a short distance. We may infer from the effect, that friction and gravitation and the resistance of the air retard it, and that if these retarding causes were removed, it would roll on forever. We roll a smoother ball over a smoother floor, and the duration of its motion is increased. If we continue to diminish the resistance as much as possible, the duration of the motion increases in proportion to this diminution. A succession of signs satisfies the mind that if these means of resistance were entirely removed, a body with a given momentum would move on forever with undiminished velocity. This argument may be applied to moral as well as to physical cases. Bishop Butler has employed it in the "Analogy" to show the inherent power of virtue.

## SECTION III.

**ARGUMENTS FROM RESEMBLANCE.****1. Nature of the Argument.**

The argument from resemblance rests upon the constancy of nature. It has no validity except upon the ground that what is true in a certain case or cases will be true in other similar cases. It is evident that this argument is liable to great abuse, owing to the difficulty of deciding what cases are essentially similar. If it be true that like cases are owing to like causes and produce like effects, it is equally true that unlike cases are not referable to like causes, and are not productive of like effects. Hence the value of the argument depends wholly upon the detection of essential resemblances.

**2. Essential Resemblances.**

In order to test the validity of arguments founded on resemblance, we must have some criterion by which to distinguish between important and unimportant resemblances. It is not necessary that the cases should correspond in *every particular*. Men may belong to different nations, engage in different pursuits, and have different habits of life, yet they possess certain qualities in common with all men, and so far as they resemble one another what is affirmed of one may be affirmed of another. Sophists are ever ready with the objection that the cases differ in *some* respects. They may differ in *all* respects except *one*, and still the argument from resemblance may be valid. Again, the cases may re

resemble each other in every particular except one, and still the argument from resemblance may be invalid. The essential point is, *are the similar features owing to the same cause?*

Let us take, for example, the proposition, "All tyrants are selfish." We may adduce as an argument the proposition, "Cæsar and Napoleon were selfish." Here the resemblance between "all tyrants" and "Cæsar and Napoleon" is the basis of the argument. Tyrants may differ in many personal qualities, in nationality, and in the age in which they live. They resemble one another, however, in one important point, *the desire of controlling others*. If this distinctive point of resemblance be referable to *selfishness* as its sole cause, *i. e.*, if tyranny be an effect of selfishness, it is clear that all tyrants are selfish, for selfishness is the cause of their being tyrants. Arguments from resemblance are but *probable*, for they are valid only in so far as they prove a common cause, but the proof of a cause is never more than probable. The degree of probability depends partly upon the closeness of connection between the cause and its effect. As in *a priori* arguments, physical causes and effects are more closely connected than moral causes and effects.

### 3. Example.

(1) **Nature of Example.**—Among the varieties of argument founded upon resemblance, the simplest, and, perhaps, most common is example. The logical analysis of this argument is as follows. We assume, as a major premise, that whatever is true of the case adduced as an example, is universally true in like cases. In the minor premise we assert something to be true in

the example. In the conclusion we infer that what has been asserted is true of all like cases. Using this conclusion as a major premise, we assert in the minor that an individual case belongs to the class mentioned in the major, and our conclusion is, that the assertion in the major applies to the individual case.

(2) **Invented Examples.**—Fictitious cases are often adduced as arguments. They are legitimate in proportion to their verisimilitude. Aristotle cites an instance of invented example used by Socrates, in which the latter shows the absurdity of choosing magistrates by lot by the folly of selecting a pilot in the same manner; since, if the lot fell on an unskilled person, it would probably result in the loss of the ship. Although only a supposed case, this example has considerable force. This force is wholly derived from its *general* truth; *i. e.*, it is such a case as *might* arise, and if it should, the relations of cause and effect would be as represented.

(3) **Illustrative Examples.**—Examples are frequently used merely as illustrations, not to confirm out to explain a proposition. Illustrative examples affirm nothing more than a resemblance, argumentative examples affirm a common cause of which the resemblance is the effect. Hence it is unfair to treat mere illustrations as if they were designed as arguments. Fables and legends are frequently employed as embellishments of discourse, or to explain the general meaning. It is sophistical to attack these as unreal, as if the truth of the main proposition depended upon the truth of the illustrations. It is fair and important, however, to point out the fact that these explanatory examples have no argumentative force, and



should be taken, not as instances of the general truth alleged, but as supposed consequences of it. In this case the truth of the examples presupposes the general truth, and hence it would be arguing in a circle to prove the law from supposed instances. Suppositions illustrate, but prove nothing.

#### 4. Induction.

If we stop at the general conclusion of the first syllogism in the illustration of example, the argument is called induction. The cases from which the conclusion is drawn may be one or many, according to the nature of the subject-matter. In physical investigation, one experiment may be sufficient to establish the conclusion. If, for example, a substance turns blue litmus paper red at the first trial, the chemist is satisfied that the substance possesses acid properties. If five men have died in a certain town on five successive Saturdays, it would be a hasty inference to lay it down as certain that some citizen of that town will die on every following Saturday. As in the argument from example, we must eliminate as far as possible what is accidental, and determine what is essential and causal in the similar cases. This is done in several ways.

(1) **The Method of Agreement.**—When two or more phenomena are uniformly associated, as a surface colder than the surrounding air and the production of dew, we infer that one of the associated phenomena is the cause of the other. There is great danger of error in the use of this method. Thus misfortune and piety may be associated uniformly in the enterprises of a man, but it would be fallacious to make the one the cause of the other, on that ground alone

(2) **The Method of Difference**—When a phenomenon A is not associated with a phenomenon B, but is uniformly associated with a phenomenon C, we may infer that A is caused by some difference between B and C. When that difference lies in a single particular, that particular may be regarded as the cause of A, if it be of a causal nature. If, for example, times were hard under one administration of the government, and prosperous under a new rule, with no difference in the state of affairs except that a change had been made in the financial system, the new rule would properly be regarded as the cause of prosperity. This is the method of difference. This also is liable to sophistic uses. The failure to detect any other difference than the change may be owing to the limitation of our faculties or our facilities for knowing. A common laborer may be led by a demagogue to attribute to a new administration what is really owing to some other cause, as a good crop, or a demand for labor occasioned by a new discovery.

(3) **The Method of Residues**.—If we carry out the method of difference as far as possible by removing one condition after another until one remains, we may regard the remaining circumstance as the cause. If we wish to find the cause of a man's failure to perform a certain piece of work, we may show that his failure was not for want of help, for help was given; nor of time, for there was sufficient time; nor of ability, for he was fully capable; nor on account of sickness, for he was in good health; nor because of preoccupation, for he was at leisure; nor from forgetfulness, for he was reminded at the time; nor from indolence, for he was fond of labor; we may infer that it was very probably

*unwillingness.* This, however, cannot be inferred unless every other equally probable supposition has been excluded. This is called the method of residues.

(4) **The Method of Concomitant Variations.**—If now we vary the circumstances, so as to produce gradations of a phenomenon, we have the method of concomitant variations. If it be shown that the higher we raise the temperature of a mass of iron the more space the mass occupies, we conclude that heat expands iron.

By these methods we determine whether or not a particular fact exists, and whether or not certain particular facts are similar. By induction we infer that these particular truths are universal. No real induction is formally valid. In affirming that what is true of a part is true of the whole we transcend our actual knowledge, and hence may fall into error. The four methods above are intended to reduce this possible error to its minimum.

### 5. Analogy.

The argument from analogy is founded on a resemblance of *relations*, while ordinary examples are founded on a *direct* resemblance. There is an analogy between the human heart and a great city, and hence it has been argued that when the size of a city is greatly increased its functions are impaired. The argument of the inhabitation of the planets is of this kind, since they resemble the earth in their general relations, though not in all particulars. The argument from analogy has great force in winning the assent of superficial thinkers, but its logical analysis reveals the danger of depending upon it, unless confirmed by collateral proofs.

## SECTION IV.

**THE CONDUCT OF A DISCUSSION.**

Argumentation, unlike the other elementary forms of discourse, admits of two sides, and implies mental conflict. The conduct of an argumentative discussion requires skill in addition to a knowledge of the different classes of arguments. We shall, therefore, in this section consider those principles of argumentation which govern the enforcement of our ideas when they are exposed to opposition. This subject naturally falls under the following heads: (1) the PREPARATION OF THE QUESTION; (2) the INTRODUCTION; (3) the CONFIRMATION OF THE THESIS; and (4) REFUTATION. These will now be treated in their order.

**I. THE PREPARATION OF THE QUESTION.****1. Necessity of Preparation.**

The importance of attending to the form of the proposition to be proved is equally great whether it is to be discussed affirmatively and negatively by different persons, or is to constitute the theme of a single speaker or writer. It is not necessary that the proposition be formally announced at the beginning. If it be offensive or insignificant, its announcement should be withheld until the facts and arguments have removed the prejudices against it. But if the proposition to be proved be laid down in the author's mind in the beginning, and be steadily held in view throughout the discussion, it will insure the absence of what is irrel-

avant, and impart to the whole train of argument the character of coherence and adaptation.

## 2. Exposition.

When the proposition is laid down, it should be carefully studied, in order to satisfy the mind that it is just what is meant to be asserted, and that we are prepared to establish precisely this proposition and not another allied to it. Debate is frequently rendered unnecessary by mere exposition ; the apprehension of the real meaning putting the question beyond all doubt. When the proposition is perfectly clear, a formal and avowed exposition of it is unnecessary. All ambiguities and special senses should be explained in the beginning. If the proposition is to be debated, it should be stated in the form of an affirmative resolution. The advocate of the affirmative assumes the burden of proof, and until arguments are advanced in confirmation of the proposition, none are needed in refutation. Much has been written on "presumption and burden of proof." The simple and universal rule on the subject is, that the burden of proof always lies with the affirmative. This rule is founded on the self-evident principle that no one should be bound to prove a negative.

## 3. Concession.

In the exposition of any question it will be seen that there are certain facts which both sides admit. These should be eliminated from the discussion by a concession of their reality. Silence is often interpreted as concession. Care should be taken to deprive an opponent of the right to claim such a concession. A

topic may be waived, with the express promise to consider it at another time. This may properly be done, as it may not be possible to put the topic in its true light until certain facts and arguments have been presented. Sophists frequently waive a subordinate but important proposition, and evade any farther consideration of it, or finally claim that it is unnecessary.

#### 4. Contrary Opinions.

It is often advisable to state contrary opinions at the beginning. There are several advantages in this belonging to different cases. When the only alternative opinion is manifestly absurd, the statement that it is the *only alternative* will win favor for the proposition maintained. When there are other alternatives besides the one assumed by our opponent, a statement of that fact has the effect of leading to the belief that if we are wrong, our opponent at least may not be right. Other theories may have to be cleared away before our own can be established. Burke begins his work on the "Sublime and Beautiful" by showing that beauty does not consist in "adaptation," "proportion," or "perfection."

## II. THE INTRODUCTION.

### 1. Design of an Introduction.

An introduction is not an essential part of a composition. Its very name implies that it is preparatory to something else, which is complete in itself, but needs to be brought into relation with the time and occasion. Hence Cicero's rule was, to compose the introduction

after he had finished the composition. Mere generalities are thus avoided, and the introduction is made truly subservient to its end. Although the *attention* needs to be stimulated less than at any other part of a discourse, since all attend to the first few words, it is desirable to arouse *interest* by the character of the introduction.

## 2. Kinds of Introduction.

Adaptation to its purpose requires that the introduction vary with the character of the composition. A few varieties are enumerated by Dr. Whately which readily suggest others.

(1) **Inquisitive.**—The inquisitive introduction aims to arouse interest by asking some question, or showing the importance of what is to be treated.

(2) **Paradoxical.**—When one is perfectly sure of his proofs, it may stimulate interest to state the conclusion to be reached in some paradoxical way, or to represent it as strange or unusual.

(3) **Corrective.**—It may be well to show that the subject has been misunderstood, neglected, or misrepresented, and should therefore engage the attention. This may be called the corrective introduction. It is particularly appropriate if the subject be a trite one.

(4) **Preparatory.**—It is sometimes necessary to guard against some mistake, explain some peculiarity in the discussion, or account for some deficiency. This has been called the preparatory introduction.

(5) **Narrative.**—It is often desirable to inform the reader or hearer of some event, or to describe some state of affairs, necessary to be known for the comprehension of what is to follow. All historical questions

require an introduction of this kind. This is the narrative introduction.

Two or more of these forms may be combined.

### III. CONFIRMATION.

#### 1. The Uses of the Different Classes of Arguments.

When the thesis has been laid down, formally or mentally, we need to confirm it by such arguments as are best suited to its nature. The uses of the various arguments will, therefore, now be considered.

(1) **A Priori.**—The *a priori* argument is used to *account* for a fact, and to establish *future events*. As has been shown, we may infer an effect from the existence of a cause, proportionately to the tendency of the cause to produce the effect. In this way past events are explained, and future events are anticipated.

(2) **Sign.**—The argument from sign is used to establish a fact after its occurrence, or as a general truth. Thus murder could be proved by testimony, or by circumstantial signs, such as blood on the hands, possession of an identified weapon, an effort to conceal one's self, etc. A general truth may be proved by authority; as, for example a legal or religious doctrine.

(3) **Resemblance.**—Arguments from resemblance are less certain than the preceding kinds, but often quite as satisfactory to minds predisposed to the conclusion. They are most useful in showing the *consistency* of an alleged fact. Induction is the means of establishing new *general* truths, as in the sciences. Future events are inferred from examples, but always on the assumption of a common cause uniformly acting.



## 2. The Arrangement of Arguments.

(1) **Importance of Arrangement.**—As in the military art, so in composition, arrangement is of the greatest importance. If one were to attempt to prove that a miracle had been performed without giving any reason why it should be, the proofs would need to be very strong in order to be satisfactory. If, however, it be first shown that a revelation might be expected from a benevolent deity, and that it could not be confirmed without miracles, much less proof would be necessary. In the contest between Æschines and Demosthenes concerning the crown, the former requested the judges to require the latter to adopt the same arrangement in his reply as had previously been chosen by his adversary. Demosthenes rightly claimed that this demand was unfair, and chose his own order.

(2) **Order of Arguments According to Kind.**—It is plain that *a priori* arguments ought to have the precedence, since they render natural what might otherwise seem improbable. A theory of the causes cannot always be given, but it is desirable that a fact be accounted for. *A posteriori* arguments, or positive proofs of the facts, are then received with less hesitation. The argument from cause may not be sufficient. It does not follow because a phenomenon *might* occur, that it actually *did* occur. When antecedent probability has been established by arguments from cause to effect, arguments from sign and resemblance may be added to show that the causes alleged were actually operative, and did produce the alleged effect.

(3) **Order of Arguments According to Strength.**—The most *obvious* arguments should come first, yet not

in such a way as to bring the *weakest* first. The Nestorian arrangement of troops, with the weakest in the middle, suggests an advantageous order of arguments. It avoids anti-climax, and at the same time opens the discussion with a strong argument. An inverse recitation of the arguments also obviates the effect of anti-climax, when in the original order the weakest comes last. A mere mention of the weak arguments at the beginning, with the statement that you do not rely upon them or mean to use them, may often prove effective.

(4) **Proving by Installments.**—Sometimes it is necessary to divide a proposition into several, and to prove each of these by itself. If Paley in his *Evidences* had proceeded at once to prove that we ought to believe the statements of the Scriptures, his argument would have been unnecessary in the view of believers, and probably inconclusive in the view of skeptics. He proves several propositions which together establish his main proposition, and thus the discussion is made entertaining to believers and conclusive to many who were skeptical. His successive propositions are as follows:—

(a) The apostles *suffered*.

(b) They suffered *knowingly*.

(c) They suffered *for their testimony*.

(d) They testified to *miracles*.

(e) The miracles were the *same as are recorded in the New Testament*.

#### IV. REFUTATION.

Refutation consists in overthrowing arguments and objections opposed to the thesis which we wish to con-

firm. Several particulars with reference to its management are of great importance.

### 1. Modes of Refutation.

A conclusion can be combated in two ways ; we may prove its contradictory, or we may overthrow the arguments by which it has been supported.

(1) **Proving the Contradictory.**—Since contradictories cannot both be true, it is a practical refutation of an argument to prove the contradictory of its conclusion. This is often easier than to detect and exhibit the fault of an opposing argument. In this way writers who know nothing of each other's works may refute each other's statements. While important and often sufficient, this mode of procedure is not specifically refutatory.

(2) **Overthrowing Arguments.**—Refutation, in its specific sense, means the overthrow of an opposing argument. This overthrow may be accomplished in two ways : we may deny one of the premises, or show a fallacy in the process of reasoning.

We may deny the premise when it is false. The false premise is generally suppressed, and the argument stated as an enthymeme. A syllogistic statement of the argument will generally reveal the falsity of the suppressed premise, and this may then be pointed out. The deistic argument against the divine authority of Moses may be stated thus:

*Major*, A divinely appointed lawgiver would certainly reveal the doctrine of immortality :

*Minor*, Moses does not mention it ;

*Conclusion*, Moses was not a divinely appointed lawgiver.

The deistic argument, *as stated by its advocates*, suppressed the major premise, which was supplied by Warburton,\* who denies its truth, and thus refutes their argument.

One way of showing the falsity of a premise is to make it a premise of a syllogism in which the other premise is an admitted truth, and hence to draw an absurd conclusion. This proves the falsity of the premise taken from the opposing argument, for in a correct syllogism there is no alternative except to deny a premise or accept the conclusion. The conclusion cannot be accepted for it is absurd, the supplied premise cannot be denied for it is an admitted truth; hence the opponent's premise must be false. The conclusion of an opponent may be made a premise and proved false in the same manner. This is called the indirect argument, or *reductio ad absurdum*. It is particularly adapted to controversy on account of its irony, and power to turn the laugh on an opponent. It is said of an argument which can be thus answered, "the argument proves too much," since, if true, absurdities would logically follow from it. In his "Defence of Natural Society by a Late Noble Lord," Burke, feigning to accept the principles of Bolingbroke, makes the arguments brought by the latter against ecclesiastical institutions overthrow civil society as well, thus showing that the arguments prove too much.

The detection of fallacies in the reasoning is a purely logical process. If a fallacy exist, it will be found by running over the list of fallacies given in Logic, and testing the argument with respect to each. When the fallacy is seen the simplest refutation is the

\* *Divine Legation.*

construction of a parallel case in which the logical fault will be evident to all.

## 2. Treatment of Objections.

Objections may be offered which are not expressed in the form of arguments. In order to exhibit their argumentative value they should be thrown into a regular syllogistic form. If this be impossible, the opponent may be challenged to show the bearing of his objection; if it be exhibited as a syllogism, its answer will be more readily suggested. Several rules of a special character deserve attention in the treatment of objections.

(1) **Valid Objections on Both Sides.**—There may be valid objections on both sides of a question. If two armies are contending, one advocate may rightly urge the superior skill of his friends, another may claim the superior equipment of his friends, as reasons why each should be victorious. Both sides here have reasons for expecting victory, both sides are met with objections, and no logic but the logic of events can decide between the opposing claims. Even in physical science such objections may exist on both sides. There are objections to the infinite divisibility of matter, and objections to the contradictory doctrine. These difficulties often grow out of the limitation of our faculties and the relativity of our knowledge. Valid objections should be candidly explained as referable to such a deficiency in our powers or our knowledge.

(2) **Decisive Objections.**—Objections to our views may be offered which are not only valid, but really decide the question at issue. Such objections should be acknowledged as final. It is more expedient, to say

nothing of the ethical quality of the action, to acknowledge error than to resist palpable truth. No one believes in our infallibility when we are not moved by obvious truth, but a confession of error inspires confidence in one's honesty of purpose. There is sometimes a sophistical acknowledgment for no other purpose than the establishment of a reputation for fairness.

(3) **Statement of Objections.**—If objections are not stated in their full force, there is danger of producing the opinion that we either underestimate the full force of the opposing statements, or are not prepared to meet them. On the other hand, it is still more unfair, if not so inexpedient, to overstate objections, making them appear to be made against more than they really oppose. Thus a person who objects to a certain *interpretation* of the Scriptures is often represented as rejecting the *authority* of the whole book. Those who object to certain *modes* of public trial and punishment are sometimes answered as if they rejected *all* administration of justice.

### 3. Cautions concerning Refutation.

The attempt to satisfy other minds that our ideas alone are correct is attended with some special dangers.

(1) **Too Forcible Refutation.**—A violent attack upon some objection or argument may magnify unduly its importance. When a man lays aside his coat and makes great preparation for labor, it leads us to suppose that he is impressed with the magnitude of his task. A debater may easily give his auditors a similar impression by laboring too obviously to overthrow an objection.

(2) **Too Great Clearness.**—If any new proposition

be established too clearly, it may create surprise that any one could ever have doubted it, or that wise men should have failed to discover it, or that so able a man as your opponent could possibly dissent from it and hence it may be concluded that there is some subtle fallacy in your argument, which it is difficult to detect.

(3) **Prior Convictions.**—This will be more likely to be the case if the persons addressed have themselves strongly held the opinions controverted. They are unwilling to believe that they have been so long embracing nonsense without knowing it. It is more natural to conclude that the speaker or writer is either ignorant of some fact, or that his argument is fallacious.

(4) **Accusations.**—This feeling reaches its height and is accompanied with indignation when a direct charge of criminality or imbecility is made against those who hold the opinion refuted. Men who have been actuated by right motives in holding these views, and there are generally some such in every sect or party, know the unfairness and untruthfulness of these charges. They, at least, did not hold the opinions condemned, from any other than pure motives, and they do not believe themselves wholly stupid. They, therefore, prefer to regard their calumniator as a foe, whose arguments they may not answer, but whose conclusions they indignantly repel.

(5) **Weak Arguments.**—When the arguments to be refuted are excessively weak, it is often difficult to make them appear more foolish than they seem to be, without a direct charge of absurdity. As such arguments are usually advanced by such persons as are not really convinced by them, but who must say something

they are not likely to convince any one else. If they are answered by really strong arguments, they will have no force with the candid, and to others the most successful refutation will be of small account, for

“ One convinced against his will,  
Is of the same opinion still.”

(6) **Accessible Authorities.**—It is generally best to use only those authorities which are accessible to the class addressed. Appeals to writers in other languages and to unknown philosophers will have very little weight, if the opponent chooses to deny that the citations apply. People holding different views from those maintained suspect subtlety when a reasoner sets aside the received translation of the Scriptures, and attempts to expound the original. However necessary this may be in order to arrive at truth, this procedure is looked upon as a resort of one whose views are not confirmed by the received version, but who can wrest the original to his purpose without the risk of detection. None but recognized scholars are safe in attempts of this kind, and even they are less liable to misconstruction when they are addressing those competent to understand their exposition. These remarks are not so fully applicable to those who are addressing persons who are already convinced.

(7) **Place for Answering Objections.**—Whately advises placing the answer of objections in the middle of the argument, but nearer the beginning than the end. He says on this point: “If indeed very strong objections have obtained much currency, or have been just stated by an opponent, so that what is asserted is likely to be regarded as paradoxical, it may be advis-



able to begin with a refutation ; but when this is not the case, the mention of objections in the opening will be likely to give a paradoxical air to our assertion, by implying a consciousness that much may be said against it. If again all mention of objections be deferred to the last, the arguments will often be listened to with prejudice by those who may suppose us to be overlooking what may be urged on the other side. Sometimes indeed it will be difficult to give a satisfactory refutation of the opposed opinions, till we have gone through the arguments in support of our own ; even in that case, however, it will be better to take some brief notice of them early in the composition, with a promise of afterwards considering them more fully, and refuting them. \*


\* *Rhetoric.* Part I, Chap. iii. § 7.



**BOOK III.**

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**LAW S OF . FORM**



## BOOK III.—LAWS OF FORM.

### 1. The Importance of Method.

If the principles of style were derived by a more philosophical method, there would be fewer sympathizers with the satiric fling of Hudibras,

“For all a rhetorician’s rules  
Teach nothing but to name his tools.”

The chief reason why so small a value is attached to precepts of style is, that they savor too much of arbitrary statement in pedantic forms, of which many are ignorant who are practical masters of the art of expression. There is a lack of scientific analysis and co-ordination in both methods and precepts. As a consequence there is a prevalent skepticism concerning the value of rhetorical studies. The fact that a passage is pleasing does not entitle it to legislate for all similar compositions. It must first be shown *why* it is pleasing, and *what* in it is pleasing. We must not suppose that a form of expression is good because it has fortuitously been made the medium of revealing a noble sentiment, or an original thought. Scientific analysis must so dissect its specimens as to show whether it is the *idea* or the *form* which delights us, and *why* it delights us. We have been taught that “figures of speech are ornamental” and “impart vivacity to the expression.” Writers on style have classified figures by imposing upon us a cumbrous and useless nomenclature, but seldom explain *why* they contribute force to language. The truths dogmatically embodied in such rules as “Use short sen-

tences," "Avoid long parentheses," "Use Saxon rather than Latin words," would gain a new power over our minds if they were derived from fundamental principles of mind and language, and grouped according to a scientific ordination. As the law of gravitation, so simple and yet so important, explains all the phenomena of celestial motion, so there must be some principle underlying the effects of language upon the mind, some general law of expression, which will explain the phenomena of style.

## **2. The Process of Interpreting a Sentence.**

As a general law must be operative in every sentence, we must expect to find such a law in what is most central and necessary in converting a sentence into thought, or interpreting its meaning. In this process we perform certain acts and have certain feelings. These acts are as follows.

(1) **Exercise of Presentative Power.** — In the communication of a word, something from without is obtruded upon the attention through the external senses. The mind is, however, occupied with its own processes. If those processes are very absorbing, as in persons given to abstraction and deep reflection, the attention is not readily attracted. If the processes are of small subjective interest, as generally in young and non-reflecting persons, a very slight cause is sufficient to attract the attention; but, for this very reason, it cannot be long retained. From these facts it is evident that the perception of a sight or sound is an act of the mind requiring the exercise of its powers. When we read or hear a sentence, a certain amount of *presentative* power is necessary to put its separate elements before the mind.

(2) **Exercise of Conservative Power.**—Language, written or spoken, depends upon *time*. When we look at a *picture*, the eye receives *simultaneously* rays from all points of its surface, and these form a single image, which the mind receives as *one*. When we read or hear a *sentence*, the mind receives through the eye or ear certain signs of ideas, not simultaneously, but in *succession*. Supposing each word to suggest to the mind a distinct conception, as it must to be of any value to the sentence, the conception conveyed by the first word receives a modification from every additional word. The mind must put forth a new effort with every added syllable, to perceive it and introduce it to the attention. At the same time it must hold the syllables already perceived for comparison and union with those that follow. Here is a duplex act of memory: first, to recall the *significance* of each word as it is perceived; and, secondly, to retain both the sign and the thing signified until the period is ended, so that all the modifications may be made. Here is an expenditure of *conservative* power.

(3) **Exercise of Representative Power.**—As the signs of thought are introduced into the mind they, if familiar, readily suggest, or, if strange, totally fail to suggest, that which they are designed to represent. Imagination, by its magical power, combines these isolated fragments of ideas into complete wholes. Here is another expenditure of power, a *representative* power,—we may almost call it an architectural power, framing together materials which another mind has cut and fitted, so as to construct within our own consciousness the edifice which another has first built in his.

(4) **Exercise of Realizing Power.**—The mind is

now in possession of the idea as a whole, or, more strictly, of its own conception of the idea meant to be expressed. Three distinct acts have been performed, and yet the mind is not assured of the truth or falsity of the statement. In order to decide this, the assertion must be *compared* with the stock of ideas previously acquired by experience or instruction. If the image presented in the sentence be designed to arouse emotion, the conception must be *contemplated*, in order to elicit the desired feeling. These two processes, comparing and contemplating, require a new expenditure of power, which we may call the power of *realization*.

### 3. Deduction of the General Law of Style.

(1) **Economy of Interpreting Power.**—The interpretation of a sentence requires an expenditure of mental power, and the realization of the idea demands the use of more. Since the mind possesses but a limited amount of power at any one time available, it is clear that the more we expend in *interpreting* a sentence, *i. e.*, in translating it into thought, the less we have available for *realizing* the idea. But realization is the end of communication; hence the less power required to interpret a sentence, the more excellent it is as a mode of expression.

(2) **Economy of the Feelings.**—But, apart from the effect of the *idea* upon the feelings, the *form of expression* produces an effect. If a beautiful idea is expressed in harsh and rude words, it is plain that the resultant feeling will be less agreeable in proportion to the amount of sensitive power wasted on the form of words. In other terms, if ten represent the degree of admiration which the idea by itself is capable of ex-



cing, and three the degree of aversion which the words excite, the resultant feeling of admiration will be only seven-tenths of what it would be if the form of words did not detract from it. Hence the necessity of economizing the power of feeling.

(3) **Summary.**—To sum up our results, we find as the prominent fact of our analysis, that the interpretation of language requires *acts* and produces *feelings*. Each of these acts and feelings requires the exercise of power. The mind possesses at any one moment but a limited amount of available power. The object of expression is the realization of ideas. This realization also requires an exercise of power. Since the power of the mind is divided between interpretation and realization, the most general law of style is :

THAT FORM OF LANGUAGE IS MOST EXCELLENT WHICH YIELDS ITS CONTAINED IDEA WITH THE LEAST EXPENDITURE OF MENTAL POWER.

The simplicity of this law does not diminish its value, for it is neither more simple nor more general than Aristotle's *dictum* in Logic. A comparative statement of the law is necessary, since no style can be absolutely perfect. Any form of expression requires the expenditure of *some* power. As in machinery perfection consists in reducing the friction to the minimum, not in annihilating it, which is impossible, so in expression the highest attainable excellence is but relative.

#### 4. Apparent Exceptions.

(1) **Intentional Obscurity.**—There are occasions when the design is to obscure the sense. This is the case when one is compelled to speak and desires to cov

veal his real sentiments ; when time is to be occupied in discussing a question upon which one has little to say, and yet does not wish to appear to wander from his subject ; when, as in the Delphian oracles, two interpretations are intentionally made possible so that unknown occurrences may not furnish contradictions ; where one aims to appear profound when perspicuity would reveal his superficiality. Of such a composer Pope says :

“Of darkness visible so much he lent,  
As half to show, half veil the deep intent.”

(2) **Excessive Perspicuity.**—Complaint is sometimes made against language being too perspicuous, as when a writer presents a plain thought in an infinite number of lights. In such cases the complaint is improperly directed, for it lies more against the thought than against the style. To such a writer we might apply, with Campbell, Bassanio’s description of Gratiano’s conversation :

“He speaks an infinite deal of nothing. His reasons are as two grains of wheat hid in two bushels of chaff ; you shall seek all day ere you find them ; and when you have them they are not worth the search.”

While, then, for exceptional and generally unworthy purposes, it may be desirable to overtax the interpreting powers, in order to diminish the power of realization, true excellence of style consists in the strictest economy of them. Our object is not to show how style may be made usefully bad, but why it is good.

### **5. The Composer's Powers not to be Economized.**

Our general law of style regards the economy of mental power on the part of the interpreter as the great aim of expression. It should not be supposed that the composer's powers are to be economized. He who would attain perfect clearness and accuracy of expression must be prodigal of his own powers, and so use them as to leave the least possible labor to the interpreter. It may be useful to remember that all the confessed masters of expression have been lavish of their toil. The aspirant after literary honors should recollect that Demosthenes spent three months toiling by a dim lamp in a subterranean study, while elaborating and retouching a single oration; that Virgil pronounced the "Æneid" imperfect, after eleven years of labor on it; that Tasso's manuscript was almost illegible with corrections; that Pascal sometimes spent twenty days on a single one of those famous "Provincial Letters" which even Voltaire called "one of the best books ever published in France." Nor should it be forgotten, on the other hand, that the nameless multitude of those whom oblivion has buried were too indolent or too hasty "to file off the mortal part of glowing thought with Attic art."

### **6. Division of the Subject.**

The general law of style at which we have arrived is a universal principle by which to test expression, and from which all the minor laws of form may be deduced. The work before us is simply to apply this general law to the specific cases which may arise, and to show how in

each case mental power may be economized. The laws of form will therefore be stated in the following divisions ; (1) the economy of interpreting power in PLAIN language ; (2) the economy of interpreting power in FIGURATIVE language ; and (3) the economy of the FEELINGS.

# CHAPTER I.

## THE ECONOMY OF INTERPRETING POWER IN PLAIN LANGUAGE.

### 1. The Conditions of Sentential Structure.

WE are brought face to face with the most difficult problems of style when we consider the nature of a sentence. Our embarrassment is increased by the fact that most of the text-book statements about the sentence totally miss the real difficulty of its mechanism. Before we attempt to define the laws of sentential structure, let us pause to examine the conditions upon which they depend.

(1) **The Time-relation.**—Words convey ideas in *time*, and a conception can be obtained from language only by successive increments. Since a proposition is neither true nor of any force to the mind until it is completed, this *time-relation* presses a claim to *condensation*. Hence the maxim, “Brevity is the soul of wit.” For if it require several seconds to effect the revelation of a single idea, the beginning is lost before the end is reached, and but a fragment of the idea is conveyed.

(2) **The Truth-relation.**—But condensation to the last degree can be attained only by the omission of the qualifying words and clauses which explicate the idea.

The time-relation is, therefore, constantly drawing us into general and hence inexact statements. The *truth-relation*, however, urges in the opposite direction, demanding the insertion of limitations and exceptions. In the affairs of daily life, general statements are seldom true. In mathematics general statements prevail; hence the brevity and logical simplicity of geometrical theorems.

## 2. The Style of Legal Acts.

In legal acts, innumerable qualifications and limitations are needed, in order to make the statement strictly represent the intention of the law-maker. "Instead of laying down a general proposition, which is partially false until it has received its proper restraints, the framer of the act endeavors to evade even this momentary falsehood by coupling the restraints with the very primary enunciation of the truth: *e. g.* A shall be entitled, provided always that he is under the circumstances of *e*, or *i*, or *o*, to the right of *X*. Thus even a momentary compliance with the false notion of an absolute unconditional claim to *X* is evaded."\* Embarrassed by the confusion resulting from this endless involution of limitations, so acute a lawyer and competent a scholar as Mr. Pitt confessed that he was lost in a labyrinth of clauses, so that he could not understand what the law allowed, and what it prohibited.

## 3. National Types of Style.

The tendency to yield to one or the other of these opposing influences, time and truth, marks the distinction of national styles of writing.

\* De Quincey.

(1) **The German Style.**—The Germans, a race of patient thinkers, are controlled chiefly by the truth-relation in the construction of sentences. Mr. De Quincey thus describes a German sentence :

“Every German regards a sentence in the light of a package, and a package not for the mail-coach, but for the wagon, into which his privilege is to crowd as much as he possibly can. Having framed a sentence, therefore, he next proceeds to *pack* it, which is effected partly by unwieldy tails and codicils, but chiefly by enormous parenthetical involutions. All qualifications, limitations, exceptions, illustrations, are stuffed and violently rammed into the bowels of the principal proposition. That all this equipage of accessories is not so arranged as to assist its own orderly development, no more occurs to a German as any fault, than that in a package of shawls or carpets, the colors and patterns are not fully displayed. To him it is sufficient that they are *there*. And Mr. Kant, when he has succeeded in packing up a sentence which covers three closely printed octavo pages, stops to draw his breath with the air of one who looks back upon some brilliant and meritorious performance.”

(2) **The French Style.**—The French, on the other hand, a quick, impatient people, are most influenced by the time-relation. The result is an almost monotonous brevity of sentences. “A long or involved sentence,” says the critic last quoted, “could not be produced from French literature, though a sultan should offer his daughter in marriage to the man who should find it.”

(3) **The English Style.**—As the mixture of Norman-French and Teutonic blood gives an intermediate

character to the English people, so the average English sentence lies midway between the extremes. The tendency, under the influence of German literature, is toward a Teutonic length and involution.

#### 4. The Equilibrium of these Forces.

The most frequently recurring and perplexing problem of style is, to adjust the equilibrium between these two forces, the contracting and the expanding. Condensing the sentence too much, we violate truth by omitting details and ignoring limitations. Expanding too much, we render the interpretation of the sentence impossible by forcing upon the mind more labor than it can perform. A reader may, indeed, recur to the beginning, if he be conscious of failing to grasp the thought fully, while a hearer has not this privilege. On this account, the expansion of sentences is more allowable when they are written than when they are spoken; but readers generally are not willing to read a sentence more than once. Hence the habit of "reading short," *i. e.*, of pitching upon *terms* instead of following out *propositions*. Many persons read as Mr. Dickens makes Alfred Jingle talk,—selecting the nouns and adjectives, and neglecting everything else. Even when a reader notes every word, he is often unconscious of how much he misses.

The opposition of these two forces creates a difficulty in style which cannot be wholly removed, but which may be diminished. The problem is, then, not how to annihilate the difficulty, but how to reduce it to its minimum. This must be done by a judicious balance of the claims of the time and the truth relations.



## 5. Division of the Subject.

We have then to inquire, on what do economy of time and fullness of meaning depend? Economy of time obviously depends on (1) the *length* of words, and (2) their *number*. Fullness of meaning depends on (1) the *familiarity*, (2) the *inclusion*, (3) the *implication*, (4) the *position* of words, and (5) the *relation of each word to the idea as a whole*. It will be observed that length, familiarity, inclusion, and implication, are properties of *single* words, while their number, position and relation have reference to words in *combination*. Since these are all the properties possessed by words either singly or in combination affecting either time or truth, it is plain that we shall most easily and accurately discover the requirements of expression by finding in what manner each property is related to the general law of style, the economy of mental power. We proceed, therefore, to consider (1) **DICTION**, or the Choice of Words, and (2) **SENTENCES**, or the Combination of Words.

### SECTION I.

## DICTION, OR THE CHOICE OF WORDS.

### I. *FAMILIARITY*.

#### 1. Reasons for Familiarity.

The first essential of any sign used to convey an idea, is that the sign be *recognized* as representing a certain object, act or relation. Upon our familiarity with a word all its value as a sign of an idea depends.

We can, indeed, sometimes *guess* the meaning of a sentence when only a part of the words are known. The fact that all strange words are of little or no value to the communication of an idea, is shown by our experience in learning a foreign language. When we know only a few words, the page means almost nothing to us ; when we learn the meaning of a few more, the sense begins to dawn : but when we attach the true meaning to all, the idea is caught as the eye passes over the page. Apart from the signification, familiarity has much to do with our power to put the *form* of the word before the mind. Beginners in a foreign language confound similar forms, and find great difficulty in pronouncing names. A strange word taxes every mental power, as may be seen by experiment. The sentence, " He approached with the utmost *fraicheur*," would be unintelligible to most English readers. They would be compelled to pause painfully and fruitlessly upon it, and finally leave it without deriving its content.

## 2. Aristotle's Opinion.

Aristotle defends the use of strange words, and especially the use of words in new senses, for ornament. He says in his "Rhetoric," " Men are affected in respect to style, in the very same way as they are toward foreigners and citizens. On which account you should give your phrase a foreign air ; for men are admirers of things out of the way, and what is an object of admiration is pleasant." \* If admiration be the end of writing, Aristotle's advice should be followed ; but since men understand and confide in their own coun

\* *Rhetoric*, B. III. C. ii. § 2, 2.

trymen more readily than foreigners, there is a stronger reason for rejecting strange words. Aristotle himself says in his "Poetic," "Foreign, metaphorical and ornamental words will cause diction to be neither vulgar nor mean; but proper [familiar] words produce perspicuity."\* He still more clearly states the effect of familiar words: "Words of *ordinary* use, and in their original application, and *metaphors*, are alone available in the style of prose; a proof that this is a fact is, that these are the only words which all persons employ; for everybody carries on conversation by means of metaphors, and words in their primary sense, and those of ordinary use."† This, he adds, conduces to clearness and he has defined excellence of style as consisting in its being clear.

### 3. The Barbarism.

Opposed to familiarity is the barbarism. A word may be a barbarism because of its relation to time or to place.

(1) **Barbarisms from Time.**—The first class includes words not familiar to the *generation* to which the writer belongs. These are (1) *obsolete* words, or such as were once in good use, but have ceased to be living constituents of the language; and (2) *newly coined* words, or such as have not received the sanction of time. Pope has formulated the rhetorical law on this subject in this well-known stanza:

"In words as fashions the same rule will hold,  
Alike fantastic if too new or old;  
Be not the first by whom the new are tried,  
Nor yet the last to lay the old aside." ‡

\* *Poetic*, xxii, 3. † *Rhetoric*, B. III. C. II. § 6.

‡ *Essay on Criticism*, Part I.

(2) **Barbarisms from Place.**—The barbarism embraces also words which are not familiar in *all places* where the language is written. These are (1) *foreign* words, which the semi-educated are always introducing into their writings and conversation, as a proof of their learning; (2) *provincialisms*, often unconsciously used by those who suppose their local terms to be generally known to those who speak the same language; and (3) *technical* terms belonging to special arts and sciences.

#### 4. When Barbarisms are Allowable.

(1) **Dialectic Compositions.**—A proper exception to the principle of avoiding foreign and local expressions is found in dialectic composition, where the object is to illustrate the peculiarities of speech, or to render a character consistent with his surroundings.

(2) **Technical Persons.**—The use of technical terms contributes to clearness and accuracy when they are addressed to those who are familiar with them. The very fact that a word is technical excludes from it a host of irrelevant associations usually conveyed by common words, and so renders it more precise. Dr. Campbell says of them, "In strict propriety, technical words should not be considered as belonging to the language; because not in current use, nor understood by the generality even of readers."\* Mr. Marsh observes on the representation of technical characters "It is better that a character in a play should use professional phrases, by way of indicating his occupation, than that he should tell the audience in set words, 'I am a merchant, a physician, or a lawyer,' but after

\* Campbell's *Philosophy of Rhetoric*.

all, considered as a representation of the actual language of life, it is a violation of truth of costume to cram with technical words the conversation of a technical man." \*

### 5. The Law of Use.

Horace declared *use* to be the law and rule of speaking. Dr. Campbell has discussed this criterion of speech with great judgment. His essay on the subject is worthy of universal attention.† He defines authoritative usage to be,

I. *Reputable*, or the practice of intelligent and educated writers;

II. *National*, as opposed to provincial and foreign

III. *Present*, or the usage of the generation in which we live.

### 6. The Formation of New Words.

New ideas require the formation of new words. All verbal innovations, however, have not the same justification. Horace defines the proper occasion of coining words in these lines :

“ If you write of things *abstruse* or *new*,  
Some of your own inventing may be used,  
So it be *seldom* and *discreetly* done.” ‡

If words *must* be coined, it should be “discreetly done,” so that they shall conform to the established usage of the language, both as to their sources and the union of their elements. This is what Horace means in these lines :

\* *Lectures on the English Language.*

† *Philosophy of Rhetoric*, Book II., Chap. I.

‡ Boscommon's Translation.

" An undisputed power  
Of coining money from the rugged ore,  
Nor less of coining words, is still contest,  
If with a *legal public stamp* imprest." \*

Quintilian disfavors all verbal innovations. "If the new word is well received," says he, "small is the glory; if rejected, it raises laughter." †

## II. LENGTH.

### 1. Disadvantages of Long Words.

(1) **Difficulty of Perceiving them.**—Another quality of words which deserves attention in their selection is length. Whether addressed to the eye or to the ear long words require more effort to present them to the mind for cognition than short ones. If they are addressed to the eye, the mind must pass through a process of syllabication, in order to distinguish them from other forms but slightly different. This is, doubtless, an almost unconscious process with those who are accustomed to read much, but it is illustrated in the efforts of those who are beginning. Two words very nearly alike can be distinguished only by attention to the differentiating letter or letters, and this attention is necessary upon each syllable. If the word is addressed to the ear, the same is true, with only a slight difference. Every polysyllabic word has one primary accent which gives unity to the word, forcing upon the attention by a vocal stress one syllable which serves as a nucleus around which other syllables hang as mere appendages. The syllables which are subordinate in

\* Francis' Translation.

† *Institutes*, I 5

sound are not always subordinate in sense. In the word *demonstrate*, the specific meaning is determined, not by the accented syllable, but by a single letter in the very subordinate syllable *de*, and is distinguished from that of *remónstrate* only by the initial letter, *d*, instead of *r*. Most polysyllabic words have several phonetic analogues from which they are distinguished only by a subordinate syllable. It is evident, therefore, that they do not economize the power of perception as much as short words.

(2) **Difficulty of Remembering them.**—They often prove too much for the memory also, and thus render it impossible for the other interpreting powers to act, since there is nothing definite for them to act upon. Every one is sensible of this in reading, or in listening to a speech. We may overcome the difficulties presented to the mind by one or two long words in a sentence, but when they are piled up in Johnsonian profusion, although we may be familiar with each separate word, in their aggregate they are too heavy for the mind to carry; they drop out one by one in the progress of the sentence, and at its close we are unable to say whether the proposition is true or false.

## 2. Advantages of Long Words.

(1) **Sound and Sense.**—While long words are less easily interpreted than short ones, there are grounds for their moderate use. Majesty is so connected with magnitude that the length of the word is often naturally suggestive of the grandeur of the conception, while little words connect pettiness with the thought. There is an “eternal fitness” in the adaptation of the length of words to the sense; of which Pope says:

" A vile conceit in pompous words express'd  
Is like a clown in regal purple dress'd ;  
For different styles with different subjects sort,  
As several garbs with country, town and court " \*

(2) **Actual Economy.** —A more important consideration is, that long words often express what could or otherwise expressed only by a still longer compound, or an awkward circumlocution. It is, doubtless, simpler and more intelligible to say, "the expansibility of gas," than to say, the "power of gas to be made to fill a greater space;" or, "the indestructibility of matter," than, "the want of power in matter to be put out of being." But long words are often used not so much on account of their expressiveness, as from ostentation. They give a sonorous fullness to empty thoughts, and an outward majesty to vulgar sentiments. Beranger,† in one of his songs, not unhappily compares pretentious expressions to a big, gaudily dressed drum-major and those of modest simplicity to the quiet little Napoleon at Austerlitz, clad in his plain gray coat. There is much force in this comparison, and the growing tendency to use "long-tailed words in *-osity* and *-ation*," merely for the sake of using them, shows a lamentable deficiency of good taste and good sense.

### 3. Value of Saxon Illustrated from Literature.

Even the redemptive feature of their exquisitely musical arrangement and almost unequalled imagery, has not preserved such writers as Sir Thomas Browne and Jeremy Taylor from neglect by a generation of

\* *Essay on Criticism*, Part II.

† Quoted by R. G. White, in *Words and their Uses*



readers who are unwilling to trace out such words as, "amorevalezza," "illaqueation," "immarcescible," and "salertiousness." Writers must pay the penalty of their ambition for "eighteen-inch words," as Horace calls them, for the age is impatient with glossaries. The experience of writers and the philosophy of mental action confirm the observation of Lord Stanley, that "it is the plain Saxon phrase far more than any term borrowed from Greek or Latin literature that, whether in speech or writing, goes straightest and strongest to men's heads and hearts." Yet it is not because words are *Saxon* that they are forceful; it is rather because they are centers of significance without useless syllabic appendages. A Latin term is as expressive as any other if it be brief and familiar and well charged with meaning. It is fashionable to decry all words of Latin origin, but, as Sir Francis Palgrave has said of our language, "the warp may be Anglo-Saxon, but the woof is Roman as well as the embroidery, and these foreign materials have so entered into the texture, that, were they plucked out, the web would be torn to rags, unraveled and destroyed."\* While, therefore, Saxon terms are often preferable on account of their brevity, Latin derivatives are not to be despised.

### III. INCLUSION.

#### 1. Definition and Forms of Inclusion.

By the inclusion of words is meant the extent of their application to objects, not with reference to their numbers, but their *kind*. Thus *stone* includes several

\* *History of Normandy and England*, Vol. I.

hundred species, as trap, limestone, quartz, etc., while *onyx* includes only stones of a single kind. When we remember that a sign which stands for, or includes, a great variety of things is as likely to suggest one as another of them, the question of inclusion becomes of the greatest importance to the economy of interpreting power.

With reference to their inclusion, words may be divided into three classes: (1) those which refer to things as members of a species or of a genus, or *Specific and General Words*; (2) those which, without a change of form, stand for entirely different classes of things, or *Homonyms*; and (3) those which closely resemble other words, or *Analogues*. We shall consider these three classes separately.

## 2. Specific and General Words

(1) **Difference between Specific and General Words.**—We say very different things in the sentences, “Each star is poised on the finger of God;” and “Every heavenly body is held in the hand of the Divine Being;” yet, the two ideas are not so remote from each other that the one could not be put for the other. The general idea is the same in each, but the one is specific, the other general. In the first, the statement applies to the *stars* alone; in the second, to all the *heavenly bodies*. In the first, we specify the *finger*; in the second the *hand*. In the first, God stands out as an unclassified and supreme *personality*; in the second, He is classed among *beings*, and distinguished only by the attribute of divinity. The difference between the two propositions does not lie in any figurative quality, for the figure is of the same kind in each.

Yet, the former is plainly the more striking form of expression. On what ground is the first more impressive? The answer is obvious: the first is more *specific*. The word "*star*" instantly suggests a definite image; but "*every heavenly body*" is vague, since it includes sun, moon, and stars, and to an educated mind, comets and meteors. "*Poised*" presents to the mind a specific kind of holding, while "*held*" is capable of a number of specific senses, between which the mind is at a loss which to choose. "*Finger*" points out the *exact part* of the hand, while "*hand*," having a great number of parts, suggests a complex conception. "*God*" suggests all that the mind has associated with that specific name, as representing a *person*; while "*Divine Being*" is a more diffused notion. Divesting the sentence entirely of its specific character, and putting the conception in a still more general form, we have, "All things are sustained by divine power;"—which is so general as not to present any image to the mind, and makes very little impression upon us.

(2) **Reasons for the Superior Force of Specific Expressions.**—The more specific a statement, the less mental power is required to put it before the mind for cognition. The tendency of philosophic minds is to generalize, to reduce all truth to a formula which shall be the concentrated expression of the whole. The difficulty which the human mind has experienced in arriving at any such formula, and the conflicting notions of men in all ages with respect to the truth or falsity of abstract statements, are sufficient evidence of the obstacles to be overcome in interpreting such forms of expression. Generic names offer the amplest opportunity for sophistry, because what may be true of some

members of a class may not be true of other members of the same class. The writer may have in mind one subdivision of a class of which his affirmation is true while the generic name may suggest to his reader another subdivision of the class of which the affirmation is not true. To many minds not habituated to abstract thought, abstract terms suggest no ideas whatever, but men of all grades of intelligence know the names of specific objects, acts, and relations, and these are at once suggested by the appropriate sign. It is not true that the imagination is more severely taxed by specific and concrete than by general and abstract terms. A dog, a horse, a house, or the moon is presented for cognition on the canvas of the imagination as soon as the verbal sign denoting it is uttered. Terms like animal, building, and heavenly orb are much more taxing on the powers, since they involve the presentation to the mind, not of a thing, an act, or a relation out of a conception which has no correlative in the actual world, but which is made up of qualities taken from all the individuals of the class which we have ever seen. Scarcely any uneducated man can define the word *animal*. He will almost certainly exclude *man* and *bird* and *fish*; he will be sure to exclude *oyster* and, possibly, he will represent all animals as having four legs.

The use of specific terms, when possible, obviates much of the difficulty in the interpreting mind, not exacting of it a laborious and probably futile use of the imagination in presenting for cognition a host of irrelevant objects, which, if presented, would only embarrass and confuse the mind.

(3) **A Choice of Terms Possible.**—Those who are

fond of regarding language as the incarnation of thoughts, may consider these facts and principles of small value to style, on the ground that, with a given idea to be expressed, a writer has no choice between generic and specific words. On this question of option Dr. Whately says :

“It might be supposed at first sight, that an author has little or no choice on this point, but must employ either more or less general terms according to the objects he is speaking of. There is, however, in almost every case, great room for such a choice as we are speaking of ; for, in the first place, it depends on our choice whether or not we will employ terms *more* general than the subject requires ; which may almost always be done consistently with truth and propriety though not with energy ; if it be true that a man has committed *murder*, it may correctly be asserted, that he has committed a *crime* : if the Jews were ‘exterminated and ‘Jerusalem demolished’ by ‘Vespasian’s army,’ it may be said, with truth, that they were ‘subdued’ by an enemy,’ and their ‘capital’ taken.” \*

### 3. Homonyms.

(1) **Allowable Homonyms.**—Of not less importance, but wholly distinct from the general or specific character of words, is their *double meaning*. It is an effort to make an economical use of a small verbal capital that causes every language to contain many words with several distinct meanings. They begin, doubtless, in metaphor, but finally cannot be distinguished from plain speech. The use of words in a second or third sense affords very little embarrassment to an intelligent

\* *Rhetoric*, Part III. Chap. II., § 1.

mind, unless the same word appears with more than one sense in the same sentence. The word *head* may mean a part of the body ; a chief or leader ; the large end of anything, as of a nail ; the place where the head should go, as the head of a bed ; the place of command or honor ; the intellect, as distinguished from the feelings ; the source, or fountain ; a division of a discourse ; the foam on a pot of beer ; and power, or force, as when Shakespeare says,

“ My lord, my lord, the French have gathered *head*.”

We seldom mistake the meaning of such a word in any of its uses, because the connection suggests the sense.

(2) **Ambiguous Homonyms.**—It is not so, however, in all cases. Some words signify things so nearly alike that we are at a loss to determine which of two are intended. Pope, in his “*Essay on Criticism*,” uses the word “*wit*” with at least seven different meanings, and for their shades of distinction we are dependent entirely on the context.

The worst variety of the fault appears in the use of the same sound or form in more than one sense in the same connection. This is the principle of the *pun* and the most common form of *fallacy*. Its more playful bearing is illustrated in the following advertisement of a baker : “ The subscriber, knowing that all men *neea* bread, wishes the public to know that he also *kneads* it ; and he hopes that the best *bred* people in the city will find him the best *bread* man.” When the double sense is obvious and is playfully intended, it is regarded as a *pun*, and passes for innocent wit ; but when the true sense is concealed and the coincidence of sound

or form misleads the understanding, it is called the *fallacy of an ambiguous middle*, and becomes a potent instrument of the sophist. Thus in the syllogism,

A *plain* style is intelligible,

This is a *plain* style ; therefore

This style is intelligible ;

if in the first premise the word "*plain*" is used as opposed to *obscure*, and in the second as opposed to *ornamental*, the conclusion that the style in question is intelligible may not be correct, for while the absence of *obscurity* insures intelligibility, the absence of *ornament* does not in any way affect the intelligibility.

The use of a word which in its connection is capable of more than one meaning either confuses the thought or has no effect upon the mind. In Swift's expression, "A little after the reformation of Luther," if we really think, we shall be in doubt whether the Dean refers to Luther's personal abandonment of Romanism, or to the religious revolution of which he was the leading spirit. In the phrase "the love of God," "*of*" is ambiguous, since the expression may mean God's love to us, or our love to God.

#### 4. Analogues.

Words denoting different things, and yet likely to be confounded on account of their resemblance, may be subdivided into two classes: (1) those which are similar in *form*; and (2) those which are similar in *meaning*.

(1) **Analogues in Form.**—Mr. Shillaber has won his reputation as a humorist chiefly by his illustrations of the nonsense resulting from the confounding of words which resemble each other in *form* but not in

*sense.* Mrs. Partington is too well known to require a quotation.

Respectable writers sometimes confound words from the same radical, but having different meanings; as, *falsehood, falseness, and falsity; sophism and sophistry.* As much often depends on the differential of a word as on its radical, and USE is more important than either.

(2) **Analogues in Meaning.**—The co-existence of two distinct classes of words in English, the Anglo-Saxon and the Norman-French, gives to our language a bilingual character that often leads writers into error. The very richness of the language exposes the careless to a loose expression of thought. *Daily* and *diurnal* are to a certain degree interchangeable; as in “the *daily* revolution of the earth,” and “the *diurnal* revolution of the earth;” but we cannot say “our *diurnal* bread.” Usage has appropriated *daily* to the common affairs of life, and *diurnal* to astronomical and other scientific descriptions. Rich as our language is in words closely allied in meaning, scarcely two have precisely the same signification. Successful writers have, therefore, been careful students of synonyms. Usage, “the law and rule of speaking,” as Horace calls it, is the supreme authority here, rather than etymology. A departure from the ordinary acceptation of words, however philosophical it may seem, is almost sure to present a difficulty to the interpreting mind. Since language is wholly conventional, one who would master its resources must read extensively and critically the best books of his age, and, as much as possible, associate with the most cultivated speakers.



#### IV. IMPLICATION.

##### 1. The Effect of Words on Thoughts.

When Lawrence Sterne exhorted all god-fathers not "to *Nicodemus* a man into nothing," he grasped an important principle of style; namely, the force of *implication*, or what a word may *suggest* in distinction from what it *includes*. The influence of names on thoughts is almost magical. Their effect on the sensibilities is so powerful that the author who has little to say may lull the mind to soothing slumber by visions of dreamy beauty. The operations of the interpreting powers depend largely on the condition of the sensibilities. A man enraptured by sweet music does not pause to work out a problem in the calculus; and the reader whose sensibilities are touched by joy, love, hate, envy, anger, revenge, or the sense of beauty, is borne on the current of his emotions, and the fancy plays while he reason sleeps.

##### 2. The Associations of Words.

Every word is a nucleus around which innumerable associations cluster. The mere mention of a word awakens images, and these images arouse emotion in the mind. Thus a common-place person becomes an object of admiration when classed as a *martyr*; a lazy vagabond who happens to serve in the army and receive a wound, becomes a glorious being when referred to as a "*scarred and war-worn veteran*." On the other hand, a diligent scholar sinks into a despicable object when dubbed a "*sleepy book-worm*;" and the hero of a hundred battles is a hateful thing, when the dema-

gogue calls him "*a bloody tyrant.*" Such is the power of names on thought, and, in the hand of a master, they are, by implication alone, potent instruments in shaping convictions and inspiring actions.

### 3. The Utilization of Pre-exerted Energies

This suggestive use of words owes its power to the general law of style, the economy of mental power. It is an appropriation of previous mental acts. Instead of saying of the king, he did this and that, and *therefore* deserves your hatred, we may avail ourselves of the mind's previous operations by which it has come to hate tyranny, and the name *tyrant*, on the slightest proof, works out sedition. When the implication is manifestly absurd, it passes for sport, and the deeper the implication the merrier the laugh. It is the depth of implication rather than the breadth of inclusion which cuts the school-girl so painfully, when, in a fit of anger her companion calls her a "*mean thing.*" To be a *'thing* is not simply to be divested of one's humanity and reduced to an inanimate object; but it is *implied* that whatever is meanest and most detestable in the broad category of *things*, that is meant, although it is not specified. The force of implication is well illustrated by Aristotle.\* Simonides, when the victor in a mule-race offered him a trifling present to compose a triumphal ode for the occasion, refused to write, as if feeling hurt at being asked to write on "*half-asses.*" But when he received a satisfactory present he wrote :

"Hail! Daughters of the generous *Horse*,  
That skim like wind, along the course ;"

\* *Rhetoric*, Book III. Chap. ii. § 14.

without any allusion to the *asinine* side of their pedigree.

## SECTION II.

### SENTENCES, OR COMBINATIONS OF WORDS.

We are now to consider words in their simplest form & combination, the sentence. We have already indicated that this portion of our theme is embraced in three particulars: (1) the NUMBER of words; (2) their POSITION with reference to one another; and (3) their RELATION to the idea as a whole.

#### I. THE NUMBER OF WORDS.

The time-relation of the sentence requires the words to be as few as possible; the truth-relation demands a sufficient number to explicate clearly the idea. The general law being, therefore, to use as few words as will adequately express the idea, we have only to consider the ways in which the law is most commonly violated. They are three: (1) by the *repetition* of the same sense in different words, or TAUTOLOGY; (2) by *additions* not necessary to the sense, or REDUNDANCY; and (3) by a *diffuse mode of expression* which may be recast into a briefer form, or CIRCUMLOCUTION. That these three cases involve an unnecessary expenditure of interpreting power, is self-evident. That they are serious pitfalls to intelligent writers, is evident from the instances found in the works of the greatest masters of style. As Pope has said:

‘Words are but leaves, and where they most abound  
 Meanest fruit of sense beneath is rarely found.’

### 1. Tautology.

A biographer of Dr. Johnson's, among other instances of "desperate tautology," quotes the familiar lines from the imitation of Juvenal :

" Let observation, with extensive view,  
Survey mankind from China to Peru ;"

and maintains, not unjustly, that this is equivalent to, "*Lct observation with extensive observation observa mankind extensively.*" This hardly surpasses the instance of tautology in Addison's Cato :

The dawn is overcast, the morning lowers,  
And heavily in clouds brings in the day,  
The great, the important day, big with the fate  
Of Cato and of Rome."

Dr. Whately thinks that the lack of comprehensive powers in the hearer or reader and the abstruseness of the idea may sometimes justify repetition. He says : "It is remarked by anatomists, that the nutritive quality is not the only requisite in food ; that a certain degree of *distention* of the stomach is required, to enable it to act with its full powers, and that it is for this reason hay or straw must be given to horses, as well as corn, in order to supply the necessary bulk." \* This illustration is both just and ingenious, but it is clear that this "distention" does not require the repetition so much as the analytical and progressive presentation of an idea. If a proposition is skillfully divided into minor ones, and the main truth is unfolded by easy gradations, and each increment of the total idea is presented in a perfectly clear manner,

\* *Rhetoric*, Part III, Chap. 1. § 2.

there may be sufficient distention without much repetition.

## 2. Redundancy.

Redundancy has no excuse. A word which does not contribute to unfold the meaning increases uselessly the friction of the interpreting machinery. Thus Addison says, "If he happens to have any leisure *upon his hands*." Here "upon his hands" is not only unnecessary, but even suggests a ludicrous idea to one who thinks of "leisure upon the hands." The most common forms of redundancy are those in which the expletives "there" and "being" are used; as, "*There is no one who can*," for "No one can;" and "*Being convinced of this*," for "Convinced of this."

The use of *epithets* is a common form of redundancy. In speaking of any thing which has a particular color as an essential attribute, as snow, it is an offense to the intelligence to say the "white snow." "In poetry," says Aristotle, "it is becoming enough to say, 'white milk;' in prose, however, it is rather bad taste." \* When an object may have one of *several* colors, distinctness may be given to the image by specifying the color. † Any important characteristic or action may be brought to view by a well chosen epithet. Thus in the lines,

"The *wheeling* plover ceased  
Her plaint,"

'*wheeling*' presents a peculiar motion of the plover, and also suggests a more beautiful idea than of a bird at rest.

\* *Rhetoric*, Book III, Chap. iii, § 3.

† According to Whately, (*Rhetoric*, Part III, Chap. ii, § 4) such a word would not be an epithet. His sense is peculiar.

Frigidity is the result of a too frequent use of epithets. Aristotle says of Alcidas, that his writings appear frigid "because he employs epithets not as the seasoning but as the food." He does not say the *sweat*, but the *moist sweat*; nor that he covered his *person*, but the *nakedness* of his person.

### 3. Circumlocution.

Circumlocution is the result of indistinctness or tumidity of thought. So good a writer as Lord Brougham has written this vaporous sentence :

"Among the eminent men who figured in the eventful history of the French Revolution was M. Talleyrand; and whether in that scene, or in any portion of modern annals, we shall in vain look for one who represents a more interesting subject of history."

In addition to beating out the sense to the thinnest possible film, his lordship makes Talleyrand figure in the *history* instead of the *scene*, then confounds *scene* and *annals*, and, finally, tells us that Talleyrand *represents* an interesting subject of history. The idea may be more clearly expressed in twenty-four instead of forty-four words :

Among the eminent characters of the French Revolution was M. Talleyrand, and, in modern times, we shall find no more interesting subject of history.

Circumlocution is often employed to express delicately, and hence vaguely, what one does not wish to say plainly. It is in this case an ingenious rhetorical device, but cannot be regarded as a legitimate factor of a good style.

## II. THE POSITION OF WORDS.

The position of words with reference to one another depends on : (1) their *individual force* ; (2) their *modifying effect* upon other words ; and (3) their *grammatical relations*. What is shown of single words applies also to clauses and phrases, regarded as logical elements of a sentence.

### 1. The Individual Force of Words.

So far as the position of words depends on their individual force, two particulars are to be regarded : (1) their *Emphasis* ; and (2) their *Abstractness*.

(1) **Emphasis.**—Emphasis aims at the economy of interpreting power by making the emphatic word so prominent as to remove all doubt as to which it is meant to be. This is done by taking the emphatic word out of its natural place in the sentence, and putting it where it will be striking because of the novelty of its position. It would be natural to say, “The mystery of godliness is great ;” but, since “*great*” is the emphatic word, it may be put first, and all can see that emphasis is increased by the form, “Great is the mystery of godliness.” So also in, “Great is Diana of the Ephesians ;” “Silver and gold have I none ;” “Now is the appointed time.” It is clear, however, that too frequent use of this principle of emphatic inversion would defeat its own end, since the force of it depends on its *novelty*, *i. e.*, on its being a departure from the common order.

(2) **Abstractness.**—The abstractness of words and clauses should also affect their position. There is reason to suppose that, apart from their connection, the

order of words is as important in the building up of a thought, as the order of incidents is in telling a story. As in a narrative each statement should be such as to carry the mind forward and make the account seem natural at every point, without forcing the mind to hold something as unexplained until something else is added, so in a sentence the sequence of words should be such as to waste no power in building up the thought. Mr. Herbert Spencer has treated the question, what is the natural order of images in thought?

(a) He begins by considering the *natural order of the adjective and substantive*. "Ought we to say with the French—*un cheval noir* ; or to say as we do—a black horse? Probably, most persons of culture would decide that one order is as good as the other. Alive to the bias produced by habit, they would ascribe to that the preference they feel for our own form of expression. They would expect those educated in the use of the opposite form to have an equal preference for that. And thus they would conclude that neither of these instinctive judgments is of any worth. There is, however, a philosophical ground for deciding in favor of the English custom. If a 'horse black' be the arrangement, immediately on the utterance of the word 'horse,' there arises, or tends to arise, in the mind, a picture answering to that word ; and as there has been nothing to indicate what *kind* of a horse, any image of a horse suggests itself. Very likely, however, the image will be that of a brown horse ; brown horses being the most familiar. The result is that when the word 'black' is added, a check is given to the process of thought. Either the picture of a brown horse already present to the imagination has to be suppressed and



the picture of a black one summoned into its place ; or else, if the picture of a brown horse be yet unformed, the tendency to form it has to be stopped. Whichever is the case, a certain amount of hinderance results. But if, on the other hand, ' a black horse ' be the expression used, no such mistake can be made. The word ' black ' indicating an abstract quality, arouses no definite idea. It simply prepares the mind for conceiving some object of that color ; and the attention is kept suspended until that object is known. If, then, by the precedence of the adjective, the idea is conveyed without liability to error, whereas the precedence of the substantive is apt to produce a misconception, it follows that the one gives the mind less trouble than the other, and is therefore more forcible." \*

(b) What, in a general formula, is *the order in which the constituent elements of an idea are wanted?* In reading history, our conception is much more definite if we know *when* and *where* the events occurred. Hence, if the word or clause marking the *time* or *place* be given first, and the statement of fact afterward, we have a more vivid conception of it. This seems to indicate that words referring to *time* or *place* should be introduced at the beginning of a sentence. The same precedence, according to Lord Kames, should be given to any *attendant circumstance* ; for, as he says, " When a circumstance is placed at the beginning of the period, or near the beginning, the transition from it to the principal subject is agreeable ; is like ascending or going upward." † He explains this fact on the ground that " circumstances are proper for that coolness of

\* *Philosophy of Style.*

† *Elements of Criticism*, Chap. XVIII. Sec. 2.

mind with which we begin a period as well as a volume: in the progress, the mind warms, and has a greater relish for matters of importance." "On the other hand, to place it late in the period has a bad effect; for after being engaged in the principal subject, one is with reluctance brought down to give attention to a circumstance." The principle may be illustrated by a sentence from Swift: "And although they may be, and too often are drawn, by the temptations of youth, and the opportunities of a large fortune, into some irregularities, *when they come forward into the great world*, it is ever with reluctance and compunction of mind, because their bias to virtue still continues."

It is better to put the temporal clause first, thus

And although, *when they come forward into the great world*, they may be, and too often are," etc.

Lord Kames closes his ingenious treatment of this topic with this conclusion: "That order of words in a period will be most agreeable, where, without obscuring the sense, the most important images, the most sonorous words, and the longest members bring up the rear."

(c) The *explanation* of this important truth is found in the economy of interpreting power. The mind has power to hold at once but a limited number of words. If the important images and the longest members come at the beginning, they will be blurred, if not wholly lost, by subsequent attention to accessories. The result will be, that the hearer or reader will miss what is most important unless he increases his effort. Again, conditions of time, place, and circumstance, are more *abstract* than a simple action or state affirmed. As the mind increases its burden in the progress of the sentence, and cannot properly lay it aside until the period

ended, the mind is less capable of exertion at the close than at the beginning. Hence, if the abstract ideas come at the end, it is compelled to perform its heaviest work, that of realizing abstractions, when least capable of doing it. *The natural order of words and clauses in a sentence is, therefore, from the abstract to the concrete.* It is the abstract nature of the preposition and the adverb, as well as their insignificance to the ear, which renders it improper to use them at the end of a sentence.

## 2. The Modifying Effect of Words.

We have now to consider the position of words as modifying other words in the sentence. It is obvious that most words do not exist for themselves, while some whole classes exist solely for others. This relation between words gives rise to some of the most essential principles of style. It is important, therefore, to proceed under the guidance of a sound analysis of the facts with which we are to deal. The opposite requirements of the truth-relation and the time-relation have been already pointed out. It is in the equilibrium of these two contrary forces that the main problem of combining words lies. We, therefore, consider this branch of our theme under two heads: (1) *Proximity*, or, the requirement of the time-relation; and (2) *Parenthetical Expressions*, or the requirement of the truth-relation. These counter claims do not always conflict.

(1) **Proximity.**—In a language like the English, in which the force of a modifier depends upon its *position*, two forms of difficulty arise from the separation of modifiers from what they modify: (1) a word may be supposed to modify a *different* word from the

one intended, hence *Ambiguity*; or (2) it may seem not to modify *any* word, hence *Obscurity*. In both these cases there is an obvious waste of mental power.

1) **Ambiguity.**—A failure to place related words in proximity often involves excellent writers in ambiguity. Thus Addison says: "Let us endeavor to establish to ourselves an interest in him, who holds the reins of the whole creation *in his hands*." "The creation *in his hands*" is suggestive of insignificance, the very opposite of what the author would convey, for he doubtless means, "who holds in his hands the reins of the whole creation." Dr. Blair, in his "Rhetoric," has not always avoided this fault. He says: "There is a remarkable union in his style of *harmony and ease*, when he does not mean "his style of harmony and ease," but a "union of harmony and ease in his style." An instance of the violation of this law scarcely less absurd than the famous example of "a horse plowing with one eye," is found in an essay by D'Israeli. He says, "Hence he considered marriage *with a modern political economist*, as very dangerous." This hit at modern political economists was quite unintentional, for the writer meant to say, "Hence, with a modern political economist, he considered marriage very dangerous."

(a) This law governs the position of the *adverb*, that slippery particle which occasions so much trouble. Even Dr. Johnson was sometimes led to offend in its management. He says, "I hope not much to tire those whom I shall *not* happen to please." He should have said, "whom I shall happen not to please." Dr. Blair too nods, and says, "Having had *once* some considerable object set before us;" meaning, not that the object was once considerable, but that some consider

able object was once set before him. Addison is guilty of saying, "By greatness I do not *only* mean the bulk of any single object, but the largeness of the whole view.' If he did not *only mean*, what did he *more than mean*

(b) The proper use of the *pronoun* is also deduced from this law of proximity. Mr. Hume tells us, "They flew to arms and attacked Northumberland's horse, *whom* they put to death." Truly a glorious achievement, if literally interpreted; but the historian, doubtless, intends to inform us that they put the Duke to death, instead of his *horse*. Swift, in his "Letter to a Young Gentleman," says: "From a habit of saving *time* and *paper*, *which* young men acquire at the university, they write in so diminutive a manner, and with such frequent blots and interlineations that their writing is hardly legible." It sounds strange to hear that young men acquire "*time*" and "*paper*" at the university, a place proverbial for wasting both; but it is the "*habit*" which Swift meant to say is acquired. It has been demonstrated that the following paragraph of Dean Alford's may be read in 10,240 different ways, only *one* of which expresses the true meaning:

"While treating of the pronunciation of those who minister in public, two other words occur to me which are very commonly mangled by our clergy. One of *these* (A) is 'covetous,' and its substantive 'covetousness.' I hope some who read *these lines*, will be induced to leave off pronouncing *them* (B) 'covetous' and 'covetousness.' I can assure *them* (C) that when *they* (D) do thus call *them*, (E) one, at least, of *their* (F) hearers has his appreciation of *their* (G) teaching disturbed."

Mr. G. Washington Moon, in "The Dean's English," has given the following ingenious criticism:

| The Pronouns. | Nouns to which they may apply.                 | No. of Nouns. | No. of Different Readings.          |
|---------------|--|---------------|-------------------------------------|
| A these       | words, or clergy .....                         | 2             | ..... . 2                           |
| B them        | words, clergy, readers, or lines.....          | 4             | these 4 x by the above 2 = 8        |
| C them        | words, clergy, readers, or lines.....          | 4             | these 4 x by the above 8 = 32       |
| D they        | words, clergy, readers, or lines.....          | 4             | these 4 x by the above 32 = 128     |
| E them        | words, clergy, readers, or lines.....          | 4             | these 4 x by the above 128 = 512    |
| F their       | words, clergy, readers, lines.....             | 4             | these 4 x by the above 512 = 2048   |
| G their       | words, clergy, readers, lines, or hearers..... | 5             | these 5 x by the above 2048 = 10240 |

(c) What is technically called the *splitting of particles* is forbidden by the law of proximity of related parts. Thus the sentence, "The army arrived *at*, but, for numerous reasons, could not proceed *into*, the town;" is better in the form, "The army arrived *at the town*, but for numerous reasons, could not proceed into it." When very few words intervene between the preposition and its case, the objection is very slight, since the governing particle is not long suspended.

2) **Obscurity.**—The misplacement of words sometimes produces such obscurity that the sentence seems to be nonsense. Most cases of obscurity resulting from a violation of the law of proximity are really instances of ambiguity so absurd as to seem nonsensical. Lord Bolingbroke says that "The minister who grows less by his elevation, *like a little statue on a mighty pedestal*, will always have his jealousy strong about him." At first glance, we may take the phrase, "*like a little statue on a mighty pedestal*," with the last clause; but the idea of a little statue on a pedestal with his jealousy strong about him is nonsensical. The obscurity is wholly removed by destroying the absurd ambiguity, thus: "The minister, who, *like a little statue on a mighty pedestal*, grows less by his elevation, will always have his jealousy strong about him." The erudite Johnson amuses and puzzles his readers with the astonishing statement that, "This work in its full extent, *being now afflicted with the asthma, and finding the power of life gradually declining*, he had no longer courage to undertake." It was Savage who had the asthma, as the sequel shows, but we do not discover it until we are confused with the thought that the "work" was afflicted.

From these illustrations it seems plain that *words related in thought should be in close proximity*. The reason is twofold : (1) the English language being analytic and not formal like the Latin, *position* decides what words are modified ; and (2) the longer the time which elapses between any qualifying expression and the part qualified, the longer the mind must retain something which has yet no force. The more numerous the qualifying expressions, and the more widely they are separated from what they qualify, the greater the expenditure of mental power.

(2) **Parentetical Expressions.**—While the time-relation demands proximity of related parts, the truth-relation often requires a separation of them to admit the introduction of a necessary explanation or limitation. The frequency of these parenthetical insertions depends on the character of the writer's mind, and their necessity on the nature of his thought. Some minds are troubled with an overwhelming flood of suggestion after the sentence is begun, without possessing sufficient generalizing power to seize upon the essential points and formulate general truths as they advance. They will introduce innumerable conditions of time, place, and circumstance in the midst of every proposition. Fullness of matter without definiteness of form leads men to the extremity of involved expression. It is indeed a work of art "to break up this huge fasciculus of cycle and epicycle into a graceful succession of sentences, long intermingled with short, each modifying the other, and arising musically by links of spontaneous connection." A reviewer of Coleridge's "Aphorisms" has observed that the aphoristic style is **an evasion of all the difficulties of composition.** It is



easy to state a general truth in brief compass. "The labor of composition begins when you have to put your separate threads of thought into a loom ; to weave them into a continuous whole ; to connect them ; to introduce them ; to blow them out or expand them ; to carry them to a close." \*

The difficulty, when it is real, must evidently be disposed of in one of three ways : (1) by inserting the limitation, modification, or explanation,—the *Parenthesis* ; (2) by omitting the expression,—the *Ellipsis* ; or (3) by putting what is omitted in another place,—the *Foot-note*.

1) **The Parenthesis.**—In the term "parenthesis" are included all expressions introduced between dependent parts of a sentence, whether embraced by the marks of parenthesis or not. It is a very difficult matter to decide just when these marks should be used, and when they should not. Many writers embrace by commas matter which others would enclose within marks of parenthesis. Dr. Whately compares this to a lame man's throwing away his crutches, to conceal his lameness. The Doctor maintains that this does not effect a cure. He, at least, hobbles along honestly, for some one has counted over four hundred parentheses in his small treatise on "Logic."

Dr. Blair says on the use of parentheses : "On some occasions, these may have a spirited appearance ; as prompted by a certain vivacity of thought, which can glance happily aside as it is going along. But, for the most part, their effect is extremely bad ; being a sort of wheels within wheels ; sentences in the midst of sentences ; the perplexed method of disposing of some

\* De Quincey.

thought, which a writer wants art to introduce in its proper place." \*

It is clear that explanatory words and clauses *must* sometimes be introduced between related members. So every form of motion in machinery must be retarded by some friction. We may, however, reduce the waste of power to the *minimum* by making the suspensions as few and brief as possible without impairing the sense.

Dr. Angus thinks parentheses are more endurable in poetry than in prose. His reason is that poetry has *pleasure* for its object and "in a pleasant stroll men more readily turn aside than when engaged in business pursuits." † It seems not to have occurred to him that men are more willingly called away from their *work* than from their *enjoyment*,—which is quite as true, and quite as pertinent. The following lines from Wordsworth illustrate the damaging effects of parentheses upon poetry :

" My voice proclaims  
How exquisitely the individual mind  
(And the progressive powers, perhaps, no less  
Of the whole species) to the external world  
Is fitted.—And how exquisitely too  
(Theme this but little heard of among men)  
The external world is fitted to the mind."

The truth is, since *thought* admits of suspension without irreparable damage, while *feeling* is absolutely dependent upon uninterrupted continuity, poetry, just in proportion as it is true poetry, is affected by parenthesis much more seriously than prose.

\* *Rhetoric*, Lecture XI.

† *Hand-Book of the English Tongue*.

2) **Ellipsis.**—Ellipsis often contributes to idiomatic terseness of expression, and so becomes an important aid to the economy of interpreting power. On the other hand, its improper use may introduce confusion into speech. Addison has left some very awkward ellipses; as in the sentence, “But in the temper of mind *he was then*, he termed them mercies,” etc. Here he makes Sir Andrew Freeport to be a “*temper of mind*,” when he intended to say “the temper of mind *in which* he was then.” The same writer makes a similar blunder in another instance: “This was a reflection upon the Pope’s sister, who, before the promotion of her brother, was in those circumstances *that Pasquin represented her*.” Was Pasquin her representative, or did he represent her as *circumstances*?

Although ellipsis is a source of confusion in cases where the *sense* is affected, it contributes to brevity where the *construction* alone requires that something be supplied: as, “Who steals my purse steals trash.”

3) **Foot-Notes.**—Foot-notes often furnish an escape from both parenthesis and ellipsis. Such excrescences are omnipresent reminders of the limitations of language as a medium of expression. Just in proportion as an author allows this sign of weakness to exhibit itself, in that proportion he publicly confesses his own insufficiency, or that of his medium. Yet, insufficiency is likely to show itself somewhere. He who always writes short sentences, and puts his whole thought into them, must take a very short sweep of view. He who writes long ones, must tax the interpreting power of his readers. He who constantly lets

his thoughts overflow his sentences, and drip down into foot-notes, virtually abandons an artistic solution of the great problem of style for a coarse expedient.

We are to consider the foot-note only as its use is justified or condemned by our general law of style,—the economy of interpreting power. It is surely very distracting to disturb the progress of thought, and make an excursion to the bottom of the page, or even to the end of the volume, for a scrap of information so alien to the text that it could not be incorporated in it. Although it would be a novelty in book making, it would be an excellent plan for an author who uses foot-notes to state in his preface for what purpose he uses them. If there are two classes of notes, it would be well to refer to each by distinct classes of characters. If some were references to other books, and others gave details not appropriate for the continuous text, it would be easy to refer to the first class by numbers, and to the second by the ordinary reference marks. The critical spirit of modern times and the wide range of literature require exact references for quotations and opinions, and the foot-note, unnecessary to the ancients and unused by them, is a convenient contrivance for meeting this demand. Such references however, need not interfere with the continuity of reading, provided it is understood in the beginning for what purpose they are used.

### **3. The Grammatical Relations of Words.**

Position is often determined by grammatical principles. These are, of course, to be strictly observed, except where a departure from precise grammatical

order conduces greatly to some more important element of effect, as in transpositions for emphasis. With the particulars of grammar we have nothing to do here, as grammatical propriety is assumed.

### III. THE RELATION OF WORDS TO THE IDEA AS A WHOLE.

We have now to consider words in their relation to the idea as a whole. Here again we find it necessary to view words (1) in their *time-relation*, and (2) in their *truth-relation*.

#### 1. The Time-relation of Words to the Whole Idea.

The time-relation of words to the idea as a whole determines the proper *length* of a sentence. If we could discover how great a number of words the mind can contain at once, we might hope to name the maximum allowable length of a sentence. This, however is impossible, since much depends upon the cultivation of the mind addressed, and much upon the simplicity or complexity of sentential structure. It has been observed that some speakers can frame a very long period in which the verb comes last, without losing the nominative. Others cannot proceed far without losing sight of it. Cases differ so widely that no definite rule can be laid down.

Long sentences are not generally objectionable because of their *length*; but more frequently because of a faulty arrangement. Without the majestic movement, full description, climax, variety, and accurately modified thought, cannot be expressed. A succession of short sentences becomes monotonous, unless relieved

by unusual sprightliness of utterance or epigrammatic meaning. The reading classes have now become so accustomed to long sentences that, if these are clear, well arranged, and *grow* as they advance, they occasion little difficulty in the mind of a reader. Unquestionably, more interpreting power is required to translate into thought a long sentence than a short one; but generally less power is needed than would be required to obtain possession of the same thought if expressed in a succession of short sentences. When this is the case economy of power does not preclude the use of long sentences. A statement requiring great modification in order to make it appear true if put in a short sentence and afterward modified by a series of others, would often so savor of paradox as to evoke the opposition of the reader; and then more mental power would be expended in overcoming this antagonism than would be required in the interpretation of a sentence containing a series of conditions before the full enunciation of the conclusion. A strange stupidity has been exhibited in the wholesale condemnation of long sentences on the ground of *length alone*. The principal difference between one long sentence and a series of short ones together expressing the same idea, is, that in the long sentence the relation of the parts, —temporal, causal, or illative,—is *expressly stated*; while in a series of short ones it is left to be *inferred*. Holding this in mind, it is plain that the long sentence with a proper arrangement, may often have the advantage over a series of short ones. The principle which must always determine the length is the *idea* to be expressed. How this affects the case will presently appear.

## 2. The Truth-relation of Words to the Whole Idea.

The truth-relation of words requires us to consider (1) the power of words to indicate collateral and succeeding ideas, or, *suggestiveness*; and (2) the effect of words upon the whole expression, or, *unity*.

(1) **Suggestiveness.**—Suggestiveness relates (1) to the *Development* of the idea; and (2) to *Collaterals* associated more or less loosely.

1) **The Development of the Idea.**—Mr. Landor makes Phocian say that “Thucydides and Demosthenes lay it down as a rule, never to say what they have reason to suppose would occur to the auditor and reader, in consequence of anything said before; knowing that every one is more pleased and more easily led by us when we bring forward his thoughts indirectly and imperceptibly, than when we elbow them and outstrip them with our own.”\* Mr. De Quincey thus speaks of Burke’s composition :

“Under his treatment every truth, be it what it may, every thesis of a sentence, *grows* in the very act of unfolding it. Take any sentence you please from Dr. Johnson, suppose, and it will be found to contain a thought—good or bad—fully preconceived. Where as in Burke, whatever may have been the preconception, it receives a new determination or inflection at every clause of the sentence. Some collateral adjunct of the main proposition, some temperament or restraint, some oblique glance at its remote affinities, will invariably be found to attend the progress of his sentences—like the spray from a waterfall, or the scintillations

\* *Imaginary Conversations* I.

from the iron under the blacksmith's hammer. Hence, while a writer of Dr. Johnson's class seems only to look back upon his thoughts, Burke looks forward—and does in fact advance and change his own station concurrently with the advance of the sentence.”\*

The facts noticed by these critics receive an explanation from our general law. When a sentence is so framed as to render it possible for the mind of the interpreter to outrun the speaker or writer in reaching its conclusion, the mental action is not truly interpretive but prophetic. The mind is not occupied with what *is said*, but with what is *to be said*. The ease with which this is done leaves a momentary vacuum in the attention, affording opportunity for the intrusion of some side issue which only diverts the mind from the leading topics, and wastes its powers on irrelevant matters. This is the experience of those who listen to sermons chiefly consisting of Scriptural quotations with which they are familiar. Either sleep ensues, or more interesting subjects crowd upon the attention and lead the thoughts astray. Thus the interpreting powers are not sufficiently exercised to bring the ideas fairly before the mind.

2) **Collateral Ideas.**—The suggestion of collateral ideas is an important element in style. There are many associated ideas which are to be *avoided*, and many which should be *suggested*. Consummate skill is necessary in the management of this suggestive property of style. Mr. Spencer says on this point :

“To select from the sentiment, scene, or event described, those typical elements which carry many others along with them ; and so, by saying a few things but

\* *Essay on Rhetoric*, Note 6.



suggesting many, to abridge the description; is the secret of producing a vivid impression. An extract from Tennyson's 'Mariana' will illustrate this:

All day within the dreamy house,  
 The door upon the hinges creaked,  
 The blue fly sung i' the pane; the mouse  
 Behind the moldering wainscot shrieked,  
 Or from the crevice peered about.

"The several circumstances here specified bring with them many appropriate associations. Our attention is rarely drawn by the buzzing of the fly in the window, save when every thing is still. While the inmates are moving about the house, mice usually keep silence; and it is only when extreme quietness reigns that they peep from their retreats. Hence each of the facts mentioned, presupposing numerous others, calls up these with more or less distinctness; and revives the feeling of dull solitude with which they are connected in our experience. Were all these facts detailed instead of suggested, the attention would be so frittered away that little impression would be produced. Similarly in other cases. Whatever the nature of the thought to be conveyed, this is the key to success." \*

(2) **Unity.**—The subject of Unity naturally falls under two divisions: (1) *Unity of Idea*; and (2) *Unity of Structure*.

1) **Unity of Idea.**—If a sentence express more than one principal idea, simple or complex, unity is violated. It is not meant that any part of a sentence may not be indefinitely expanded; for, so long as ho

\* *Philosophy of Style.*

mogeneity is retained, any sentence may be incredibly extended. Hazlitt is said to have written a sentence of one hundred and ten lines, in which unity is not violated. No matter how short the sentence is, as soon as heterogeneous ideas appear, unity vanishes. In the following short sentence from Ferguson, we have an account of Cato's death, vigor, age, justice, and philanthropy, all in one confused period :

“Cato died in the full vigor of life, under fifty ; he was naturally warm and affectionate in his temper, comprehensive and impartial, and strongly possessed with the love of mankind.”

The principle of unity grows out of the tendency to contemplate conceptions as individuals. Distinctness of view results from looking at one thing at once, and by itself. Unity of idea in the sentences of a paragraph is what clearness of outline is in a picture. If the outlines are dim, all the objects in the picture are obliterated and confused ; so the want of unity in a sentence renders every image indistinct. This indistinctness generally results from one of five causes : (1) changing the subject ; (2) changing the scene ; (3) crowding together things unconnected ; (4) long parentheses ; and (5) tacking on supplementary clauses. In every such case there is an obvious waste of interpreting power.

**2) Unity of Structure.**—In considering sentences with reference to their unity of structure, it is necessary to have a classification of them according to their structure. Classified on this principle, sentences are : (a) those which *suspend* the sense to the end, or, *Periodic* ; (b) those which give a *completed* meaning at more than one point, or, *Loose* ; and (c) those whose mem-

bers are *similar in form* and *contrasted* in meaning, or *Balanced*.

(a) The *periodic* structure holds the attention to the end of the sentence, but, if it be long, requires the suspension of the sense until a part may be lost. While it is conducive to unity of idea, its advantage is relative. It requires an active mind to collect and arrange a number of preliminaries, and retain them until the period is closed. "Just as it may cost a strong man less effort to carry a hundred-weight from place to place at once, than by a stone at a time; so, to an active mind it may be easier to bear along all the qualifications of an idea and at once rightly form it when named, than first imperfectly to conceive such an idea and then carry back to it, one by one, the details and limitations afterward mentioned. While conversely as for a boy, the only possible mode of transferring a hundred-weight, is that of taking it in portions; so, for a weak mind, the only possible mode of forming a compound conception may be that of building it up by carrying separately its separate parts."\* Hence we infer that the periodic structure is best adapted to short sentences, and to cultivated hearers.

(b) In a language so little inflectional as ours, the *loose* sentence must be of frequent occurrence. It is less favorable to unity than the periodic, since the additions may easily lapse into digressions. The interpretation of a loose sentence affects the mind as the body is affected by the pursuit of game which is every moment feigning to halt, but still runs on. If the game be worth catching, the chase is interesting, but both provoking and exhausting.

\* Spencer.

(c) The *balanced* sentence possesses several important excellences. It is a kind of ledger-page in miniature, on which the debit and credit are put before the mind at once. Its force is felt in such a series of sentences as this :

“ The style of Dryden is capricious and varied, that of Pope is cautious and uniform. Dryden obeys the motions of his own will, Pope constrains his mind to his own rule of composition. Dryden is sometimes vehement and rapid, Pope is always smooth uniform, and level. Dryden’s page is a natural field, rising into inequalities, and diversified by the varied exuberance of abundant vegetation, Pope’s is a velvet lawn, shaven by the scythe, and leveled by the roller.”

Both the memory and the imagination are aided by the balanced structure. The principle of contrast, which will be explained in another place, renders it a means of economizing mental power.

The principle of variety, so important in style, allows the moderate use of each form of structure, and an ingenious combination of all displays much higher attainments in art than a slavish devotion to any single mode. The principal advantage accruing from the study of sentential structure is, that we may know the peculiar excellences of each form, and be able to apply that knowledge when we wish to make our words as expressive as possible. No writer or speaker can spend a long time upon every sentence, yet, in elaborate productions, where care and labor are nothing compared with the result aimed at, these principles will be of practical value.

#### IV. THE COMBINATION OF SENTENCES.

We have now considered the various conditions affecting the structure of the sentence. “ But it is in

the *relation* of sentences, in what Horace terms their '*junctura*,' that the true life of composition resides. The mode of their *nexus*,—the way in which one sentence is made to arise out of another, and to prepare the opening for a third,—this is the great loom in which the textile process of the moving intellect reveals itself and prospers. Here the separate clauses of a period become architectural parts, aiding, relieving, supporting one another." \*

In the progress of a paragraph, two things are necessary : first, that each sentence express some idea not expressed in the preceding ; and, secondly, that the idea have some relation to the preceding idea. Although not necessarily opposed to each other, these two conditions are not always easily fulfilled at the same time, since progress in discourse is a movement away from the ideas already expressed, and yet these preceding ideas must be kept in mind in order to show the connection. Interpreting power is wasted when the connection between successive statements is obscure, and also when there is a full repetition of an idea already expressed. The highest excellence consists in a judicious yielding to each condition. This may be done in several ways.

### 1. Progressive Development.

All great writers employ a progressive development in the succession of their sentences. Thus Carlyle does not say, "Nothing dies, nothing can die," and then leap to the conclusion that, since God knows our conversation, a Boswell need not shrink from reporting it

\* De Quincey, *Essay on Language*

He does not leave even so narrow a chasm to cross, but develops his thought by increments :

“ Nothing dies, nothing can die. No idlest word thou speakest but is a seed cast into Time, and grows through all Eternity. The Recording Angel, consider it well, is no fable, but the truest of truths; the paper tablet thou canst burn; of the ‘ iron leaf there is no burning. Truly, if we can permit God Almighty to note down our conversation, thinking it good enough for Him, any poor Boswell need not scruple to work his will with it.”

Here the general statement that nothing dies is made to apply specifically to *words*; the deathlessness of a word is represented under the image of a *seed*; the *agent* of preservation is brought to view by the mention of the *recording angel*; the *means* are explained by the allusion to the “ *iron leaf*.” It is then an easy step to the assumption that God notes down our conversation.

## 2. Explicit Reference.

The explicit reference is a means of economizing interpreting power in the progress of discourse. It consists in a running reference to antecedent statements. De Quincey is especially distinguished for its felicitous use. The following illustrates it :

“ If we do submit to this *narrow valuation of style, founded on the interest of the subject to which it is ministerial*, still, *even on that basis*, we English commit a capital blunder which the French earnestly and sincerely escape; for, *assuming that the thoughts involve the primary interest*, still it must make all the difference in the world to the success of *those thoughts*, whether they are treated in the way best fitted to expel the doubts or darkness that may have settled on them.”

The explicit references are marked by italics. In

this example, they are more numerous than necessary. Skillfully used, they often obviate the ambiguous employment of the pronoun. When the pronoun is used for reference, the uncertainty of the true antecedent may require a closer attention and a more frequent recurrent movement of the mind than most readers are willing to bestow.

### 3. Necessity of a Theme.

Since the placing of one sentence after another does not constitute progress in discourse, unless the *nexus* between the succeeding parts is obvious, it is important that sentences should rise out of each other. True progress in discourse involves a constant *movement*, either toward or away from some proposition or state of feeling in the writer's mind. Hence, every paragraph should have its *theme*. This may be stated at the beginning, and from it as a starting point the writer may make an excursion, gathering up facts, illustrations, and arguments, with which to enrich it or it may be withheld, and these materials may be first collected, and the theme deduced from them. But, in any case, there must be movement, and movement in a given direction, or there is a waste of interpreting power.

### 4. Value of Analysis.

Not only every paragraph, but every group of paragraphs should have a theme. A progressive and methodical analysis should, therefore, precede every synthetic effort. "It is from fault of plan," says Buffon, "it is from not having reflected upon his subject, that a man of mind finds himself embarrassed, and

knows not where to commence to write. He perceives at once a great number of ideas ; and, as he has neither compared nor subordinated them, nothing determines him to prefer some to others ; he still remains in perplexity." \*

\* *Discours sur le Style.*



## CHAPTER II.

### THE ECONOMY OF INTERPRETING POWER IN FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE.

#### 1. Definition of Figures.

A FIGURE of speech is an expression in which one thing is said in the form of another related to it. Figures are usually divided into figures of orthography, etymology, syntax, and rhetoric. The first three classes are grammatical, and will not be treated here. All figures not grammatical may be classed as rhetorical, and will be treated in detail. Quintilian's distinction between tropes and figures is of no practical value.

#### 2. Laws of Association.

In treating of a train of thought, it was stated that ideas are associated in the mind according to certain fixed principles, and that their succession in the mind depends upon that association. "Philosophers, having observed that one thought determined another to arise, and that this determination only took place between thoughts which stood in certain relations to each other, set themselves to ascertain and classify the kinds of correlation under which this occurred, in order to generalize the laws by which the phenomenon of Reproduction was governed. Accordingly, it has been established, that thoughts are associated, that is, are

able to excite each other : (1) if coëxistent, or immediately successive in time ; (2) if their objects are conterminous or adjoining in space ; (3) if they hold the dependence to each other of cause and effect, or of mean and end, or of whole and part ; (4) if they stand in a relation either of contrast or of similarity ; (5) if they are the operations of the same power, or of different powers conversant about the same object ; (6) if their objects are the sign and the signified ; or (7) even if their objects are accidentally denoted by the same sound."\*

### 3. These Laws Reduced to Three.

These conditions were reduced by Aristotle to three and may be summed up in one, that "Thoughts that have once coëxisted in the mind are afterward associated." For our purpose, however, Aristotle's threefold division will be most convenient. We shall, then, regard these laws of association as three : (1) *Resemblance* ; (2) *Contiguity* ; and (3) *Contrast*. That is, conceptions having resemblance, contiguity, or contrast, are associated together.

### 4. Use of these Laws.

These being the tracks, so to speak, on which all minds run, it is evident that we may determine from them both *why* figures improve style, and *what* figures are advantageous.

(1) **Why Figures Improve Style.**—In all minds objects, acts and relations are associated by resemblance, contiguity, and contrast ; that is, objects which resemble each other, are contiguous to each other,

\* Sir Wm. Hamilton's *Metaphysics*.

or are contrasted with each other, mutually suggest each other. Some names are more specific and concrete than others associated with them through resemblance, contiguity, or contrast in the objects. Hence interpreting power may sometimes be economized by selecting from associated objects, acts, and relations, the most specific and concrete. This is done by figures, in which the general and the abstract are expressed in the form of the specific and concrete. They are, therefore, to style what diagrams are to Geometry, experiments to Chemistry, or maps to Geography. They render shadowy abstractions visible and tangible, and so economize interpreting power.

(2) **What Figures are Advantageous.**—In order to determine *what* figures are conducive to this end, we must consider these laws of association separately, and note in what manner they may be applied to economize interpreting power. We proceed to do this in the following sections.

## SECTION I.

### FIGURES FOUNDED ON RESEMBLANCE.

Figures founded on resemblance may be divided into two main classes: (1) those in which the resemblance is *stated*; and (2) those in which the resemblance is *implied*. In the first division falls **SIMILE**, which explicitly states the resemblance.\* In the sec-

\* Dr. Campbell's distinction between Simile and Comparison is of small practical value. He says: "The difference is this: Simile is no more than a comparison suggested in a word or

and are METAPHOR, in which the implied resemblance is so vividly conceived as to be taken for identity; PERSONIFICATION, in which the resemblance of an inanimate object to a person is so forcibly felt as to be assumed; and ALLEGORY, in which the resemblance is made to extend to a number of details. These figures will now be considered in separate divisions.

## I. SIMILE.

### 1. Forms of Simile.

Simile assumes four forms, *i. e.*, it may be founded on (1) *direct* resemblance; (2) resemblance of *causes*, (3) resemblance of *effects*; or (4) resemblance of *ratios*.

(1) **Direct Resemblance.**—Direct resemblance, contrary to a natural presupposition, is the least common and the least useful of the four kinds of simile. The reason of this is, that, in order to assist the mind in forming a conception, the objects compared must belong to different classes; but, if of different classes, they are likely to have no *direct* similitude. This is not always so. Tennyson thus describes a miller:

“Him, like the working bee in blossom dust,  
Blanched with his mill, they found.”

Here there is a direct resemblance between blossom dust and the flour on the miller's clothing, yet the two objects compared belong to different classes.

(2) **Resemblance of Causes.**—The resemblance

two. Comparison is a simile circumstantiated and included in one or more separate sentences.”—*Philosophy of Rhetoric*.

of causes is more common than the direct resemblance. An illustration is furnished by Dryden :

“ I scarcely understand my own intent ;  
But, silk-worm like, so long within have wrought  
That I am lost in my own web of thought.”

If we inquire of what resemblance is here predicated, the answer is, not of the *poet* and a *silk-worm*, for there is no resemblance between them, but of the *internal process* of both poet and silk-worm. A mode of intellectual life is compared to a mode of insect life, in order to show a resemblance between the *cause* of the poet's bewilderment and the *cause* of the insect's entanglement. As the internal operations of the insect result in its own entanglement, so the reflections of the poet result in his bewilderment.

(3) **Resemblance of Effects.**—Nothing is more evident than that widely different objects may produce similar effects upon the mind. Few things are more unlike in themselves than painting and poetry, statuary and music, yet we often hear allusions to “ word-painting,” and hear statuary defined as “ marble music.” All art has a common basis. “The fountain from which all the fine arts flow is precisely the same. It is the power of creating in our own minds images of beauty or sublimity.” Hence the resemblance of *effects* is a fertile source of simile. Mr. Longfellow's simile in the following lines has been criticised as “ far-fetched :”

“The day is done, and the darkness  
Falls from the wing of night,  
As a feather is wafted downward  
From an eagle in his flight.”

If every simile must be a *configuration*, this may be faulty, but that is an assumption wholly without proof. The poet wishes to convey the idea of the *gentle* and *silent* descent of darkness, and in the whole realm of imagery he could not have chosen a more appropriate emblem of combined gentleness and silence of movement than the falling feather. The effect of approaching darkness and the effect of a falling feather, to the mind, are similar from the fact that they produce in the mind similar emotions.

(4) **Resemblance of Ratios.**—The greatest number of similes are based upon analogy, or the resemblance of ratios. Similes of this class are of great value to expression. If an object, cause or effect may be likened directly to something else, it must be somewhat simple by nature, and hence easily understood without comparison. Similes based on analogy, involving a similarity not of things but of relations, must contribute more to rendering the general and abstract comprehensible. In figures of this kind direct resemblance may be wholly wanting. Thus there is no likeness between a man and fruit on a tree, or a clock, yet Dryden very forcibly says :

“ Of no distemper, of no blast he died,  
 But fell like autumn fruit that mellowed long,  
 E'en wondered at because he dropped no sooner,  
 Fate seemed to wind him up for four-score years,  
 Yet freshly ran he on ten winters more,  
 Till, like a clock worn out with eating time,  
 The wheels of weary life at last stood still.”

Here the comparison is not between things, but between relations.

The following from Burns demonstrates that a sim-

It does not necessarily imply any direct resemblance of things, or more than a single point of resemblance between relations, since pleasures are happily compared to several objects between which there is no similitude and only one common property,—evanescence .

“ Ah ! pleasures are like poppies spread—  
 You seize the flower, the bloom is shed ;  
 Or like the borealis' race,  
 That flit ere you can point their place ;  
 Or like the snow-flakes on the river,  
 A moment white—then dark forever ;  
 Or like the rainbow's lovely form,  
 Evanishing amid the storm.”

Indeed, the most attenuated resemblances between things affect us most agreeably, if there be a real resemblance between their relations. Thus Shelley ventures to the Ultima Thule of similitude for this exquisite simile :

“ Our boat is asleep on Terchio's stream ;  
 Its sails are folded *like thoughts in a dream.*”

Comparison is pictorial speech. It serves the same purpose in language that pictures do in books. Every one feels that he derives a clearer idea of any thing from a picture, or even from a rude diagram, than from words alone. By presenting two objects to the mind at once, and affirming a likeness between their causes, effects, or relations, an abstract thought becomes clear through the concrete image.

## 2. Laws of Simile.

Although interpreting power is economized by the use of comparison, the utility of it depends upon some special laws.

(1) **Similar Objects.**—There is evidently no economy when the resemblance is found between exactly similar objects or acts. Thus in Pope's Homer, one fight is compared to another :

“ Nor could the Greeks repel the Lycian powers,  
Nor the bold Lycians force the Grecian towers.  
As, on the confines of adjoining grounds,  
Two stubborn swains with blows dispute their bounds  
They tug, they sweat ; but neither gain nor yield,  
One foot, one inch, of the contended field.”

If such a comparison has any justification, it is, that the complex is made simple by making the general fight an individual combat.

(2) **Vague Resemblances.**—There is no economy when the resemblance is vague. Quintilian, speaking of comparison, says : “ In this kind of figure it is especially important to guard against that which we use for the sake of a comparison being either *obscure* or *unknown* ; for that which is used to illustrate something else should itself be plainer than that which it illustrates.” \*

Mrs. Browning, usually so felicitous in her choice of figures, writes :

“ Then the bitter sea  
Inexorably pushed between us both ;  
And sweeping up the ship with my despair,  
Threw us out as a pasture to the stars.”

Of this Peter Bayne justly says :

“ No Ossianic juvenile ever perpetrated purer nonsense. What possible resemblance there can be between a ship and a pasture ; why and when stars go out to

\* *Institutes*, Book VIII, III., 73.



grass ; and wherefore having so gone, they should feed on ships and young ladies,—these are questions of insoluble mystery.” \*

(3) **Simpler Objects.**—It is plain that simile most economizes mental power when it compares the complex to the simple, the mental to the physical. Aristotle † cites Plato’s comparison of the populace to “a pilot strong, but rather deaf.” Here the complex idea of the power and folly of a mob is reduced to a simple one under the figure of a single person guiding a vessel, strong enough to move it at his will, but deaf to the sound of breakers and of warning. The sacrifice of one’s self for the benefit of others, and the gradual loss of strength in their service, is a moral conception somewhat complex in its nature; but Antisthenes beautifully concreted it into a picture when he likened Cephisidotus the slim to frankincense, for “*in its consumption it spreads universal delight.*”

(4) **The Position of Parts in a Simile.**—The position of parts in a simile is important to its effect. Both Aristotle and Quintilian overlook this. The former says nothing on the subject, while the latter gives no principle as a guide, simply declaring that the illustrated or the illustrative member may come first, as circumstances direct. ‡ Mr. Spencer has enunciated a valuable law for the position of the parts of a simile. “As whatever qualifies should precede whatever is qualified, *force will generally be gained by placing the simile [illustrative member] before the object to which it is applied.*” That this arrangement is the best, may

\* *Essays.*

† *Rhetoric*, Book III, Chap. iv., § 8

‡ *Institutes*, Book VIII, III., 77.

be seen in the following passage from the 'Lady of the Lake :

'As wreath of snow, on mountain breast,  
Slides from the rock that gave it rest,  
Poor Ellen glided from her stay,  
And at the monarch's feet she lay.'

"Inverting these couplets will be found to diminish the effect considerably. There are cases, however, even where the simile is a simple one, in which it may with advantage be placed last ; as in these lines from Alexander Smith's 'Life Drama :'

'I see the future stretch  
All dark and barren as a rainy sea.'

"The reason for this seems to be, that so abstract an idea as that attaching to the word 'future,' does not present itself to the mind in any definite form and hence the subsequent arrival at the simile [illustrative member] cutsails no reconstruction of the thought.

"Such, however, are not the only cases in which this order is the more forcible. As the advantage of putting the simile before the object depends on its being carried forward in the mind to assist in forming an image of the object ; it must happen that if, from length or complexity, it cannot be so carried forward, the advantage is not gained. The annexed sonnet from Coleridge is defective from this cause :

'As when a child, on some long winter's night,  
Affrighted, clinging to its grandam's knees,  
With eager wond'ring and perturb'd delight  
Listens strange tales of fearful dark decrees,

Muttered to wretch by necromantic spell ;  
 Or of those hags who at the witching time  
 Of murky midnight, ride the air sublime,  
 And mingle foul embrace with fiends of hell ;  
 Cold horror drinks its blood ! Anon the tear  
 More gentle starts, to hear the beldame tell  
 Of pretty babes, that loved each other dear,  
 Murdered by cruel uncle's mandate fell :  
 Ev'n such the shiv'ring joys thy tones impart,  
 Ev'n so, thou, Siddons, meltest my sad heart.'

“ Here, from the lapse of time and accumulation of circumstances, the first part of the comparison is forgotten before its application is reached ; and requires re-reading. Had the main idea been first mentioned less effort would have been required to retain it, and to modify the conception of it into harmony with the comparison, than to remember the comparison and refer back to its successive features for help in forming the final image.”

## II. METAPHOR.

### 1. Nature of Metaphor.

In the metaphor, resemblance is not formally expressed, but so emphatically implied as to affirm an identity of the objects compared. Thus Byron so vividly realized the resemblance between the swaying of a suspended ball and man's oscillation between joy and sorrow, as to identify the two in his thought in the beautiful line in which he says of man,

“ Thou *pendulum* between a smile and tear.”

## 2. Superiority of Metaphor to Simile.

It is apparent that the metaphor surpasses the simile in force. This is owing partly to its greater brevity, and partly to the higher degree of unity in metaphorical expression. Dr. Whately\* points out the feebleness of the simile as compared with the metaphor in the following expressions: "Cromwell treated the laws with the same contempt as a man does any thing which he tramples under his feet;" and "Cromwell trampled the laws under his feet." He gives no explanation of the cause of the superiority of the metaphor. The cause seems to be, that the metaphor is *brief* and suggests a *simple* image; while the simile is *long* and presents a *complex* image,—Cromwell, and a shadowy *somebody* who is trampling an unknown *something* under his feet.

## 3. Metaphor Based on Analogy.

Most metaphors are based on analogy, or resemblance of relations. A single illustration will suffice. There is no direct resemblance between a *lock* in a canal, and a *poet*, yet Lowell very forcibly says of Dryden:

"*He was the lock* that let our language down from its point of highest poetry to its level of easiest and most gentle flowing prose."

The resemblance here implied is between the relation of the lock to the water level, and Dryden's relation to style. If this obvious principle were more widely understood, many a stupid criticism would be deprived of its sting.

\* *Rhetoric*. Part III. Chap. ii. § 8

#### 4. Laws of Metaphor.

Some important laws for the use of metaphors are derived from the economy of interpreting power.

(1) **Necessity of Clearness.**—Since, from the nature of metaphor, the resemblance is merely implied, it should be easily perceived. “It would be harsh and obscure to say, ‘the stranded vessel lay shaken by the waves,’ meaning ‘the wounded chief tossing on the bed of sickness;’ it is therefore necessary to state the resemblance.”\* When the case does not admit of pure metaphor, but would also have an air of clumsiness if simile were employed, an ingenious device is to *unite* the two figures in the same expression. Sir Walter Scott furnishes examples of a simile explained by a series of metaphors, and a metaphor explained by a simile. He says of a morbid fancy,

“— *like* the bat of Indian brakes,  
Her pinions fan the wound she makes,  
And soothing thus the dreamer's pain,  
She drinks the life-blood from the vein.”

“*Like*” introduces a comparison, and the last three lines are explanatory metaphors. Again,

“They *melted* from the field *as* snow  
When streams are swollen, and south winds blow.  
Dissolves in silent dew.”

“Here “*melted*” is a metaphor, explained by the simile introduced by “*as*.”

(2) **Blending Plain and Figurative Language.**—Although two figures of cognate import may be thus united in the same expression, confusion results from

\* Whately.

the blending of plain and figurative language. Shake-  
speare has exemplified the fault in these lines :

“ This precious stone set in the sea,  
Which serves it in the office of a wall,  
Or as a *moat* defensive to a house  
Against the *envy* of less happier lands.”

A moat might be a useful defense against an *army*,  
but would not be a protection against *envy*.

(3) **Mixing Metaphors.**—The mixing of metaphors  
is a common but gross fault, as when the excited advo-  
cate exclaimed : “ I smell a mouse ; it is floating in  
the air ; but we will nip it in the bud.” This fault  
is pointed out with a refinement of sarcasm in the fol-  
lowing passage of the “ Rehearsal :”

“ *Physician.*—Sir, to conclude, the place you fill has  
more than amply exacted the talents of a wary pilot,  
and all these threatening storms, which, like impreg-  
nate clouds, hover o’er our heads, will, when they are  
but grasped by the eye of reason, melt into fruitful  
showers of blessing on the people.

*Bayes.*—Pray, mark that allegory. Is not that  
good ?

*Johnson.*—Yes, that *grasping of a storm with the  
eye* is admirable !”

(4) **Straining Metaphors.**—A metaphor loses its  
value as an aid to interpretation if it is strained beyond  
its clear and natural application. This is so obvious as  
not to require illustration.

(5) **Concrete Metaphors.**—The metaphor is most  
useful when it embodies the abstract, intangible, or  
intellectual in the similitude of the concrete, visible,  
and material. The whole vocabulary of spiritual and

moral discourse is derived from roots primarily significant of physical phenomena. As an example of the exhaustless fund of illustration to be found in the relations of material things, observe how two widely different notions have been expressed under the similitude of refraction. Burke furnishes the first case :

“These metaphysic rights entering into common life, like rays of light which pierce into a dense medium, are by the laws of nature refracted from their straight line. Indeed, in the gross and complicated mass of human passions and concerns, the primitive rights of man undergo such a variety of refractions and reflections, that it becomes absurd to talk of them as if they continued in the simplicity of their original direction.”

Here is another use of the laws of refraction by Herbert Spencer :

“The white light of truth, in traversing the many-sided soul of the poet, is refracted into iris-hued poetry.”

### 5. The Value of Metaphor.

The skillful use of metaphor is the secret charm of many a famous pen. It not only lends grace and attractiveness to style through images of beauty, but it also economizes interpreting power. If metaphors were *merely* ornaments, as many rhetorical writers seem to regard them, they would have no more place in a composition than gold jewels would have in the nose of a philosopher. They might be admired by the untutored barbarian ; but to writers of sense and refinement they would be tokens of an unnatural taste. But metaphors offer the richest mine in which genius may seek for unappropriated treasure. Its treasures are

absolutely inexhaustible. The resemblances of ratios have no limits which finite faculties can ever reach. They lie all about us, in every department of creation, from the flower to the star. The dull soul does not perceive them until genius spreads them before us in their beauty and freshness. When America's Milton and Shakespeare come, they will not go with the penny-a-liners to Homer and Virgil for their imagery, but to the hidden quarries of nature, and from their interminable depths they will bring materials for castles of diction as grand as the old-time structures from which others steal the moss-grown stones.

### III. PERSONIFICATION.

#### 1. The Nature and Origin of Personification.

Personification consists in attributing personality or some of the attributes of personality, to an inanimate object, because of a fancied resemblance to a living being. The philosophy of this figure leads us far into the mysteries of mythology, and throws a flood of light upon the genesis of myths. To the inhabitants of the infant world, every thing was animated with an individual life. "We cannot realize that sentiment with which the eye of antiquity dwelt on these sights of nature. To us all is law, order, necessity. We calculate the refractory power of the atmosphere, we measure the possible length of the dawn in every climate, and the rising of the sun is to us no greater surprise than the birth of a child. But if we could believe again, that there was in the sun a being like our own, that in the dawn there was a soul open to human sympathy,—if we could bring ourselves to look for a moment upon



these powers as personal, free, and adorable, how different would be our feelings at the blush of day." \* But prior to reflection all motion is the product of will, and will implies personality. Consciousness teaches us that *our* movements emanate from a volition, radiate from a conscious subject, and, before the rise of natural philosophy, it would be easy for man to people the earth, the sea, and the sky with personalities like his own. Thus, say a certain school of comparative mythologists, every word was a personifying metaphor, and in time, its significance fading from memory, it was supposed to designate a real being—a hero or a god.

"In the ancient poetical and proverbial language of Elis," says Müller, "people said, 'Selene [moon] loves and watches Endymion [setting sun]', instead of 'the sun is setting and the moon is rising'; 'Selene kisses Endymion into sleep,' instead of, 'it is night.' These expressions remained long after their meaning had ceased to be understood; and as the human mind is generally as anxious for a reason as ready to invent one, a story arose by common consent, and without any personal effort, that Endymion must have been a young lad loved by a young lady Selene." †

## 2. Personification Natural to Man.

This poetic instinct of the earliest men has not wholly died out in the human breast. A spark still survives, and as the feelings are aroused,

"And as imagination bodies forth  
The form of things unknown,"

\* Max Müller's *Chips from a German Workshop*, II.

† *Chips*, ii

it touches abstractions with its Promethean fire, and breathes into their nostrils the breath of life. Thus Wordsworth gives personality to age :

“ *Age!* twine thy brows with fresh spring flowers  
And call a rain of laughing *Hours*,  
And bid them dance, and bid them sing ;  
And thou, too, mingle in the ring !”

### 3. Personification in Oratory.

But not in poetry alone is personification a natural form of expression. It vivifies the grandest oratory. Curran, speaking of Irish independence, says, “ I saw her by her cradle, and I have followed her hearse.” Fired with the noble theme of freedom, he conceives of universal emancipation as a living genius, presiding over British soil, and clothed with all the majesty of beneficent power :

“ I speak in the spirit of British law, which makes liberty commensurate with and inseparable from the British soil, which proclaims even to the stranger and the sojourner, the moment he sets his foot on British earth, that the soil on which he treads is holy, and consecrated by the genius of Universal Emancipation. No matter in what language his doom may have been pronounced ; no matter what complexion incompatible with freedom an Indian or an African sun may have burned upon him ; no matter in what disastrous battle his liberties may have been cloven down ; no matter with what solemnities he may have been devoted on the altar of slavery,—the moment he touches the sacred soil of Britain, the altar and the god sink together in the dust, his soul walks abroad in her own majesty, his body swells beyond the chains that burst from around

him, and he stands redeemed, regenerated, and disenthralled by the irresistible genius of Universal Emancipation."

A single sentence like this will impress the sublimity of a sentiment more forcibly than a folio of abstract propositions logically deduced from an axiom.

#### 4. Forms of Personification.

Two forms of personification may be distinguished : (1) that which ascribes personality to inanimate objects ; and (2) that which attributes to an inanimate object some quality of a living being.

(1) **Personality Ascribed.**—The first form is likely to seem forced except in the highest flights of poetry and oratory. Milton uses it with power in describing the grief of nature over the sin of Eve :

Earth felt the wound ; and Nature from her seat  
Sighing, through all her works gave signs of woe,  
That all was lost."

Wordsworth thus invests religion with the terrors of an unnatural maternity :

" Sacred Religion, mother of form and fear,  
Dread arbitress of mutable respect  
New rites ordaining when the old are wrecked,  
Or cease to please the fickle worshiper."

Shelley breathes a soul into the cloud which makes it seem almost a sister :

I bring fresh showers for the thirsting flowers  
From the seas and the streams ;  
I bear light shade for the leaves when laid  
In their noonday dreams

From my wings are shaken the dews that waken  
 The sweet buds every one,  
 When rocked to rest on their mother's breast,  
 As she dances about the sun.  
 I wield the flail of the lashing hail  
 And whiten the green plains under;  
 And then again I dissolve it in rain,  
 And laugh as I pass in thunder."

(2) **Qualities of Life Attributed.**—The second form of personification is more common, and pervades all animated speech and writing. While it does not affirm personality, it implies the possession of life by inanimate objects. It appears in such expressions as, "the *thirsty* soil," "ravenous famine," "angry tempest," and the like. What unutterable loneliness in these lines by Leigh Hunt :

"A *ghastly* castle that eternally  
 Holds its *blind visage* out to the *lone sea*."

#### IV. ALLEGORY.

##### 1. The Nature of Allegory.

Allegory is commonly defined as "a continued metaphor," or a metaphor developed so as to include a number of details. This definition does not express the whole truth, since it takes a species for a genus. An allegory may consist of a single metaphor expanded, or of several cognate metaphors. In the following beautiful passage by Longfellow, the original metaphor, representing the state under the figure of a ship, is steadily kept in view to the end, without a digression to mar its consistent development :

'Thou too, sail on, O ship of state!  
 Sail on, O Union, strong and great!  
 Humanity, with all its fears,  
 With all its hopes of future years,  
 Is hanging breathless on thy fate!  
 We know what master laid thy keel,  
 What workmen wrought thy ribs of steel,  
 Who made each mast, and sail, and rope,  
 What anvils rang, what hammers beat;  
 In what a forge and what a heat  
 Were shaped the anchors of thy hope!  
 Fear not each sudden sound and shock—  
 'Tis of the wave and not the rock;  
 'Tis but the flapping of the sail,  
 And not a rent made by the gale!  
 In spite of rock and tempest roar,  
 In spite of false lights on the shore  
 Sail on, nor fear to breast the sea!  
 Our hearts, our hopes, are all with thee,  
 Our hearts, our hopes, our prayers, our tears,  
 Our faith triumphant o'er our fears,  
 Are all with thee, are all with thee."

Many of the finest allegories do not consist in the development of a single metaphor, but in the combination of several cognate metaphors. In Bunyan's "Pilgrim's Progress," the fundamental metaphor is the representation of a Christian by a pilgrim, but in the course of its development several cognate metaphors are introduced, and likewise developed. The same is true in Spenser's "Faery Queen," in which personified vices and virtues are made to perform their part in a series of allegoric adventures.

## 2. Allegory Distinguished from Allied Forms.

Great confusion has resulted from a failure to dis-

tinguish the allegory from other forms of expression somewhat similar, such as the myth, the fable, and the parable. By some writers they are treated as almost synonymous, by others they are variously distinguished. Properly considered, they are widely different. The *myth* involves the blending of the inner meaning and the outward symbol, presenting itself not as the *vehicle* of truth, but as *truth*. Thus the myth of the labors of Hercules does not pretend to be the shadowing forth of some deeper meaning, such as the passage of the sun through the twelve signs of the zodiac, but literal fact. The myth is, therefore, an *unconscious allegory*.\* The allegory proper, the fable, and the parable, agree in not claiming *to be the truth*, but merely *vehicles* of the truth. The fable and the parable are distinguished chiefly by this difference: the fable recounts what is impossible if literally interpreted; the parable is generally literally possible. This distinction does not hold with those who use the words without discrimination.

### 3. Laws of Allegory.

As the allegory is composed of metaphors, the principles laid down as governing them separately, apply when they are used in combination. Two principles need to be more carefully observed.

(1) **Development of the Radical Metaphor.**—The radical metaphor must be strictly developed, without any blending of plain and figurative expressions, or

\* For the myth of Hercules, see Anthon's *Classical Dictionary*, art. *Hercules*. For the explanation of the unconscious growth of myths, see Max Müller's *Chips*, Vol. II., and Personification in this book.

mixing of metaphors. The substitution of "*girl*" for "*rose*" in the following, illustrates the confusion that would result from neglecting this law :

“ You took her up a tender little flower,  
 Just sprouted on a bank, which the next frost  
 Had nipped ; and, with a careful loving hand  
 Transplanted her into your own fair garden,  
 Where the sun always shines ; there long she flourished,  
 Grew sweet to sense and lovely to the eye,  
 Till, at the last, a cruel spoiler came,  
 Cropt this fair *rose*, and rifled all its sweetness,  
 Then cast it like a loathsome weed away.”

(2) **The Analogy Evident.**—It is not less important that the analogy be evident. Since the resemblance is one of ratios, if the radical metaphor is obscure, its development will render it more so, and interpreting power will not be economized. The allegory and the enigma differ only in degree ; the difference being, that in an enigma the meaning of the metaphorical terms is so obscure as to be unintelligible. An allegorical writer may easily become a Sphinx.

## SECTION II.

### FIGURES FOUNDED ON CONTIGUITY.

#### 1. The Theory Explained.

In order to understand how figures of speech are based on contiguity in time or space, a prefatory explanation of this form of association is necessary. “ In passing along a road which we have formerly traveled in company with a friend, the particulars of the conversation in which we were then engaged are frequently suggested to us by the objects we meet with.

In such a *series* we recollect that a particular subject was started ; and in passing the different houses, and plantations, and rivers, the arguments we were discussing when we last saw them, recur spontaneously to the memory. The connection which is formed in the mind between the different words of a discourse we have committed to memory, the connection between the different notes of a piece of music in the mind of the musician, are all obvious instances of the same law of our nature.\* A whole cannot be conceived without parts, nor parts without a whole ; every thing being either a cause or an effect, or both, nothing can be thought of without implying an antecedent or a consequent. Thus "local contiguity binds up objects otherwise unconnected into a *single object of perceptive thought*." † Of the objects so united in our thoughts, some are more simple and concrete than others, hence interpreting power is economized by selecting the former for figurative expression.

## 2. Forms of Contiguity.

Contiguity assumes three forms : (1) a whole is related to its parts ; (2) an object is related to its accompaniments ; and (3) emotions are co-existent in the mind. Each of these forms of contiguity is the basis of one or more figures of speech. The relation of a whole to its parts gives rise to *Synecdoche* ; the relation of an object to its accompaniments, to *Metonymy* the co-existence of emotions, to *Exclamation*, *Hyperbole*, *Apostrophe*, and *Vision*.

\* Dugald Stewart, *Works*, II.

† Sir William Hamilton's *Metaphysics*.



## I. SYNECDOCHE.

### 1. Forms of Synecdoche.

This figure has three forms : (1) a *part* is put for the *whole* of an object ; (2) the *whole* is put for a *part* ; and (3) the *material* is put for the *thing itself*.

(1) **A Part for the Whole.**—There is a clear economy of interpreting power in the first form of synecdoche. Whenever any object is mentioned, some purpose is aimed at. The nature of this purpose determines the *view* taken of the object. Some *one* part must be more suggestive of this view than any other. Thus *man* may be variously designated by one of his parts, according to the view taken of him. Considered as a *messenger* bearing good news, we may say of him, “How beautiful are the *feet* of them that preach the gospel of peace, and bring glad tidings of good things ;” viewed as demanding bodily *sustenance*, “This officer has a thousand *mouths* to feed ;” contemplated merely as a *worker*, “All *hands* were busily occupied ;” regarded simply as a *human being*, “Eight *souls* were saved.” Thus we may continue to abstract this or that part, according to our purpose.

In all these cases there is an obvious force resulting from the designation of a part. That which is pertinent is brought directly to the attention ; that which is irrelevant is kept out of view ; the simple takes the place of the complex, the specific of the abstract. Hence the obvious principle, that the part most suggestive of the specific view should be selected.

(2) **The Whole for a Part.**—Sometimes, on the contrary, there is an economy of interpreting power in

using the *whole* for a *part*. There is here danger of violating the principle, that the specific is more expressive than the general. But there are cases where a general word is very important. The breadth of inclusion renders an expression more forcible when the intention is to heighten the effect by implying vast extent or magnitude. To speak of the "Roman *nation*" does not impress the mind with the grandeur and extent of the empire which embraced nearly every civilized land, so well as to say, "the Roman *world*." So "the *country* is in arms," "the whole *land* was aglow with excitement," "the *nation* awoke with indignation,"—are much more expressive of a universal movement than to speak of "men," "patriots," etc.

(3) **The Material for the Object.**—The material of an instrument may be more expressive of the idea than the outlines associated with its proper name, and hence the third form of synecdoche often has an economic value. Thus "gold" is often more suggestive than "money." In the following stanza "*steel*" is better than "*sword*," as suggestive of the fineness of edge which a steel blade is capable of taking:

"The wounds that are dealt by that murderous *steel*  
Will never yield case for the surgeons to heal."

## II. METONYMY.

### 1. Forms of Metonymy.

Metonymy is the designation of an object by one of its accompaniments. Rhetoricians have divided and subdivided metonymies until the most capacious memory would be taxed to retain them. They are as numerous as the various forms of accompaniment. A three-

fold classification will furnish illustrative instances of this figure. Metonymies may be divided into the following classes: (1) the *effect* is put for the *cause* or the *cause* for the *effect*; (2) the *sign* is put for the *thing signified*; and (3) the *container* is put for the *thing contained*.

(1) **Cause and Effect.**—The connection of an effect with a cause is an intuition of the human mind. The effect may be better or less known than the cause, according to circumstances. Sometimes a complex and obscure cause produces a simple and obvious effect and, on the other hand, a simple and obvious cause may produce a complex and obscure effect. A proper metonymy uses the better known for the less known either the cause for the effect, or the effect for the cause. In the words of Junius, “can *gray hairs* make folly venerable?” the *effect*, “*gray hairs*,” is put for the *cause*, old age, because the color of the hair is a visible and inseparable characteristic of old age, while old age is a mere abstraction. On the other hand, the *cause* may be more suggestive than the effect. Thus, “They have *Moses* and the *prophets*,” is more expressive than “They have the *law* and the *prophecies*,” for in this instance the persons are less abstract than the terms “*law*” and “*prophecies*.”

(2) **The Sign and the Thing Signified.**—By association certain signs and symbols become significant of general notions. Thus “*crown*,” “*scepter*,” and “*purple*,” are indicative of sovereignty, because long associated with it as its external concomitants and representative symbols. Proverbs naturally couch themselves in this form of metonymy. “The *pen* [literary power] is mightier than the *sword* [military power].”

(3) **Container and Thing Contained.**—An economy of mental processes, but more especially of time and new words, is often secured by putting the container for the contained. Thus we speak of the "table," meaning the *eatables* on it; of the "house," meaning its *occupants*; of the "camp," meaning its *tents and equipage*.

## 2. The Law of Selection.

The principle of economy in all metonymies requires the selection of that which best suits the purpose of the idea. The mind has a tendency to unity of conception, and hence to the rejection of all distracting details. Metonymy satisfies this tendency of the mind by removing particulars that would complicate thought, and by furnishing what is most necessary to the conception to be formed. Like most other figures of speech, it is not well adapted to strictly scientific statements.

### III.—CO-EXISTENT EMOTIONS.

#### 1. Meaning of Co-existent Emotions.

When two emotions, or an emotion and a perception co-exist, they are associated by contiguity of time *i. e.*, as has been explained, by forming parts of the same mental state. Joy, anger, surprise, and other similar emotions, naturally express themselves in exclamatory and exaggerated forms. These forms become associated with the emotions to which they correspond. Hence, when the forms are used, they recall the emotions with which they are associated in the mind. Thus they become exponents of the commun-

cator's feelings, and assist the interpreter in understanding with what intention the words are used.

## 2. Figures Founded on Co-existent Emotions.

Co-existent emotions give rise to four kinds of figurative expression : (1) *Exclamation*, when the idea is associated with strong emotion ; (2) *Hyperbole*, when exaggerated statement is employed ; (3) *Apostrophe*, when the idea is so vividly conceived as to lead to direct address ; and (4) *Vision*, when the past or future is conceived of as present.

(1) **Exclamation.**—Not every exclamation is a figure of speech. The expressions Oh ! Alas ! and the like are plain language, because they fail to fulfill the condition of figures, *that one thing is expressed in the form of another*. Interjections are as natural expressions of feeling as verbs and nouns are respectively of actions and objects. The primary and natural expression of strong emotion is not a *proposition*, but an *interjection*. The proposition,—subject, copula and predicate,—is the intellective form of utterance ; the exclamation is the emotive.\* When a proposition is thrown into the interjectional form, *i. e.*, is spoken or written in the manner of an interjection, the emotive form of that particle is made the medium of expressing an idea primarily intellective ; then it becomes figurative. Hamlet, speaking in the propositional form would have said : “ Man is a wonderful work ; noble in reason, infinite in faculties, express and admirable

\* For a valuable discussion of the Interjection, see EARL'S *Philology of the English Tongue*, Chap. iii.

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in form and moving, in action like an angel, in apprehension like a god, the beauty of the world, the paragon of animals." But filled with emotion by these high thoughts, Shakespeare makes him speak in the interjectional form : "What a piece of work is man ! how noble in reason ! how infinite in faculties ! in form and moving, how express and admirable ! in action how like an angel ! in apprehension, how like a god ! the beauty of the world ! the paragon of animals !"

(2) **Hyperbole.**—Emotion once excited, though brief, is cumulative. As the eye runs along the ascending lines of some cathedral spire until it leaps into free space, so emotion rising with indescribable swiftness, is soon far above its primary causes. Hence exaggeration is natural to imaginative and emotional people, who conceive more vividly than facts allow, and speak even more vividly than they conceive. The philosophy of the figure is, that facts are measured by the strength of the co-existent emotion, and hence, in expression, are magnified to correspond with the emotion. The hyperbole is, therefore, a form of expression in which one thing is said under the form of another more impressive than itself. The intelligent hearer is aware of this, and makes a due allowance. Saul and Jonathan are represented as "swifter than eagles and stronger than lions." Every intelligent reader knows that this is said in the exaggerated form suggested by strong emotion, and yet he feels, at the same time, that by this very exaggeration that feeling of wonder and admiration which prompted the form of expression is communicated to himself. In this lies the value of the figure in economizing interpreting power.

The hyperbole may be made one of the most forcible

ble helps to expression. Milton's fondness for it is everywhere evident. Thus in "Comus":

" I was all ear  
And took in strains *that might create a soul*  
*Under the ribs of Death.*"

In "Il Penseroso":

" Such notes as warbled to the string  
*Drew iron tears down Pluto's cheek.*"

This happy instance in "Paradise Lost" is but one of hundreds:

" He called  
His legions, angel forms, who lay entranced  
*Thick as autumnal leaves that strew the brooks*  
In Vallombrosa."

Much of the brilliancy of humorous writing is derived from hyperbole. Thus, in "Henry IV." Shakspeare makes Falstaff say: "There's but a shirt and a half in all my company; and the half shirt is two napkins, tacked together, and thrown over the shoulders like a herald's coat without sleeves."

Hood writes of a night so terrible that a Christian farmer would not leave his scarecrow out of shelter; and Jerrold, of a man so unwisely benevolent that he held his umbrella over a duck in a shower of rain.

No high purpose of style is subserved when a lady speaks of a "sublime lemonade," a "heart-rending cup of tea," or "magnificent soup." The whole tendency of such exaggeration is, to weaken the force of every utterance of those who thus abuse speech, and finally to emasculate language.

(3) **Apostrophe.**—In the higher flights of imagination, the absent are conceived of as present, the inani-

mate as living, the abstract as personal, and are directly addressed. This figure is clearly allied to personification, with which it is often combined. The national hymn "America" is in the apostrophic form, and how much it owes to this may be seen by constructing a parody, altering

"My country, 'tis of thee,"

to the third person. The use of this figure presupposes elevated emotion, and would be absurd without it.

(4) **Vision.**—Vision has sometimes been confounded with apostrophe, but the two are entirely distinct. While apostrophe consists in a direct address, vision treats the past and the future as if they were the present. It does not invoke, but describes. A striking illustration is found in Edward Everett's description of the perils of the *Mayflower* :

"Methinks I see it now—that one solitary, adventurous vessel, the *Mayflower* of a forlorn hope, freighted with the prospects of a future state, and bound across the unknown sea. I behold it pursuing with a thousand misgivings the uncertain, the tedious voyage. I see them now, scantily supplied with provisions; crowded almost to suffocation in their ill-stored prison; delayed by calms, pursuing a circuitous route. The awful voice of the storm howls through the rigging; the laboring masts seem straining from their base; one dismal sound of the pump is heard; the ship leaps, as it were madly from billow to billow; the ocean breaks and settles with ingulfing floods over the floating deck, and beats with deadening, shivering weight against the staggering vessel."

### 3. Explanation of these Figures.

The figures founded on co-existent emotions have been touched hastily, in order that their rationale might be explained in one place.



Sir William Hamilton has established the law, enunciated by Kant, that "Knowledge and feeling, though always co-existent, are always in the inverse ratio of each other." This law explains the figures founded on co-existent emotions, and furnishes a foundation on which to base laws for their use. All these figures are products of strong emotion. The strength of the emotions obliterates distinctions of fact which are obvious to minds not thus aroused. In hyperbole, wide differences are overlooked; in apostrophe, the chasm between life and death, personality and insensibility, is crossed with a leap; in vision, centuries are swept out of view, and the past seems to coincide with the present. Emotion of any kind is eclectic, excluding from view all that is not in harmony with itself, and intensifying and magnifying what is accordant with itself. "When we are under a strong emotion, all things discordant with it," says Bain, "are kept out of sight. A strong *volitional* urgency will subdue an opposing consideration actually before the mind; but intense feeling so lords it over the *intellectual* trains that the opposing considerations are not even allowed to be present. One would think it were enough that the remote considerations should give way to the near and pressing ones, so that the 'video meliora' might still remain with the 'deteriora sequor'; but, in truth, the flood of emotion sometimes sweeps away for the moment every vestige of the opposing absent, as if they had at no time been a present reality. Our feelings not merely play the part of rebels or innovators against the canons of the past, they are like destroying Vandals, who efface and consume the records of what has been."\*

\* *The Emotions and the Will*

Originally produced by the contemplation of realities, emotion stimulates the fancy, which "gives to airy nothing a local habitation and a name;" then, catching inspiration from its own creations, the dominant emotion wholly influences the trains of thought, until distinctions of space, time, cause and effect, and value, are obliterated or transferred. An angry man sees no beauty in his foe, a lover no blemish in his mistress, an enthusiast no fallacy in his theory. Thus also the poet and the orator, when the "eye is with fine frenzy rolling," construe the universe to suit their mood. Stars and flowers become sisters, the trees and clouds assume personality, the dead are recalled from the world of shades, and are addressed as if living. To the fancy of the poet, all this is momentarily real, and the inadequate expression of a truth beyond all powers of utterance to express; to the cool critic, who catches no spark of the poetic fire, it is superlative nonsense. Hence the realistic verdict of Bentham, in which he pronounces poetry to be "misrepresentation in verse." Hence also what is loudly applauded as oratory when the enthusiasm of the assembly runs at full tide, seems bombastic and insipid to the deliberate reader.

#### 4. Laws of these Figures.

Two laws for the use of these strongly emotive figures grow out of their relation to the economy of interpreting power: (1) they aid the expression of strong emotion, since exaggeration is naturally associated with it; and (2) they are effective only when preceded by such trains of thought and feeling as will justify exaggeration

## SECTION III.

**FIGURES FOUNDED ON CONTRAST****1. The Theory of Contrast.**

The mind is affected by a change from one state of consciousness to another. The greatness and suddenness of the change determine the degree in which the mind is affected. Thus we are shocked by a sudden transition from darkness to a bright light, or from hilarious joy to profound grief. This effect upon the mind is owing to the principle of contrast. It is a law of the mind that qualities contrasted are rendered more striking. If, for example, two pictures, one beautiful, the other ugly, are seen at the same time, both the loveliness of the one and the repulsiveness of the other are magnified by the comparison. Contrast is particularly adapted to the exhibition of minute differences. If we hold a candle between us and the noon-day sun, the former will appear dark when compared with the effulgence of the latter. If a piece of black cloth be laid upon a substance truly black, the black cloth will appear relatively gray. So when two thoughts or emotions are brought into close proximity, and especially when they are set in opposition by a balanced sentential structure, the distinction between them will be greatly magnified by the contrast. Now, as the jeweler displays the brilliancy of his wares by exhibiting them on a black and non-reflecting back-ground, so the writer may add attractiveness to his conceptions, and economize the interpreting powers of his reader, by employing the principle of contrast.

## 2. Essentials of a Perfect Contrast.

A perfect contrast requires opposition or contrariety. It also requires that the objects contrasted belong to the same generic class. We cannot contrast *heat* and *light*, *virtue* and *pleasure*, because they belong to different categories. The proper opposite of *virtue* is *vice*. These belong to the same category, since they are both states of moral character. *Heat* and *cold* are in contrast, because they are states of temperature. Hence a perfect contrast requires that the objects contrasted be of the same generic class, but the most widely different of that class.

## 3. Figures Founded on Contrast.

Contrast gives rise to two classes of figures: (1), those in which there is an *expressed contrast*; and (2) those in which a contrast is *implied*.

### I. EXPRESSED CONTRAST.

The figures in which two expressed ideas are contrasted are *Antithesis* and *Climax*.

#### 1. Antithesis.

(1) **The Nature of Antithesis.**—Antithesis is a form of expression which impresses an idea upon the mind by bringing opposites into one conception. Thus, in the sentence, "*Gold* cannot make a man *happy* any more than *rags* can make him *miserable*;" "*Gold*" and "*rags*," "*happy*" and "*miserable*" are set in opposition, in order to give a double illustration of the sentiment, "Happiness is not dependent on what we possess." The resultant idea derived from both members

of an antithesis is, in force, not unlike a conclusion that has been established by both negative and affirmative proof.

(2) **The Natural Form of Antithesis.**—The form of the antithesis is naturally, but not necessarily, the balanced sentence. This form of sentential structure, renders the opposition more evident to the eye or ear, thus insuring the perception of the antithetical effect. Thus, in the sentence, "*Faithful* are the *wounds* of a *friend*, but *deceitful* are the *kisses* of an *enemy*;" the opposition of like parts of speech, "*faithful*" and "*deceitful*," "*wounds*" and "*kisses*," "*friend*" and "*enemy*," and the corresponding length of the two members, give additional force to the antithesis of thought. The structure of the sentence has much to do with the effect of the following stanza :

"In *peace* there's nothing so becomes a man  
As *mild* behavior and *humanity*;  
But when the blast of *war* blows in our ears,  
Let us be *tigers* in our *fierce* deportment."

Sometimes the antithesis lies almost wholly in the structure of the sentence. Thus, in Pope's well-known comparison of Homer and Virgil commencing, "Homer was the greater genius, Virgil the better artist;" there is no contrast of opposition between "genius" and "artist," "man" and "work," "profusion" and "magnificence." Frequently there is real antithesis without the balanced structure. Thus the innocence of Lucretia and the violence of Sextus are contrasted in these lines :

"Now look ye where she lies,  
That beauteous flower, that innocent sweet rose,  
Torn up by ruthless violence."

(3) **Laws of Antithesis.**—The nature of antithesis renders easy the deduction of two laws: (1) since the balanced form displays the contrast most clearly, interpreting power is economized by uniformity in the length and structure of the contrasted members; and (2) since the antithetical form becomes monotonous from this uniformity, antitheses should not be very frequent.

## 2. Climax.

Climax, or the rhetorical ladder, consists in such an arrangement of ideas in a series as to secure a gradual increase of impressiveness. It is based on the principle of contrast. Antithesis contrasts objects by bringing them together in opposition; climax contrasts objects by exhibiting their degrees of difference through a series of intermediates. "It is observed by all travelers who have visited the Alps, or other stupendous mountains, that they form a very inadequate notion of the vastness of the greater ones, till they ascend some of the less elevated, (which yet are huge mountains), and thence view the others still towering above them. And the mind, no less than the eye, can not so well take in and do justice to any vast object at a single glance, as by several successive approaches and repeated comparisons."\*

Cicero has used the climax with great effect in his "Oration against Verres." Withholding the real crime for a moment, he refers to the atrocity of lesser offenses, thus magnifying the guilt of Verres by a series of contrasts:—"It is an outrage to *bind* a Roman citizen; to *scourge* him is an atrocious crime; to *put*

\* Whately's *Rhetoric*, Part II. Chap. ii. § 4.

*him to death* is almost parricide; but to CRUCIFY him — what shall I call it ?”

## II. IMPLIED CONTRAST.

The figures in which an expressed idea is contrasted with an implied opposite are EPIGRAM, INTERROGATION and IRONY.

### 1. Epigram.

The epigram, like the antithesis, is based on an obvious contrariety. Primarily the word meant an inscription on a monument. It is used also to signify any terse or pointed expression. It is here employed in a special sense, to designate those forms of expression in which there is a contradiction between the *real* and the *apparent* meaning; as, “*Verbosity* is cured by a wide *vocabulary* ;” “*Conspicuous* for *absence* ;” “Some are too *foolish* to commit *follies*.”

That such apparent contradictions have any tendency to economize interpreting power is not clear. They possess two qualities which in part compensate for their contradictory character. They are necessarily brief, so that the mind is not confused with a complicated structure; and, appearing to violate a law of thought, they stimulate to unusual interest. A series of epigrams rapidly delivered would be unintelligible. A style too epigrammatic is generally wearisome. Such a style is better adapted to be a depository of thought than to be a medium of communication, since, when the sense is once grasped, the brevity and paradox of the form of expression fix it in the memory. The epigram, therefore, is the natural garb of the proverb.

## 2. Interrogation.

An interrogation may be a part of plain speech. It becomes figurative when it is an affirmation in the form of a question. Thus, "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" is meant to be an emphatic affirmation that He will do right. The reason of the emphasis in the interrogative form is obvious. It has been shown that differences are more evident when contraries are brought into one conception. The interrogation forces upon the attention at once both an affirmative and a negative answer. Thus the affirmative and negative answers are brought into contrast, and the *affirmative is admitted from the impossibility of the negative.*

## 3. Irony.

Irony also involves the principle of contrast. It consists in putting an assumption in the place of a known truth, that the truth may be made more impressive by the contrast. A single example, from Whittier, will illustrate this :

"What has the gray-haired prisoner done?  
Has *murder* stained his hands with gore?  
Not so. His crime's a *fouler* one—  
*God made the old man poor.*"

Here the poet, pleading for the abolition of imprisonment for debt, represents *poverty* as a *crime*. That it is not a crime to be born poor is self-evident, but its guiltlessness is made the clearer by being brought into the same view with murder, from which it is so different. The contrast is heightened by rep-



representing poverty as a *fouler* crime than murder. Hence we may conclude, that irony depends upon the contrast between the truth and an assumption. Conclusive proof of this is found in the fact, that a statement is not recognized as ironical if its untruthfulness is not apparent.

## CHAPTER III.

### ECONOMY OF THE FEELINGS.

#### 1. The Effect of Words on the Sensibilities.

WE have seen how language must be framed in order to economize the powers of *interpretation*; we have now to consider how the power of *feeling* may be economized.

Words as mere sounds, apart from their meaning, have an effect upon the sensibilities. Some combinations of words are agreeable, others disagreeable, to the listener, and, by an unavoidable association, even to the silent reader. It is clear, then, that forms of expression, aside from their sense, may mar the realization of the idea, either by producing feelings which divert the attention from it, or which are not in harmony with it. The state of feeling best adapted to interpretation is that of agreeable stimulation derived from the easy and uninterrupted movement of the machinery of expression. As soon as the words grate upon the ear, or the construction halts, we are conscious of a disagreeable feeling, and a consequent inability to use all our powers in realizing the idea.

#### 2. Hamilton's Theory of the Feelings.

Sir William Hamilton, in his theory of pleasure and pain, regards agreeable and disagreeable feelings as the

results respectively of a normal or an abnormal activity of natural powers. He says :

“By relation to the object about which it is conversant, an energy is perfect, when this object is of such a character as to afford to its power the condition requisite to let it spring to full spontaneous activity ; imperfect, when the object is of such a character as either, on the one hand, to stimulate the power to a continuance of activity beyond its maximum of free exertion ; or, on the other hand, to thwart it in its tendency towards this its natural limit. An object is, consequently, pleasurable or painful, inasmuch as it thus determines a power to perfect or imperfect energy.” \*

### 3. Application of the Theory to Expression

Now, since expression exists for the idea merely, and since the realization of the idea affords to the mind its natural play of activity, every diversion of the mind caused by the form of expression which does not assist in revealing the idea, determines an imperfect energy, which is disagreeable. Hence the highest activity in realizing the idea depends on the economy of the feelings, by removing all causes of diversion and discord. Any activity prolonged beyond what is customary, becomes disagreeable ; hence the law of *Variety*. The simultaneous exertion of the same faculty in contrary directions is disagreeable ; hence the law of *Harmony*. These two laws will be more fully illustrated in the following sections.

\* *Metaphysics.*

## SECTION I.

## VARIETY.

## 1. The Necessity of Variety.

Every part of our physical organization has a definite amount of force to be used in sensation, and when, by prolonged exertion, this force is expended, pain takes the place of pleasure. What is true of our bodies is true analogically of our minds. Experience teaches that mental activities which once gave delight, produce pain when greatly prolonged. How great a prolongation may be pleasurably endured, depends greatly on habit. The sounds of many northern dialects which are so unpleasant to us, are musical to those who have heard them from childhood. Our own speech would grate upon an Italian ear, unaccustomed to so many and difficult combinations of consonants. But, although habit and training create wide differences in the sensibilities of men, it is a demand of universal human nature that we vary the powers employed in any activity, and also the mode of their employment. Hence the necessity of variety in style.

## 2. The Applications of Variety.

Variety is necessary in all the elements of expression. We shall notice its application to the following: (1) *Letters*; (2) *Words and Syllables*; (3) *Sentences*; and (4) *Figures*.

I. *LETTERS*.

In the combination of letters the law of variety may

be violated in two ways : (1) by the cumulation of *Consonants* ; and (2) by the cumulation of *Vowels*.

### 1. The Cumulation of Consonants.

Too many consonants taken together tax the powers disagreeably, as may be seen in such words as *twelfths*, *hundredths*, *sixthly*, *strengthenedst*. These words are not only difficult to pronounce, but they are unpleasant to the ear. Whether their unpleasantness to the ear is owing wholly to an association of the sound with the difficulty of utterance, or partly to a straining of a perceptive power beyond its habitual limit, is a curious question whose decision would not practically affect the law of variety. There may be some reason to suppose the latter, from the fact that no one of these letters is disagreeable if sounded by itself, and that any letter becomes disagreeable if repeated continually.

A succession of consonants of different orders renders the effect still more disagreeable. Mutes are divided into surd and sonant, according as they are formed of voiced or unvoiced breath. The transition of the vocal organs from the production of a surd to the production of a sonant, is difficult. Thus it is impossible to pronounce the syllable *sofā*, without making the “f” a “v,” or the “ā” a “t.”

### 2. The Cumulation of Vowels.

A succession of vowels produces a hiatus which is disagreeable. Hence the tendency to separate them by the insertion of a consonant *as, an ox, an army*, rather than, *a ox, a army*.

## II. WORDS AND SYLLABLES.

Variety in the use of words and syllables is violated (1) by the recurrence of the same sound,—*Tautophony*, and (2) by the recurrence of the accent at regular intervals,—*Meter*.

### 1. Tautophony.

(1) **Offensive Tautophony.**—The unpleasant effect of the repetition of the same sound in the following sentence is felt at once: “The Captain ordered the Orderly to order the ordnance arranged in order.” The substitution of synonyms for some of these words improves the effect.

The recurrence of the same syllable often becomes offensive. Thus *holily*, *lowly*, *uniform formality*, are unpleasant to the ear. Dr. Johnson says “*Tediousness is the most fatal of all faults.*” Here the first two words hiss sharply, and the sentence ends with an unmelodious repetition of “*al.*” Clearness of meaning sometimes renders such collocations difficult to avoid.

(2) **Intentional Tautophony.**—In alliteration and consonantal rhyme, tautophony is purposely employed. How such repetition of sounds becomes subservient to expression will presently appear.

1) **Absence of Intentional Rhyme in the Classical Languages.**—Mr. Marsh observes that “It has been thought singular that with the multitude of like terminations, and the great sensibility of the Greek and Latin ear, neither rhyme, alliteration, nor accent should have become metrical elements, but that, on the

contrary, repetition of sound in all its forms should have been sedulously avoided."\* He then offers the following explanation of this fact: "The frequent recurrence of like sounds in those languages was unavoidable; it was a grammatical necessity, and if such sounds had been designedly introduced as rhymes, and thus made still more conspicuous, they could not but have been as offensive to the delicacy of ancient ears as excessive alliteration is to our own. To them such obvious coincidences appeared too gross to be regarded as proper instrumentalities in so ethereal an art as poetry, and they constructed a prosody depending simply on the subtlest element of articulation, the quantity or relative length of the vowels."

2) **Reason of this Absence.**—The absence of intentional rhyme in Greek and Latin poetry results not so much from its grossness as from its inutility. In English, rhyme is a real auxiliary of poetic expression. That there is something persistent in it, is evident from the fact that it has triumphed over the violent opposition of Sir Philip Sidney, Ben Jonson, and Milton. Rhyme came into our language as a constituent element of poetry just at the time when English was passing, or, more strictly, had passed from an inflected to an uninflected form of speech. Latin contains many more rhyming words than any other spoken language, but Italian contains four times as many as English, and Spanish six times as many as English. Rhyme becomes subservient to poetical expression by the fewness of rhyming words. In a language so poor in rhymes as English, rhyme economizes expectant attention by the regular introduction of corresponding

\* *Lectures on the English Language.*

forms. When one of the rhyming words is given, we can almost predict what its mate will be. We cannot indeed, always name the exact word, but, since the conditions of the case limit the number of possible words, we are prepared for a word of a certain kind. In Spanish, words have on the average twenty-five rhymes each. It is clear that in Latin the number would be so great as to afford no clue to what word would be given. Hence the Romans never intentionally or spontaneously wrote rhyme. In English, words average only three rhymes each. Hence, since the language has lost its inflections, rhyming poems are the most common. Knowing the ending of a rhyming word before it is given, we are in possession of the whole before it is pronounced, and accordingly have a fraction of time to dwell upon the idea expressed. An experimental test of this prediction of a word may be made by causing some lines of poetry to be read aloud. The regular recurrence of corresponding syllables relieves the listener of a certain amount of attention. That economized attention may be devoted to the realization of the ideas. This economy of expectant attention depends on the *regularity* of the rhyme. Here is another reason why rhymes are not common in inflected languages, since they would occur in the middle of lines as well as at the end. In English, the *regularity* compensates for the lack of variety. Nor is the *regular* recurrence of rhyme a serious violation of variety, for different sounds intervene between the rhyming words.

3) **The Adaptation of Rhyme to Poetry.**—We find here also an explanation of the adaptation of rhymed verse to poetic ideas. Emotion is a subjective



state, and is interrupted by any objective diversion of the attention. Pain and grief for example are forgotten when the mind is occupied with externals. But rhyme, by the economy of expectant attention, reduces the causes of diversion; for, substituting the regularity of periodic consonance for the irregularity of prose, it leaves the mind more completely absorbed in the contemplation of emotive images.

## 2. Meter.

The regular recurrence of the accent constitutes meter. This regular movement economizes expectant attention by the certainty that a definite structure will follow.

(1) **Proof of the Value of Meter.**—A proof that the structure is anticipated is found in the fact that a shock of disappointment is felt when the meter is imperfect. One may descend a flight of steps in the dark with rapidity and safety, if the steps are all equal, but one is sure to be impeded by inequalities. Why is this? It is evidently owing to the certainty of uniformity in the steps, and the consequent removal of the necessity for constant attention. In other words, it is the economy of expectant attention. So in a metrical composition, the uniformity of structure relieves the mind from expectant attention.

(2) **Example.**—An example will illustrate this statement. The following description in prose demands some attention to the irregular construction of the sentences, which abstracts just so much power from the total ability of the mind to feel the beauty of the scene described:

“The sinuous paths of moss and lawn that lie across

and along through this garden, some at once, open to the breeze and the sun, some lost among bowers of blossoming trees, were all paved with delicate bells and daisies, as fair as the fabulous asphodels, and flowerets, drooping as day drooped, that fell into blue, purple, and white pavilions, to roof the glow-worm from the dew of evening."

See now how much more impressive the loveliness of this scene becomes, when the poet's art, by rhyme and meter, removes the necessity of attention to the sentimental structure :

" And the sinuous paths of lawn and moss,  
That led through this garden along and across  
Some open at once to the sun and the breeze,  
Some lost among bowers of blossoming trees,  
Were all paved with daisies and delicate bells  
As fair as the fabulous asphodels,  
And flow'rets drooping as day drooped too,  
Fell into pavilions white, purple, and blue,  
To roof the glow-worm from the evening dew.

(3) **The Adaptation of Meter to Poetry.**—It is evident that meter is not so well adapted to the expression of pure thought as to the expression of pure feeling, or the emotive images which produce feeling. There is an incongruity between pure thought and any uniform structure. A predetermined measure is a fetter to the expression of abstract thought, and its stiffness appears in the more purely thoughtful passages of didactic poetry. Meter often necessitates inversions and transpositions which obscure the thought. Rhyme limits the vocabulary too much for the exact expression of pure thought. Hence intellectual statements are awkward in verse. The expression of emotion,

however, finds in verse no real barrier. Emotion is less dependent on exact propositions, and arises more from affecting images, which may be combined as readily in meter as without it.

(4) **Rhythm.**—Rhythm differs from meter in requiring a less regular recurrence of accent. Aristotle holds that every prose sentence should possess rhythm but not meter. The practice of the best ancient writers evinces an æsthetic perception of rhythmical beauty seldom equaled by the moderns.

(5) **Meter no Violation of Variety.**—Meter is an apparent violation of the law of variety, but it is only apparent. Thought requires freedom of movement for its full and natural expression ; hence great variety is essential to prose, and its proper movement is rhythmical. Emotion is best produced by contemplating a series of emotive images, without any abstraction of the attention, hence its proper movement is metrical. ‘The jerks, the breaks, the inequalities, and harshnesses of prose, are fatal to the flow of a poetical imagination, as a jolting road or stumbling horse disturbs the reverie of an absent man. But poetry makes these odds all even. It is the music of language answering to the music of mind ; untying, as it were, ‘the secret soul of harmony.’ Wherever any object takes such a hold of the mind, by which it seeks to prolong and repeat the emotion, to bring all other objects into accord with it, and to give the same movement of harmony, sustained and continuous, or gradually varied according to the occasion, to the sounds that express it—this is poetry. There is a deep connection between music and deep-rooted passion. In ordinary speech we arrive at a certain harmony by modulations of the voice ; in

poetry the same thing is done systematically by a regular collocation of syllables." \* Variety is necessary even in verse, but it is variety in uniformity. The cæsuras, emphases, and rhetorical suspensions break the monotony of the measure. The distinction between the variety required in prose and in poetry is based on this: *feeling is a state, and must not be disturbed; thought is a process, and lives by motion.*

### III. SENTENCES.

Variety applies (1) to the *length*, and (2) to the *structure* of sentences.

#### 1. Length.

Dr. Blair's observations on this point can scarcely be improved. He says: "If we would keep up the attention of the reader or hearer, if we would preserve vivacity and strength in our composition, we must be very attentive to vary our measures. . . . Short sentences should be mixed with long and swelling ones, to render discourse sprightly as well as magnificent." † Closeness of attention to musical effect may itself become a source of monotony by the too frequent repetition of a typical sentence which by itself is melodious. Discords are purposely introduced into music to break the monotony of excessive sweetness.

#### 2. Structure.

Sentences similarly constructed soon become wearisome. Variety should extend to the distribution of members and the cadence of the period. It has been

\* Haslitt's *Lectures on Poetry*, Lecture I.

† *Rhetoric.*

shown that the different kinds of sentence, the loose, the periodic, and the balanced, have their peculiar offices in expression. Variety in sentential structure is certain to follow from variety and affluence of ideas, for each succeeding idea will naturally assume a form corresponding to itself. Dr. Blair says truly: "It have only one tune, or measure, is not much better than having none at all. A very vulgar ear will enable a writer to catch some one melody, and to form the run of his sentences according to it; which soon proves disgusting."\*

#### IV. FIGURES.

Variety in the use of figures may be violated in two ways: (1) by using such as are *similar*; and (2) by using them too *profusely*.

##### 1. Similarity.

The repetition of any one kind of figure, such as metaphor, climax, antithesis, or hyperbole, renders a composition wearisome. This is especially the case when they are drawn from one object. Trite similes and metaphors want the charm of novelty, which is a form of variety.

##### 2. Profusion.

Too many figures of whatever kind produce a feeling of satiety, as the palate is sated by immoderate indulgence. Cicero says: "In all human things, disgust borders so nearly on the most lively pleasures, that we need not be surprised to find this hold in speech.

\* *Rhetoric.*

From reading either poets or orators we may easily satisfy ourselves, that neither a poem nor an oration, which, without intermission, is showy and sparkling, can please us long.\* Quintilian says of figures, that ‘as they beautify composition when they are seasonably introduced, so they deform it greatly, if too frequently sought after.’† Crowding together many figures is certain to result in confusion, which, aside from the violation of the law of variety, is a sufficient reason for their moderate use.

## SECTION II.

### HARMONY.

It is a mysterious but universally known fact, that harmony gives pleasure and discord pain. It is so in music, in painting, and in architecture, as well as in speech. This appears to be partly owing to the unity of action of our faculties in receiving impressions. A variety relieves them from too prolonged an exertion, harmony secures unity in their action. There is, therefore, an economy of sensitive power when the constituents of a compound object so correspond as to allow a harmonious action of the mental powers exerted upon it. Hence the importance of harmony between the idea and the medium in expression. The law of harmony applies (1) to *Sounds*, and (2) to *Figures*.

#### I. *SOUNDS*.

There has been much discussion of the question, How far may sound be an echo to the sense? Some

\* *De Oratore*, L. III.

† *Institutes*, I. IX. 3.

find numerous correspondences between words and things. Others regard their connection as wholly imaginary, and, if there be any imitation, they deem it as wholly accidental. It seems evident, after a careful study of examples, that speech has an illustrative power which depends on imitation or a very intimate and general mental association. Without attempting an exhaustive treatment of so technical a subject, we may notice the illustrative effect of articulate language in representing (1) other sounds; (2) time and motion; (3) size; (4) ease and difficulty; (5) the agreeable and the disagreeable; and (6) climax in sense.

### 1. Other Sounds.

Some words unquestionably imitate natural inarticulate sounds. Thus *hiss*, *whiz*, *crash* and *splash*, as ordinarily uttered, correspond closely to the noises for which they stand. There is certainly an onomatopoeic effect in the following lines from Pope :

‘What! like Sir Richard, rough and fierce,  
 With arms, and George, and Brunswick crowd the verse  
 Rend with tremendous sounds your ears asunder,  
 With gun, drum, trumpet, blunderbuss, and thunder?  
 Then all your muse’s softer art display,  
 Let Carolina smooth the tuneful lay,  
 Lull with Amelia’s liquid name the nine,  
 And sweetly flow through all the royal line.”

The following is a fine imitation of the sounds made by falling timber :

“Deep-echoing groan the thickets brown.  
 Then rustling, crackling, crashing, thunder down.”

## 2. Time and Motion.

Quick time and lively motion are imitated by a succession of light and tripping syllables; as in the line,

“When the merry bells ring round.”

The galloping of a horse is suggested by the movement of these lines :

“At each bound he could feel his scabbard of steel  
Striking his stallion’s flanks.”

Slow motion is expressed in the line,

“Up the high hill he heaves the huge round stone.”

Slowness of motion and dignity are indicated by ambics, as in the following :

The list’ning crówd admire the lófty soúnd,  
A present deity, they shout around,  
A present deity, the vaulted roofs rebound.  
    With rávished eárs  
    The monarch hears,  
    Assumes the god,  
    Affects to nod,  
And seéms to sháke the sphéres.

Quick time and motion are expressed by trochees, as in this song to the wine god :

“Báachus éver fáir and yóung  
Drinking joys did first ordain.  
Bacchus’ blessings are a treasure  
Drinking is the soldier’s pleasure  
    Rích the tréasure,  
    Sweet the pleasure,  
Sweet is pleasure after pain.”



Rapidity and impetuosity may be represented in anapæsts, as in the following, where the intermingling of iambs imparts a moody quality to the expression

“ Revéngé, revéngé, Timótheus críes,  
 See the fúries arise !  
 See the snakes that they rear,  
 How they hiss in their hair,  
 And the spárkles that flásh from their éyes !  
 Behóld how they tóss their tórches on hígh,  
 How they point to the Persian abodes  
 And glittering temples of their hostile gods.  
 The princes applaud with a furious joy ;  
 And the king seized a flambeau with zeal to destroy.”

### 3. Size.

Size is capable of some imitation in words. Short and easily sounded words are often expressive of littleness, while cumbrous and ill-formed words are suggestive of bulk, and sonorous combinations sometimes give rise to the feeling of grandeur. The following from Milton illustrates how great bulk may be expressed in verse :

—“ Part, huge of bulk,  
 Wallowing, unwieldy, enormous in their gait,  
 Tempest the ocean.”

### 4. Ease and Difficulty.

Pope forcibly illustrates the excessive labor with which a dull writer “ makes his barrenness appear,”

“ And strains from hard bound brains eight lines a year ”

Ease of movement is suggested by these lines :

“ Soft is the stream when Zephyr gently blows,  
 And the smooth stream in smoother numbers flows.”

### 5. The Agreeable and the Disagreeable.

Agreeable or disagreeable feelings are produced by melodious or unmelodious sounds. How delightful are the feelings aroused by such music as this of Whittier's .

' I love the old melodious lays  
Which softly melt the ages through,  
The songs of Spenser's golden days,  
Arcadian Sidney's silvery phrase,  
Sprinkling our noon of time with freshest morning dew."

With what irritation do we hear such a line as this

"Grate on their scannel pipes of wretched straw."

### 6. Climax in Sense.

Perhaps the most effective correspondence between sound and sense occurs when a climax of meaning and a climax of sound coincide. The following sentence from Sterne admits of a vocal prolongation of the last word, which adds much to the effect :

"The accusing spirit which flew up to Heaven's Chancery with the oath, blushed as he gave it in ; and the recording angel, as he wrote it down, dropped a tear upon the word, and blotted it out forever."

Notice how completely the effect is lost by introducing a number of small and weak words at the close :

"The accusing spirit which flew up to Heaven's Chancery with the oath, blushed as he gave it in ; and the recording angel as he wrote it down, dropped a tear on it, and blotted it out once for all."

Since every sentence should grow in the force of its meaning to the close, the principle forbids the use of insignificant words at the end of a sentence, and re-

quires the longest and most sonorous members to be placed last.

## II. FIGURES.

Figures have various degrees of adaptability to the purposes of expression. This regards (1) the *kinds* of figures; (2) their *number*; and (3) the *objects* from which they are drawn.

### 1. The Kinds of Figures.

Calm reasoning and deliberate description direct us to the choice of figures founded on resemblance. The simile especially is adapted to what is unimpassioned, since to express a resemblance implies a somewhat deliberate discrimination. On the other hand, impetuous passions, obliterating fine distinctions, and seizing only salient points, impel us to the use of figures founded on contiguity. Of figures founded on resemblance, the metaphor is most accordant with emotion, especially personification, which is peculiar to an emotional state of mind. The figures based on contrast occupy a middle ground, but of these the antithesis is the most deliberate, and climax, irony, and interrogation are more emotive. Harmony, therefore, requires the selection of such kinds of figures as correspond with the ideas to be expressed.

### 2. The Number of Figures.

That there is a relation between ideas and the number of figures to be used, is evident. Many figures crowded together confuse the understanding by their want of harmony with one another. If constructed for a common effect in producing emotion, they will

not on account of their number fail to produce that emotion, unless they are greatly confused. Hence in poetry, the language of feeling, we may properly use figures in greater profusion than in prose, the language of thought.

### 3. The Source of Figures.

The objects from which figures are drawn should be in keeping with the ideas to be expressed. The dignity or meanness of an object from which a metaphor or a simile is drawn, is readily transferred to the object described. Dean Swift has made an extensive and humorous collection of examples, illustrating how authors may degrade instead of exalting their subjects by the character of their figures. \*

When figures grow out of the subject by what might be called "spontaneous generation," harmony is almost inevitable. Any attempt to lay them on as external ornaments will make the expression seem artificial. In nature, all life develops from a primal cell; in expression, every thing should proceed by natural evolution from a germ of thought. Thus a composition will have the unity and symmetry which mark an organic growth.

The bestowment of excessive pains on the harmony of the idea and the medium, is certain to result in failure, just as a forced smile is certain to degenerate into a foolish grin. Milton speaks of

"Thoughts that voluntary move  
Harmonious numbers."

What are these thoughts? When the feelings of a

\* *The Art of Sinking*.—Pope may have written this

musical composer are feeble and uncertain, he strikes the notes aimlessly, and his production possesses no distinctive character. When his emotions are definite and strong, he sweeps the key-board with a power of expression which holds and thrills his audience. In the first case, the emotions are dependent upon the expression; in the second, they are free, and use the notes only as a means of utterance. So in verbal expression, thoughts vividly conceived, use the vocabulary as an *instrument*, while sluggish ideas creep along by the *help* of the language. Strong feelings and clear thoughts are, therefore, the primary conditions of all harmonious expression. Art may retouch and improve in some instances, but such thoughts and feelings will spontaneously assume those forms which **harmonize with the ideas expressed.**

# Exercises

In the preceding pages the theory of effective discourse has been systematically explained. The practical application of the laws of discourse is twofold : (1) they may be used as criteria of judgment in *Criticism*, or (2) they may be followed as guiding principles in *Construction*. Skill in any art is the result of practice. The ready apprehension of merits and defects in the compositions of others, and facility in applying the principles of rhetorical science in our own works are to be acquired only by careful and protracted exercise in criticism and production. While it is true that practice without principles constantly leads into error, it is also true that principles without practice have only a theoretical value. Hence great importance is attached to the practical use of the laws of discourse both in criticising the works of others and in original composition. After mastering the principles of Rhetoric, the student is prepared to examine literary productions with intelligent discrimination. He will be gratified to find that all truly effective writing and speaking are in accord with the laws which he has learned, and that compositions which ignore these laws are faulty in the degree of their departure from them. He will find also that his own efforts will increase in real value in proportion to his observance of these laws. Each day's

practice in criticism and production will contribute somewhat to the improvement of the faithful student, until he will at length become a master of accurate, methodical and effective composition.

To this end two kinds of exercises are added to the text of this book, the first *critical*, the second *constructive*. The first are intended to help the learner in discovering the faults and excellences of others, the second to assist him to realize in his own productions the highest rhetorical qualities.

## I.

### EXERCISES IN CRITICISM.

The laws of discourse laid down in the preceding pages are not conditions which simply *may* be fulfilled in the best writing, but they *must* be observed in all really excellent discourse. Like the principles of reasoning of which Logic treats, they are the *essential* conditions of perfect results. Genius itself is not exempt from them, but must ever be tested by them. They are the only criteria of judgment by which we may assign to a writer his true place in the republic of letters. Just as great generals often lose battles, and great statesmen adopt unwise measures, so great writers often fail of a uniform perfection. Criticism, however, aims to discover the merits as well as the defects of a composition, and it is often more profitable to observe how genius surmounts difficulties, than to perceive how readily it stumbles into errors. Hence the critical study of the masterpieces of literature in all departments is of great practical utility. Extracts of considerable length would be necessary to illustrate

the application of the laws of mind, general and particular. "Shaw's Choice Specimens of English Literature" may be used in classes with great advantage. A few selections may, however, be introduced here.

1. Criticise the following as specimens of Description.

(1) Italy is the central one of the three great peninsulas which project from the south of Europe into the Mediterranean Sea. It is bounded on the north by the chain of the Alps, which form a natural barrier, and it is surrounded on the other sides by the sea. Its shores are washed on the west by the "Mare Inferum," or the Lower Sea, and on the east by the Adriatic, called by the Romans the "Mare Superum," or the Upper Sea. It may be divided into two parts, the northern consisting of the great plain drained by the River Padus, or "Po," and its tributaries, and the southern being a long tongue of land, with the Apennines as a back-bone running down its whole extent from north to south. The extreme length of the peninsula from the Alps to the Straits of Messina is 700 miles. The breadth of northern Italy is 350 miles, while that of the southern portion is on an average not more than 100 miles. But, till the time of the Empire, the Romans never included the plain of the Po in Italy. To this country they gave the general name of *Gallia Cisalpina*, or Gaul on this (the Roman) side of the Alps, in consequence of its being inhabited by Gauls.—*Smith*.

(2) Greece is deficient in a regular supply of water. During the autumnal and winter months the rain, which falls in large quantities, fills the crevices in the limestone of the hills and is carried off by torrents. In summer rain is almost unknown and the beds of the torrents full of water in the winter then become ravines, perfectly dry and overgrown with shrubs. Even the rivers, which are partly supplied by springs, dwindle in the summer to very insignificant streams. None of the Grecian rivers are navigable, and the Achelous, which is the most considerable of all has a course of only 130 miles.



The chief productions of Greece in ancient times were wheat, barley, flax, wine, and oil. The hills afforded excellent pasture for cattle, and in antiquity were covered with forests, though they are at present nearly destitute of wood.

In almost every part of Greece there were rich veins of marble, affording materials for the architect and the sculptor such as hardly any other country in the world possesses. The limestone, of which most of its mountains is composed, is well adapted for military architecture ; and it is to this hard and intractable stone that we owe those massive polygonal walls, of which the remains still crown the summits of so many Grecian hills. Laurium near the southern extremity of Attica yielded a considerable quantity of silver, but otherwise Greece was poor in the precious metals. Iron was found in the range of Taygetus in Laconia, and copper as well as iron near Chalcis in Eubœa.—*Smith.*

(3) The *lurcher* is a kind of dog, somewhat resembling a greyhound, and supposed to derive its origin from some of the old rough-haired races of greyhound crossed with the shepherd's dog. It is lower, stouter, and less elegant than the greyhound, almost rivals it in fleetness, and much excels it in scent. It is covered with rough wiry hair, is usually of a sandy red color, although sometimes black or grey ; and has half-erect ears and a pendent tail. It is the poacher's favorite dog, possessing all the qualities requisite for his purposes, in sagacity rivaling the most admired dogs, and learning to act on the least hint or sign from his master. Of course it is detested by gamekeepers, and destroyed on every opportunity.—*Chambers' Encyclopedia.*

(4) In the centre of the court, under the blue Italian sky, and with the hundred windows of the vast palace gazing down upon it, from four sides, appears a fountain. It brims over from one stone basin to another, or gushes from a Naiad's urn, or spirts its many little jets from the mouths of nameless monsters, which were merely grotesque and artificial when Bernini, or whoever was their unnatural father, first produced them ; but now the patches of moss, the tufts of grass, the

trailing maiden-hair, and all sorts of verdant weeds that thrive in the cracks and crevices of moist marble, tell us that Nature takes the fountain back into her great heart, and cherishes it as kindly as if it were a woodland spring. And, hark, the pleasant murmur, the gurgle, the plash! You might hear just those tinkling sounds from any tiny waterfall in the forest, though here they gain a delicious pathos from the stately echoes that reverberate their natural language. So the fountain is not altogether glad, after all its three centuries of play!—*Hawthorne.*

- (5) A chieftain's daughter seemed the maid  
 Her satin snood, her silken plaid,  
 Her golden brooch such birth betrayed.  
 And seldom was a snood amid  
 Such wild luxuriant ringlets hid,  
 Whose glossy black to shame might bring  
 The plumage of the raven's wing :  
 And seldom o'er a breast so fair  
 Mantled a plaid with modest care ;  
 And never brooch the folds combined  
 Above a heart more good and kind.  
 Her kindness and her worth to spy,  
 You need but gaze on Ellen's eye ;  
 Not Katrine, in her mirror blue,  
 Gives back the shaggy banks more true  
 Than every free-born glance confessed  
 The guileless movements of her breast .  
 Whether joy danced in her dark eye,  
 Or woe or pity claimed a sigh,  
 Or filial love was glowing there,  
 Or meek devotion poured a prayer,  
 Or tale of injury called forth  
 The indignant spirit of the North.  
 One only passion unrevealed  
 With maiden pride the maid concealed,  
 Yet not less purely felt the flame ;  
 O need I tell that passion's name !—*Scott.*

(6) Formed in the best proportions of her sex, Rowena was tall in stature, but not so much so as to attract observation on account of superior height. Her complexion was exquisitely fair, but the noble cast of her head and features prevented the insipidity which sometimes attaches to fair beauties. Her clear blue eye, which sat enshrined beneath a graceful eye brow of brown sufficiently marked to give expression to the forehead, seemed capable to kindle as well as melt, to command as well as to beseech. If mildness were the more natural expression of such a combination of features, it was plain that in the present instance, the exercise of habitual superiority, and the reception of general homage, had given to the Saxon lady a loftier character, which mingled with and qualified that bestowed by nature. Her profuse hair, of a color between brown and flaxen, was arranged in a fanciful and graceful manner in numerous ringlets, to form which art had probably aided nature. These locks were braided with gems, and being worn at full length, intimated the noble birth and free-born condition of the maiden. A golden chain, to which was attached a small reliquary of the same metal hung round her neck. She wore bracelets on her arms, which were bare; her dress was an undergown and kirtle of pale sea-green silk, over which hung a long loose robe, which reached to the ground, having very wide sleeves, which came down, however, very little below the elbow. This robe was crimson, and manufactured out of the finest wool. A veil of silk, interwoven with gold, was attached to the upper part of it, which could be at the wearer's pleasure either drawn over the face and bosom, after the Spanish fashion, or disposed as a sort of d'espere round the shoulders.—*Scott*.

(7) The Romans, originally, were not only frugal, but they dressed with great simplicity. In process of time, they became extravagantly fond of elaborately ornamented attire, especially the women. They wore a great variety of rings and necklaces; they dyed their hair, and resorted to expensive cosmetics; they wore silks of various colors, magnificently embroidered. Pearls and rubies, for which large estates had

been exchanged, were suspended from their ears. Their hair glistened with a net-work of golden thread. Their stolæ were ornamented with purple bands, and fastened with diamond clasps, while their pallæ trailed along the ground. Jewels were embroidered upon their sandals, and golden bands, pins, combs, and pomades raised the hair in a storied edifice upon the forehead. They reclined on luxurious couches, and rode in silver chariots. Their time was spent in paying and receiving visits, at the bath, the spectacle, and the banquet Tables, supported on ivory columns, displayed their costly plate; silver mirrors were hung against the walls, and curious caskets contained their jewels and money. Bronze lamps lighted their chambers, and glass vases, imitating precious stones, stood upon their cupboards. Silken curtains were suspended over the doors and from the ceilings, and lecticæ, like palanquins, were borne through the streets by slaves, on which reclined the effeminated wives and daughters of the rich. Their gardens were rendered attractive by green-houses, flower-beds, and every sort of fruit and vine.—*Lord.*

2. Criticise the following as specimens of Narration.

(1) Thick as standing corn, and gorgeous as a field of flowers, were the Beloochees in their many-colored garments and turbans. They filled the broad deep bed of the Fullaillee; they were clustered on both banks, and covered the plain beyond. Guarding their heads with large dark shields, they shook their sharp swords, gleaming in the sun, and their shouts rolled like a peal of thunder, as with frantic might and gestures, they dashed against the front of the 22d. But with shrieks as wild and fierce, and hearts as big, and arms as strong, the British soldiers met them with the queen of weapons, and laid their foremost warriors wallowing in blood. Then also the few guns that could be placed in position on the right of the 22d, flanked by Henderson's small band of Madras sappers, swept diagonally the bed of the river, tearing the rushing masses with a horrible carnage. Soon the Sepoy

regiments, 12th and 25th, prolonged the line of fire to the left, coming into action successively in the same terrible manner. Clibborne's grenadiers were distant, skirmishing with the matchlock men in Kottree when they should have charged hem : but that was their commander's fault.

Now the Beloochees closed in denser masses, and the dreadful rush of their swordsmen was felt, and their shouts, answered by the pealing musketry, were heard along the line, and such a fight ensued as has seldom been told of in the records of war. For ever those wild fierce warriors, with shields held high and blades drawn back, strove with might and valor to break through the British ranks. No fire of small arms, no sweeping discharges of grape, no push of bayonets could drive them back ; they gave their breasts to the shot, their shields to the bayonets, and, leaping at the guns were blown away by twenties at a time ; their dead rolled down the steep slope by hundreds ; but the gaps were continually filled from the rear, the survivors pressed forward with unabated fury, and the bayonet and the sword clashed in full and frequent conflict.—*Napier*.

(2) While the Christian princes were thus wasting each other's strength, Solyman the Magnificent entered Hungary with a numerous army, and investing Belgrade, which was deemed the chief barrier of that kingdom against the Turkish arms, soon forced it to surrender. Encouraged by this success, he turned his victorious arms against the island of Rhodes, the seat, at that time, of the knights of St. John of Jerusalem. This small state he attacked with such a numerous army as the lords of Asia have been accustomed, in every age, to bring into the field. Two hundred thousand men, and a fleet of 400 sail, appeared against a town defended by a garrison consisting of 5,000 soldiers, and 600 knights, under the command of Villiers de L'Isle Adam, the grand master, whose wisdom and valor rendered him worthy of that station at such a dangerous juncture. No sooner did he begin to suspect the destination of Solyman's vast armaments, than he dispatched messengers to all the Christian courts, imploring their aid

against the common enemy. But though every prince in that age acknowledged Rhodes to be the great bulwark of Christendom in the East, and trusted to the gallantry of its knights as the best security against the progress of the Ottoman arms ; though Adrian, with a zeal that became the head and father of the Church, exhorted the contending powers to forget their private quarrels, and, by uniting their arms, to prevent the infidels from destroying a society which did honor to the Christian name ; yet so violent and implacable was the animosity of both parties, that, regardless of the danger to which they exposed all Europe, and unmoved by the entreaties of the grand master, they suffered Solyman to carry on his operations against Rhodes without disturbance. The grand master, after incredible efforts of courage, of patience, and of military conduct, during a siege of six months ; after sustaining many assaults, and disputing every post with amazing obstinacy, was obliged at last to yield to numbers, and having obtained an honorable capitulation from the Sultan, who admired and respected his virtue, he surrendered the town, which was reduced to a heap of rubbish, and destitute of every resource. Charles and Francis, ashamed of having occasioned such a loss to Christendom by their ambitious contests, endeavored to throw the blame of it on each other ; while all Europe, with greater justice, imputed it equally to both. The Emperor, by way of reparation, granted the Knights of St. John the small island of Malta, in which they fixed their residence, retaining, though with less power and splendor, their ancient spirit and implacable enmity to the infidels.--*Robertson*.

- (8) On Linden, when the sun was low,  
 All bloodless lay the untrodden snow ;  
 And dark as winter was the flow  
     Of Iser rolling rapidly.  
 But Linden saw another sight,  
 When the drum beat, at dead of night,  
 Commanding fires of death to light  
     The darkness of her scenery.

By torch and trumpet fast arrayed,  
 Each horseman drew his battle-blade,  
 And furious every charger neigh'd,  
     To join the dreadful revelry.  
 Then shook the hills, with thunder riven,  
 And, louder than the bolts of Heaven,  
     Far flash'd the red artillery.  
 But redder yet that light shall glow  
 On Linden's hills of stainèd snow,  
 And bloodier yet the torrent flow  
     Of Iser, rolling rapidly.  
 'Tis morn ; but scarce yon level sun  
 Can pierce the war-clouds, rolling dun,  
 Where furious Frank and fiery Hun  
     Shout in their sulph'rous canopy.  
 The combat deepens. On, ye brave  
 Who rush to glory or the grave !  
 Wave Munich, all thy banners wave,  
 And charge with all thy chivalry !  
 Few, few shall part, where many meet !  
 The snow shall be their winding sheet,  
 And every turf beneath their feet  
     Shall be a soldier's sepulchre.—*Campbell.*

(4) I have mentioned that I saved the skins of all the creatures that I killed, I mean the four-footed ones, and I had them hung up stretched out with sticks in the sun, by which means some of them were so dry and hard that they were fit for little, but others, it seems, were very useful. The first thing I made of these was a great cap for my head, with the hair on the outside, to shoot off the rain ; and this I performed so well that, after, I made me a suit of clothes wholly of those skins—that is to say, a waistcoat, and breeches open at the knees, and both loose, for they were rather wanting to keep me cool than to keep me warm. I must not omit to acknowledge that they were wretchedly made ; for if I was a good carpenter, I was a worse tailor. However, they were such as I made a very good shift with, and when I was abroad

if it happened to rain, the hair of the waistcoat and cap being outermost, I was kept very dry.

After this, I spent a great deal of time and pains to make an umbrella. I was indeed in great want of one, and had a great mind to make one. I had seen them made in the Brazils, where they are very useful in the great heats which are there, and I felt the heats every jot as great here, and greater too, being nearer the equinox ; besides, as I was obliged to be much abroad, it was a most useful thing to me, as well for the rains as the heats. I took a world of pains at it, and was a great while before I could make any thing likely to hold ; nay, after I thought I had hit the way, I spoiled two or three before I made one to my mind. But at last I made one that answered indifferently well ; the main difficulty I found was to make it let down ; I could make it spread, but if it did not let down too, and draw in, it would not be portable for me any way but just over my head, which would not do. However, at last, as I said, I made one to answer. I covered it with skins, the hair upwards, so that it cast off the rain like a penthouse, and kept off the sun so effectually that I could walk out in the hottest of the weather with greater advantage than I could before in the coolest, and when I had no need of it I could close it, and carry it under my arm.—*Defoe's Robinson Crusoe.*

3. Criticise the following Definitions, and show wherein they are defective.

(1) Life is vitality, the state of being alive, the opposite of death.

(2) A triangle is half a parallelogram.

(3) A triangle is a figure having three rectilinear sides.

(4) A fish is an animal that lives in water.

(5) A parallelogram is a figure of four parallel and equal sides.

(6) Capital is that portion of the produce of industry which can be made directly available to support human existence or facilitate production.—*M' Culloch.*



(7) Rent is what is paid for the license to gather the produce of the land.—*Smith*.

(8) A figure, in Rhetoric, is some deviation from the plain and ordinary mode of expression, with a view of making the meaning more effective.—*Hart*.

(9) A fallacy is any unsound mode of reasoning which appears to demand our conviction, and to be decisive of the question in hand, when in fairness it is not.—*Whately*.

(10) See the definitions of Poetry given in the Introduction.

4. Criticise the following examples of Division, and point out the defects.

(1) Government is either monarchical, democratic, or aristocratic.

(2) All objects are animals, vegetables, or lifeless matter

(3) Europeans are white, foreign-born, or descendants of foreigners.

(4) All men are either rational or unreasonable.

(5) Language is to be studied in three sciences: Grammar, Logic, and Rhetoric.

(6) Plane figures are triangles, squares, polygons, circles or ellipses.

(7) Sentences, considered rhetorically, are divided into Periodic, Loose, Balanced, Short, and Long.—*Hart*.

(8) Practical convenience is served by a reference to the different occasions of Oratory; each giving rise to a distinct method and constituting a separate professional study.

I. The Oratory of the Law Courts.

II. Political Oratory.

III. Pulpit Oratory.

IV. Moral Suasion.—*Bain*.

(9) We can know only (a) Substance, (b) Quantity, (c) Quality, (d) Relation, (e) Action, (f) Passion, (g) the Where, (h) the When, (i) Position, (j) Possession.—*Aristotle*.

(10) Written discourse, in prose, may be divided, according to the subject itself and its just treatment, into Letters, History, Biography, Essays, and Prose Fiction.—*Coppée*.

5. Criticise the following specimens of Exposition through concomitant notions.

(1) To the question what the thing we speak of is, or what this facetiousness doth impart? I might reply as Democritus did to him that asked the definition of a man, 'Tis that which we all see and know; any one better apprehends what it is by acquaintance than I can inform him by description. It is indeed a thing so versatile and multiform, appearing in so many shapes, so many postures, so many garbs, so variously apprehended by several eyes and judgments, that it seemeth no less hard to settle a clear and certain notion thereof, than to make a portrait of Proteus, or to define the figure of a fleeting air. Sometimes it lieth in pat allusion to a known story, or in a seasonable application of a trivial saying, or in forging an apposite tale: sometimes it playeth in words and phrases, taking advantage from the ambiguity of their sense, or the affinity of their sound: sometimes it is wrapped in a dress of humorous expression: sometimes it lurketh under an odd similitude: sometimes it is lodged in a sly question, in a smart answer, in a quirkish reason, in a shrewd imitation, in cunningly diverting, or cleverly retorting an objection: sometimes it is couched in a bold scheme of speech, in a tart irony, in a lusty hyperbole, in a startling metaphor, in a plausible reconciling of contradictions, or in acute nonsense: sometimes a scenical representation of persons or things, a counterfeit speech, a mimical look or gesture passeth for it: sometimes an affected simplicity, sometimes a presumptuous bluntness, giveth it being: sometimes it riseth from a lucky hitting upon what is strange: sometimes from a crafty wresting obvious matter to the purpose: often it consisteth in one knows not what, and springeth up one can hardly tell how. Its ways are unaccountable and inexplicable, being answerable to the numberless roving of fancy and windings of language. It is, in short, a manner of speaking out of the simple and plain way (such as reason teacheth and proveth things by), which, by a pretty surprising uncouthness is

conceit or expression, doth affect and amuse the fancy, stirring in it some wonder, and breeding some delight thereto.

—*Barrow.*

(2) I call it atheism by establishment, when any state, as such, shall not acknowledge the existence of God as a moral governor of the world ; when it shall abolish the Christian religion by a regular decree ; when it shall persecute with a cold, unrelenting, steady cruelty, by every mode of confiscation, imprisonment, exile, and death, all its ministers ; when it shall generally shut up or pull down churches ; when in the place of that religion of social benevolence, and of individual self-denial, in mockery of all religion, they institute impious, blasphemous, indecent, theatric rules, in honor of their vitiated, perverted reason, and erect altars to the personification of their own corrupted and bloody republic ; when schools and seminaries are founded at the public expense to poison mankind, from generation to generation, with the horrible maxims of this impiety ; when wearied out with incessant martyrdom and the cries of a people hungering and thirsting for religion, they permit it as a tolerated evil—I call this atheism by establishment.—*Burke.*

#### 6. Classify and criticise the following Arguments.

(1) We differ from the leaf only in this circumstance, that it would require the operation of greater elements to destroy us. But these elements exist. The fire which rages within may lift its devouring energy to the surface of our planet, and transform it into one wide and wasting volcano. The sudden formation of elastic matter in the bowels of the earth—and it lies within the agency of known substances to accomplish this—may explode it into fragments. The exhalation of noxious air from below may impart virulence to the air that is around us ; it may affect the delicate proportion of its ingredients ; and the whole of animated nature may wither and die under the malignity of a tainted atmosphere. A blazing comet may cross this fated planet in its orbit, and realize all the terrors which superstition has conceived of it

We cannot anticipate with precision the consequences of an event which every astronomer must know to lie within the limits of chance and probability. It may hurry our globe towards the sun, or drag it to the outer regions of the planetary system, or give it a new axis of revolution.  
— *Chalmers.*

(2) If a father, who, when he provides a home for his children, fits it up with all the necessities and all the luxuries which they can possibly need, gives indisputable evidence of intelligence and love, then are those attributes to be ascribed to Him who fitted up this world to be the home of his creatures. This is seen, as already intimated, in the constitution of the atmosphere, in the distribution of light and heat, of electricity and magnetism, in the establishment of those laws which secure the regular succession of the seasons, in the preparation of soil by the disintegration of rocks, the falling of rain, the deposition of dew which falls gently with life-giving power on the thirsty earth ; in innumerable other provisions and dispositions of the forces of nature without which neither vegetable nor animal life could be sustained. There are many special provisions of this kind which fill the mind with gratitude and wonder. It is a general law that bodies contract as they become colder. Water, however, when it freezes expands and becomes lighter. If it were not for this benevolent exception to the general law, not only would the inhabitants of all our rivers perish, but the greater part of the temperate zone would be uninhabitable.— *Hodge.*

(3) It has been frequently remarked, that the period of the highest literary glory of civilized nations is generally found to follow close on some remarkable or portentous achievements in commerce or in war. Among the ancient Greeks, the combination of great literary names in the age of Pericles follows the defeat of the Persians. The Roman age of Augustus, when that mighty nation was resting from her conquests, produced the same galaxy of genius. In the same way, the famous literary age of Louis XIV. was certainly

prepared, if not produced, by the religious wars of the Reformation, and after the national enthusiasm had been excited by the success of the French arms in Germany and Flanders. In our own case, a gigantic revolution had been accomplished. The intellect of England had been engaged in a violent struggle for religious liberty, and the nation now started on its race of poetical immortality.—*Graham.*

(4) Julian, the emperor, united intelligence, learning, and power, with a persecuting zeal, in a resolute effort to root out Christianity. In the year 361, he composed a work against its claims. We may be well assured that if any thing could have been said against the authenticity of its books, he would have used it. His work is not extant; but from long extracts, found in the answer by Cyril, a few years after, as well as from the statements of his opinions and arguments by this writer, it is unquestionable that Julian bore witness to the authenticity of the four Gospels and of the Acts of the Apostles. He concedes, and argues from their early date, quotes them by name as the genuine works of their reputed authors; proceeds upon the supposition, as a thing undeniable, that they were the only historical books which Christians received as canonical—the only authentic narratives of Christ and his Apostles, and of the doctrine they delivered. He has also quoted, or plainly referred to, the Epistles to the Romans, Corinthians, and Galatians, and nowhere insinuates that the authenticity of any portion of the New Testament could reasonably be questioned.—*M'Ilvaine.*

(5) There is nothing more pernicious to the character than to listen to flattery. It increases our vanity, gives us a false idea of ourselves, and becomes an insurmountable barrier to all improvement. For it is obviously impossible for any one who believes all the fulsome adulation poured into his ear, to make any progress either in knowledge or virtue; and he is sure at length to fall a victim to one who will profit by his folly. Had not the crow lent a willing ear to the artful insinuations of the fox, she would not have had to mourn when too late, the consequences of her silly vanity.

7. In the following exercises on the Barbarism these questions should be asked :

- (1) What is the ORIGIN of this word ?
- (2) If foreign, has it been NATURALIZED ?
- (3) If old, is it OBSOLETE ?
- (4) Is it formed according to the ANALOGY of the language ?
- (5) Is it either TECHNICAL or LOCAL ?
- (6) What AUTHORITY can be quoted for it ?

(1) The missionary work held Lota by a double chain ; it was a birthright and a vocation—that is, as far as other people can *vocate* for a girl.—*Putnam's Magazine*.

(2) The young but inactive half Mexican, who smiled at Caleb's infrequent jokes and listened a good deal when Caleb *orated* and the boss of the schooner slept.—*Overland Monthly*.

(3) As he saith, our whole life is a *glucupicron*, a bitter sweet passion, honey and gall mixed together.—*Burton*.

(4) I was *chez moi*, inhaling the *odeur musquée* of my scented *oudoir*, when the Prince de Z. entered. He found me in my *demi-toilette*, *blasée sur tout*, and pensively engaged in solitary conjugation of the verb *s'ennuyer* ; and though he had never been one of my *habituels*, or by any means *des nôtres*, I was not disinclined, at this moment of *délassement* to glide with him into the *crocchio ristretto* of familiar chat.—*New Monthly Magazine*.

(5) When we came to *settle* for the wine.—*Howells*.

(6) The invention described in yesterday's "Times," and displayed on Saturday in Newark, by which a person who may happen to be buried alive, is enabled to *resurrect* himself from the grave, may lead some people to fancy there is actual danger of being buried alive.—*New York Times*.

(7) It seems that this State, so quickly *enthused* by the generous loyal cause of emancipation, has grown weary of virtuous effort, and again stands still.—*Baltimore American*.

(8) The trials of the witches awaken, by turns, pity, indignation, disgust, and dread—dread at the thought of what

the human mind can be brought to believe not only probable, but *proven*.—*Lowell*.

(9) A *fardel* of never ending misery and suspense.—*Murryatt*.

(10) Mine ancient wound is hardly whole,  
And *lets* me from the saddle.—*Tennyson*.

8. In the following exercises on Homonyms, the student should give *all the possible meanings* of the words given. As language was spoken before it was written, a word is a certain sound or combination of sounds without regard to the spelling.

(1) Round, (2) Light, (3) Church, (4) Government, (5) Truth, (6) Value, (7) Same, (8) Why, (9) Cause, (10) Reason, (11) Authority, (12) Faith, (13) Time, (14) Person, (15) Certain, (16) One, (17) Experience, (18) Necessity, (19) Possibility, (20) Law.

9. In the following groups of words, point out the distinctions of meaning, giving especial attention to the differential part of words having the same radical.

(1) Corporal, corporeal. (2) Subtle, subtile. (3) Observance, observation. (4) Construe, construct. (5) Prediction, predication. (6) Learned, learnt. (7) Stationary, stationery. (8) Inconsistent, incongruous, incoherent. (9) Sympathy, compassion, commiseration, condolence. (10) Thwart, oppose, resist, withstand. (11) Oculist, optician, eye-doctor. (12) Custom, habit, usage. (13) Discover, invent. (14) By, with. (15) Sufficient, enough. (16) Thoughtless, remiss, careless, negligent. (17) Tenet, position, doctrine, creed, dogma. (18) Social, sociable. (19) Opinion, belief, sentiment, notion, idea. (20) Weak, feeble, infirm.

10. The following specimens of Tautology may be corrected.

(1) Particularly as to the affairs of this world, integrity hath many advantages over all the fine and artificial ways of

dissimulation and deceit ; it is much the plainer and easier, much the safer and more secure way of dealing with the world ; it has less of trouble and difficulty, of entanglement and perplexity, of danger and hazard in it. The arts of deceit and cunning do continually grow weaker, and less effectual and serviceable to them that use them.—*Tillotson*.

(2) It is impossible for us to behold the divine works with coldness or indifference, or to survey so many beauties without a secret satisfaction and complacency.—*Addison*.

(3) In the Attic commonwealth, it was the privilege and birthright of every citizen and poet, to rail aloud and in public.—*Swift*.

(4) He [Pryor] had often infused into it [his style] much knowledge and much thought ; he had often polished it into elegance, often dignified it into splendor, and sometimes heightened it to sublimity ; and did not discover that it wanted the power of engaging attention, and alluring curiosity.—*Johnson*.

(5) The very first discovery of it [beauty] strikes the mind with inward joy, and spreads delight through all its faculties.—*Addison*.

(6) How many are there by whom these tidings of good news were never heard.—*Bolingbroke*.

(7) Never did Atticus succeed better in gaining the universal love and esteem of all men.—*Spectator*.

(8) I could heartily wish there was the same application and endeavors to cultivate and improve our church music as have been lately bestowed on that of the stage.—*Addison*.

#### 11. Correct the Redundancies in the following.

(1) Magnanimity and greatness of mind.—*Ferguson*.

(2) The mysteries of the arcana of alchemy.—*D'Israeli*.

(3) The vice of covetousness is what enters deeper into the soul than any other.—*Guardian*.

(4) There is such a thing as a man endeavoring to persuade himself and endeavoring to persuade others, that he knows about things, when he does not know more than the outside



ains of them ; and he goes flourishing about with them.--*Carlyle.*

(5) He is always delightfully fresh, because he sets before us the world as it honestly appeared to Geoffrey Chaucer, and not a world as it seemed proper to certain persons that it ought to appear.—*Lowell.*

(6) Aristotle's style, which is frequently so elliptical as to be dry and obscure, is yet often, at the very same time, unnecessarily diffuse.—*Whately.*

(7) As has been formerly remarked, a well-chosen epithet may often suggest, and therefore supply the place of an entire argument.—*Whately.*

### 12. Avoid the Circumlocution in the following.

(1) Pope professed to have learned his poetry from Dryden, whom, whenever an opportunity was presented, he praised through the whole period of his existence with unvaried liberality ; and perhaps his character may receive some illustration, if a comparison be instituted between him and the man whose pupil he was.—*Johnson.*

(2) If one were called on to fix the period in the history of the world during which the condition of the human race was most happy and prosperous, one would, without hesitation, name that which elapsed from the death of Domitian to the succession of Commodus.—*Gibbon.*

### 13. Criticise the Arrangement of words in the following.

(1) All that is favored by good use is not proper to be obtained.—*Lindley Murray.*

(2) I allude to the article "Blind," in the Encyclopedia Britannica, published at Edinburgh in the year 1783, which was written by him.—*Mackenzie.*

(3) And these are inserted by the composers without the slightest compunction.—*Alford.*

(4) A man does not lose his mother now in the papers.—*Alford.*

(5) I only bring forward some things.—*Alford*.

(6) I remember when the French band of the "Guides" were in this country, reading in the "Illustrated News."—*Alford*.

(7) I have noticed the word "party" used for an individual occurring in Shakespeare.—*Alford*.

(8) Though some of the European rulers may be females, when spoken of altogether, they may be correctly classified under the denomination "Kings."—*Alford*.

(9) Had I but served my God, with half the zeal  
I served my king, he would not in mine age  
Have left me naked to mine enemies.—*Shakespeare*.

(10) This art can only be obtained by the habitual study of his sensations.—*D'Israeli*.

(11) Errors are sometimes committed by the most distinguished writers, with respect to the use of "shall" and "will."—*Butler's Grammar*.

(12) Thus I have fairly given you, sir, my own opinion, as well as that of a great majority of both houses here, relating to this weighty affair; upon which I am confident you may securely reckon.—*Swift*.

(13) These forms of conversation by degrees multiplied and grew troublesome.—*Spectator*.

14. In the following exercises, the sentences should be reconstructed, and, if necessary, subdivided, so as to avoid long Parenthetical Expressions.

(1) It seems to me, that, in order to maintain the system of the world, at a certain point, far below that of ideal perfection, (for we are made capable of conceiving what we are incapable of attaining) but, however, sufficient, upon the whole, to constitute a state easy and happy, or at the worst, tolerable; I say, it seems to me, that the Author of Nature has thought fit to mingle, from time to time, among the societies of men, a few, and but a few, of those on whom he is graciously pleased to bestow a larger portion of the ethereal

spirit, than is given, in the ordinary course of his government, to the sons of men.—*Bolingbroke.*

(2) He (Sir W. Grant) possessed the first great quality of dispatching business (the real, not the affected dispatch of Lord Bacon), the power of steadily fixing his attention upon the matter before him.—*Brougham.*

(3) The famous poisoned valley of Java (which, as Mr. Loudon, a recent traveler in that region, informs us, is twenty miles in length and is filled with skeletons of men and birds; and into which it is said that the neighboring tribes are in the habit of driving criminals, as a convenient mode of executing capital punishment) has proved to be the crater of an extinct volcano.

(4) This would be the proper place for introducing (if I did not hesitate to introduce in any connection with merely human instances) the example of him who said, etc.—*John Foster.*

15. In the following exercises such words as are improperly omitted, should be supplied.

(1) Arbitrary power I look upon as a greater evil than anarchy itself, as much as a savage is a happier state of life than a galley-slave.

(2) He is inspired with a true sense of that function, when chosen from a regard to the interests of piety or virtue.—*Guardian.*

(3) I beg of you never let the glory of our nation, who made France tremble, and yet has the gentleness to be unable to bear opposition from the meanest of his own countrymen, be calumniated in so impudent a manner, as in the insinuation that he affected a perpetual dictatorship.—*Steele.*

(4) He meets with a secret refreshment in a description, and often feels a greater satisfaction in the prospect of fields and meadows than another does in the possession.—*Addison.*

(5) And while he hesitated, the lady asked him was he come to finish the bust.—*Charles Reade.*

(6) Ere he thoroughly recovered the shock a wild cry arose.—*Charles Reade*.

(7) Had Darnley proved the useful Catholic which the Queen intended him to be, they would have sent him to his account with as small compunction as Jael sent the Canaanite captain, or they would have blessed the arm that did it with as much eloquence as Deborah.—*Froude*.

(8) Hence the reason is perspicuous why no French plays when translated have, or ever can, succeed on the English stage.—*Dryden*.

(9) The following facts may or have been adduced as reasons on the other side.—*Latham*.

16. So divide or reconstruct the sentences in the following exercises as to secure Unity of Idea. Point out in what respect Unity is violated.

(1) He [Prior] is supposed to have fallen by his father's death into the hands of his uncle, a vintner near Charing Cross, who sent him for some time to Dr. Busby at Westminster, but not intending to give any education beyond that of the school, took him when he was well advanced in literature to his own house, where the Earl of Dorset, celebrated for patronage of genius, found him by chance, as Burnet relates, reading Horace, and was so well pleased with his proficiency, that he undertook the care and cost of his academical education.—*Johnson*.

(2) In this uneasy state, both of his public and private life, Cicero was oppressed by a new and cruel affliction, the death of his beloved daughter Tullia ; which happened soon after her divorce from Dolabella ; whose manners and humors were entirely disagreeable to her.—*Middleton*.

(3) It [the sun] breaks the icy fetters of the main, where vast sea-monsters pierce through floating islands, with arms which can withstand the crystal rock ; whilst others, who of themselves seem great as islands, are by their bulk alone armed against all but man ; whose superiority over creatures of such stupendous size and force, should make him mindful of his

privilege of reason, and force him humbly to adore the great composer of these wondrous frames, and the author of his own superior wisdom.—*Shaftesbury*.

(4) To this succeeded the licentiousness which entered with the restoration, and from infecting our religion and morals, fell to corrupt our language ; which last was not like to be much improved by those who at that time made up the court of King Charles II. ; either such who had followed him in his banishment, or who had been altogether conversant in the dialect of those fanatic times ; or young men who had been educated in the same company : so that the court which used to be the standard of propriety and correctness of speech was then, and I think hath ever since continued, the worst school in England for that accomplishment, and so will remain till better care be taken in the education of our young nobility, that they may set out into the world with some foundation of literature, in order to qualify them for patterns of politeness.—*Swift*.

(5) The usual acceptance takes profit and pleasure for two different things, and not only calls the followers or votaries of them by the several names of busy and idle men, but distinguishes the faculties of the mind, that are conversant about them ; calling the operation of the first, wisdom, and of the other wit—which is a Saxon word, used to express what the Spaniards and Italians call *ingenio*, and the French, *esprit*, both from the Latin ; though I think wit more particularly signifies that of poetry, as may occur in remarks on the Runic language.—*Sir W. Temple*.

(6) After a short time he came to himself ; and the next day they put him on board his ship, which conveyed him first to Corinth, and thence to the island of Egina.—*Hook*.

(7) The Britons, daily harassed by cruel inroads from the Picts, were forced to call in the Saxons for their defence, who consequently reduced the greatest part of the island to their power, drove the Britons into the most remote and mountainous parts, and the rest of the country, in customs, religion and language, became wholly Saxon.—*Swift*.

17. In the following exercises, point out which sentences are Periodic, which Loose, and which Balanced. If another form would be better suited to the idea, so modify the structure as to make the form and meaning correspond.

(1) Gathering up barely a portion of what I had written for publication, I have given it as careful a revision as my leisure would allow, have indeed in many parts rewritten it, seeking to profit by the results of the latest criticism, as far as I have been able to acquaint myself with them.—*Trench.*

(2) He was grave, trifling, zealous and untrue.

(3) Deep in the shady sadness of a vale  
Far sunken from the healthy breath of morn,  
Far from the fiery noon and eve's one star  
Sat gray-haired Saturn, quiet as a stone.—*Keats.*

(4) Of man's first disobedience, and the fruit  
Of that forbidden tree, whose mortal touch  
Brought death into the world, and all our woe,  
With loss of Eden, till one greater Man  
Restore us, and regain the blissful seat,  
Sing heavenly Muse, that on the secret top  
Of Oreb, or of Sinai, didst inspire  
That shepherd, who first taught the chosen seed,  
In the beginning how the heaven and earth  
Rose out of chaos : or, if Sion hill  
Delight thee more, and Siloa's brook that flowed  
Fast by the oracle of God, I thence  
Invoke thy aid to my adventurous song,  
That with no middle flight intends to soar  
Above the Aonian mount, while it pursues  
Things unattempted yet in prose or rhyme.—*Milton*

18. In the following exercises on Figures, the student should ask these questions.

(1) On what PRINCIPLE is this figure founded ?

(2) What is its specific NAME ?

(3) Is it CORRECT ?

(4) If correct, wherein lies its VALUE ?

(5) If incorrect, wherein lies its DEFECT ?

(6) What OTHER FIGURE would express the same idea ?

(1) To Adam, Paradise was a home ; to the good among his descendants, Home is a paradise.—*Hare*.

(2) And pity, like a naked new-born babe,  
Striding the blast, as heaven's Cherubim horsed  
Upon the sightless couriers of the air,  
Shall blow the horrid deed in every eye,  
That tears shall drown the wind.—*Shakespeare*.

(3) Fancy sports an airy wing, like a meteor on the bosom of a summer cloud.—*Burke*.

(4) We feel the strength of mind through the beauty of the style ; we discern the man in the author, the nation in the man, and the universe at the feet of the nation.—*De Staël*.

(5)

An elm is

A forest waving on a single tree.—*Holmes*.

(6) Greece cries to us by the convulsed lips of her poisoned lying Demosthenes ; and Rome pleads with us in the mute persuasion of her mangled Tully.—*Edward Everett*.

(7) Even then, before this splendid orb was entirely set, and while the western horizon was in a blaze with his descending glory, on the opposite quarter of the heavens arose another luminary, and for his hour became lord of the ascendant.—*Burke*.

(8) These institutions attract to themselves the mental strength of the land, forming a focus from which radiates, whether in Theology, Science, Literature or Art, the new world of thought, which finds its way to the remotest regions, often filtered and unacknowledged.—*Matthew Arnold*.

(9) There Honor comes, a pilgrim gray,  
To deck the turf that wraps their clay ;  
And Freedom shall a while repair  
To dwell a weeping hermit there.—*Coleridge*

(10) **Belinda smiled, and all the world was gay.**—*Pope.*

(11) The poems of Byron are as the scenes of a summer evening, where all is tender, and grand, and beautiful; but the damps of disease descend with the dews of heaven, and the pestilent vapors of night are breathed in with the fragrance and the balm, and the delicate and the fair are the surest victims of the exposure.—*Frisbie.*

(12) This is the history of the world, and all that is in it. It passes while we look at it. Like as when you watch the melting tints of the evening sky—purple, crimson, gorgeous gold, a few pulsations of quivering light, and it is all gone.—*Robertson.*

(13) Of the nineteen tyrants who started up under the reign of Gallienus, there was not one who enjoyed a life of peace or a natural death.—*Gibbon.*

(14) A sail! a sail! a promised prize to hope,  
Her nation's flag—how speaks the telescope?  
No prize, alas! but yet a welcome sail.—*Byron.*

(15) **Better fifty years of Europe than a cycle of Cathay.**—*Tennyson.*

(16) Homer calls words winged; and the epithet is peculiarly appropriate to his, which do indeed seem to fly, so rapid and light is their motion, and which have been flying ever since over the whole peopled earth, and still hover and brood over many an awakened soul. Latin marches, Italian struts, French hops, English walks, German rumbles along. The music of Klopstock's hexameter is not unlike the tune with which a broad-wheeled wagon tries to solace itself when crawling down a hill. But Greek flies, especially in Homer.—*Hare.*

(17) I am a Royalist, I blushed for the degradation of the crown. I am a Whig, I blushed for the dishonor of Parliament. I am a true Englishman, I felt to the quick for the disgrace of England. I am a man, I felt for the melancholy reverse of human affairs in the fall of the first power in the world.—*Burke.*



18) To one so gifted with the prodigality of heaven can we approach in any other attitude than of prostration.—*Gilfillan.*

- (19) Nor durst begin  
To speak, but wisely kept the fool within.—*Dryden.*
- (20) Walk thoughtful on the silent, solemn shore  
Of that vast ocean it must sail so soon ;  
And put good works on board ; and wait the wind  
That shortly blows us unto worlds unknown.—*Young.*
- (21) I bridle in my struggling muse with pain,  
That longs to launch into a nobler strain.—*Addison.*
- (22) I will bury myself in my books, and the Devil may pipe  
to his own.—*Tennyson.*

(23) The mind of Elizabeth was like one of those ancient Druidical monuments called rocking-stones. The finger of Cupid, boy as he is painted, could put her feelings in motion ; but the power of Hercules could not have destroyed their equilibrium.—*Scott.*

(24) I was sailing in a vast ocean without other help than the pole-star of the ancients, and the rules of the French stage among the moderns.—*Dryden.*

(25) He [Cromwell] set up Parliaments by the stroke of his pen, and scattered them with the breath of his mouth.—*Cowley.*

- (26) Men may come, and men may go,  
But I [the brook] go on forever.—*Tennyson.*
- (27) So frowned the mighty combatants, that hell  
Grew darker at their frown.—*Milton.*
- (28) Yon row of visionary pines,  
By twilight glimpse discovered ! Mark how they flee  
From the fierce sea-blast, all their tresses wild  
Streaming before them.—*Wordsworth.*
- (29) Talent convinces ; Genius but excites :  
This tasks the reason ; that the soul delights.  
Talent from sober judgment takes its birth,  
And reconciles the pinion to the earth :

Genius unsettles with desires the mind,  
 Contented not till earth be left behind.  
 Talent, the sunshine on a cultured soil,  
 Ripens the fruit by slow degrees for toil ;  
 Genius the golden Iris of the skies,  
 On cloud itself reflects its wondrous dyes,  
 And to the earth in tears and glory given,  
 Clasps in its airy arch the pomp of heaven.—*Bulwer.*

(30) The moral and political system of Hobbes was a palace of ice : transparent, exactly proportioned, majestic, admired by the unwary as a delightful dwelling ; but gradually undermined by the central warmth of human feeling, before it was thawed into muddy water by the sunshine of true philosophy.—*Mackintosh.*

(31) And it came to pass at noon that Elijah mocked them, and said, "Cry aloud ; for he is a god : either he is talking, or he is pursuing, or he is in a journey, or peradventure he sleepeth, and must be awaked."—*Bible.*

(32)                   The universal host upsent  
 A shout that tore Hell's concave, and beyond  
 Frighted the reign of Chaos and old Night.—*Milton.*

(33) There is a period in the history of Europe when every commotion on its surface was occasioned by one cause deeply seated, like the internal fire that is supposed to have produced the earthquake of Lisbon. This cause was the Reformation. From 1520 to 1649 the Reformation was the great lever of Europe.—*Lord John Russell.*

(34) Wit laughs at things ; Humor laughs with them. Wit lashes external appearances, or cunningly exaggerates single foibles into character ; Humor glides into the heart of its objects, looks lovingly on the infirmities it detects, and represents the whole man. Wit is abrupt, darting, scornful, and tosses its analogies in your face ; Humor is slow and shy. Insinuating its fun into your heart. Wit is negative, analytical, destructive ; Humor is creative.—*Whipple.*

(35) As in the hollow breast of Apennine,  
 Beneath the shelter of encircling hills,  
 A myrtle rises, far from human eyes,  
 And breathes its balmy fragrance on the wild  
 So flourished, blooming and unseen by all,  
 The sweet Lavinia.—*Pope*.

(36) He [Gower] is the Undertaker of the fair mediæva' legend; and his style has the hateful, the seemingly un-natural length of a coffin.—*Lowell*.

(37) He did not establish a throne surrounded by republican institutions, but a republic surrounded by the ghost of monarchical institutions.—*Alison*.

(38) Language is the amber in which a thousand precious thoughts have been safely imbedded and preserved.—*Trench*.

(39) O for a beaker full of the warm South.—*Keats*.

19. Point out the faults in the following sentences and their effect upon the Feelings.

(1) That man made me miss my mark.—*Alison*.

(2) St. Augustine lived holily and godlily.

(3) It is quite proper that a character should be pervaded by a spirit of humility, but this feeling should never be allowed to degenerate into servility.

(4) Antony has done his part. He holds the gorgeous East in fee. He has revenged Crassus. He will make kings, though he be none. He is amusing himself, and Rome must bear with him. He has his griefs as well as Cæsar. Let the sword settle their disputes. But he is no longer the man to leave Cleopatra behind.

(5) The general idea of good or bad fortune, therefore, creates some concern for the person who has met with it; but the general idea of provocation excites no sympathy with the anger of the man who has received it. Nature, it seems, teaches us to be more averse to enter into this passion, and till informed of its cause, to be disposed rather to take part against it.

- (6) And those that leave their valiant bones in France,  
 Dying like men, though buried in your dunghills,  
 They shall be famed ; for there the sun shall greet them,  
 And draw their reeking honors up to heaven.—*Shakespeare*
- 7 Loud as a bull makes hill and valley ring,  
 So roared the lock when it released the spring.—*Pope*.
- 8<sup>1</sup> Superior beings, when of late they saw  
 A mortal man unfold all nature's law,  
 Admired such wisdom in an earthly shape,  
 And showed a Newton as we show an ape.—*Pope*.

## II.

### EXERCISES IN CONSTRUCTION.

WHILE great importance is attached to the preceding exercises in criticism, it is believed to be of still greater moment that every student should be able to realize a high degree of excellence in his own compositions. To this end the teacher should insist upon a rigid drill in the following constructive exercises.

Although not strictly within the province of the rhetorician, *filling the mind with valuable ideas* should not be overlooked. Facts and the mental combination of facts by reflection upon them are the forces which produce changes in the minds of men. The rhetorician's art is feeble and even pernicious unless it be joined with a competent understanding of the subject-matter treated. The sources of information are (1) observation, (2) reflection, (3) conversation, and (4) reading. These are the sources of culture, and it is culture which makes rhetorical power truly effective. Rhetoric is but a *method*. The artist must have *material* or his skill is of little value.

1. Let the learner mention subjects suitable for the following classes of hearers or readers, and state what chief qualities the treatment should possess.

(1) A Sunday school. (2) A political mass-meeting. (3) A philosophical society. (4) An American jury. (5) A college literary society at its anniversary. (6) An educated Christian church. (7) A workingmen's association. (8) An infuriated mob. (9) Fashionable novel readers. (10) A "popular lecture audience."

2. Let the student make an analysis of the following themes in Description.

- (1) The Inland Waters of the United States.
- (2) An Ocean Steamer.
- (3) The most important Public Building in the town.
- (4) The Emotion of Patriotism.
- (5) The Love of Justice.
- (6) The Sentiment of Friendship.
- (7) The Character of Julius Cæsar.
- (8) The Character of Xenophon.
- (9) The Character of Abraham Lincoln.
- (10) True Manhood.

3. Write an outline of the following themes in Narration.

- (1) My School Life.
- (2) The Punic Wars.
- (3) The Life of Sir Walter Scott.
- (4) The Battle of Waterloo.
- (5) The Literature of the Age of Elizabeth.
- (6) The Discovery of America.
- (7) The History of Greece in the Time of Pericles.
- (8) The Story of the Holy Grail.
- (9) The Carboniferous Age.
- (10) The Genesis of Civilization.

## 4. Define the following Terms.

(1) Flattery. (2) Printing. (3) Geography. (4) Music  
 (5) Procrastination. (6) Education. (7) Philosophy. (8) Science. (9) Generosity. (10) Perception. (11) Language  
 (12) History. (13) A year. (14) Autobiography. (15) Man

5. Divide the classes denoted by the following Terms into species, according to some principle of your own selection.

(1) Words. (2) Sentences. (3) Languages. (4) Men. (5) Americans. (6) The Sciences. (7) Merchants. (8) Mechanics. (9) Celestial bodies. (10) Bodies of water. (11) Occupations. (12) Sources of happiness. (13) Sources of value. (14) Governments. (15) Religions. (16) Amusements.

6. Explicate the following propositions by Definition or Division.

- (1) Prosperity depends on morality
- (2) Models improve practice.
- (3) Labor is necessary to success.
- (4) The press ought to be truthful.
- (5) Luxury is destructive of liberty
- (6) Climate affects character.
- (7) The fine arts are beneficial to civilization
- (8) Godliness is profitable unto all things.
- (9) Anxiety shortens life.
- (10) Love is the strongest bond of union.

7. Prove the following propositions by arguments from Cause to Effect.

- (1) Aaron Burr was a conspirator against his country.
- (2) Bonaparte, were he living, would change the geography of Europe.
- (3) The Government of the United States will endure forever.
- (4) The Christian religion will ultimately be universal.
- (5) Shakespeare could have been a great orator.

8. Prove the following propositions by arguments from Sign.

- (1) The globe has existed for ages longer than man.
- (2) There was civilization in Egypt four thousand years ago.
- (3) Man is an infinitely progressive being.
- (4) It is right to punish the murderer with death.
- (5) Jesus Christ rose from the dead.

9. Prove the following propositions by arguments from Resemblance.

- (1) Every language has its idioms.
- (2) Many benefits result from Invention.
- (3) The drama is an early form of literature.
- (4) Human life is transitory.
- (5) A precocious genius seldom becomes mature.
- (6) Perseverance ends in success.

10. The following questions may be discussed in class, according to the principles given in the text, the teacher presiding as critic, and pointing out errors in the conduct of the discussion.

- (1) *Resolved*, That the State should superintend all education within its borders.
- (2) *Resolved*, That the Electoral System of choosing the President of the United States should be abolished.
- (3) *Resolved*, That the physical sciences are more conducive to the highest prosperity of the race than the mental sciences.
- (4) *Resolved*, That the highest development of science and literature in the same individual is impossible.
- (5) *Resolved*, That the death penalty should be abolished.

11. While original composition is on the whole the best exercise on the laws of form, several easier processes are helpful in acquiring skill in expressing ideas. Some of these will be mentioned.

- (1) A *Paraphrase* consists in giving the exact thought of a

writer in different language. When poetry is turned into prose it is called Metaphrase. If the principles of Style are constantly kept in mind, it may prove a very profitable exercise. The extracts given in the Exercises in Criticism may be used for this purpose.

(2) *Abridgment* consists in giving the substance of a composition in fewer words. It is an aid in forming a terse, compact style, and should be frequently practiced. The following points are necessary to a good abridgment :

- (a) Give all the essentials, omitting minor details ;
- (b) Give them accurately and concisely ;
- (c) Give nothing not in the original work.

(3) *Translation* consists in expressing ideas in another language with the same clearness and force as they possess in the original. A good translation requires the observance of the following rules :

(a) The translation must represent the sense of the original without omission or addition.

(b) It must be idiomatic ; *i. e.* to an ordinary reader conversant only with the language in which the translation is made, it should appear to be a native production in word and phrase.

(c) It must possess the general spirit of the original, as regards simplicity, grace, magnificence, and other qualities.

Extemporaneous translation is recommended by Mr. Marsh as a help to the acquisition of a wide vocabulary.


12. The end of all constructive effort is Original Composition. The best way to acquire good habits of expression is to write much and carefully. The first efforts in any art must be self-conscious, but habit soon controls us almost entirely, and we write well or ill according as we have been trained. Principles will at first retard our fluency and, possibly, even give an air of artificiality to our expression ; but gracefulness and power will finally vindicate Art, and prove her



only a perfected Nature. A few brief suggestions may assist the composer :

- (1) Select a theme which interests you.
- (2) Think about it until you have started questions which you cannot answer.
- (3) Seek these answers from men and libraries.
- (4) Form your own opinions distinctly.
- (5) Prepare a full analysis before you write.
- (6) Follow faithfully the laws of expression.
- (7) Lay your composition aside, if possible, until its contents are out of your mind.
- (8) Criticise it as if you were not its author, and be sure that you understand just what you meant to say.





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